The Aleutian Islands campaign

The Aleutian Islands campaign was a military campaign conducted by the United States, Canada, and Japan in the Aleutian Islands, part of the Territory of Alaska, in the American Theater and the Pacific Theater of World War II starting on June 3, 1942. In the only two invasions of the United States during the war of a U.S. incorporated territory, a small Japanese force occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska, where the remoteness of the islands and the challenges of weather and terrain delayed a larger American-Canadian force sent to eject them for nearly a year. Successful Japanese invasions of other U.S. territories, which were unincorporated territories, in the western Pacific shortly after the Attack on Pearl Harbor included Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. The islands' strategic value was their ability to control Pacific transportation routes as US General Billy Mitchell stated to the U.S. Congress in 1935, "I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world."

The Japanese reasoned that control of the Aleutians would prevent a possible US attack across the Northern Pacific. Similarly, the US feared that the islands would be used as bases from which to carry out a full-scale aerial attack on US West Coast cities like Anchorage, Seattle, San Francisco, or Los Angeles.

A battle to reclaim Attu was launched on May 11, 1943 and completed after a final Japanese banzai charge on May 29. On August 15, 1943, an invasion force landed on Kiska in the wake of a sustained three-week barrage, only to discover that the Japanese had withdrawn from the island on July 29.

The campaign is known as the "Forgotten Battle" because it has been overshadowed by other events in the war.

Military historians often believe that the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians was a diversionary or feint attack during the Battle of Midway that was meant to draw out the US Pacific Fleet from Midway Atoll, as it was launched simultaneously under the same commander, Isoroku Yamamoto. Some historians have argued against that interpretation and believe that the Japanese invaded the Aleutians to protect their northern flank and did not intend it as a diversion.

Hundreds of Alaska Natives were evacuated from their Aleutian homes on Atka, the Pribilofs, Unalaska, Umnak, and Akutan to the unfamiliar forested coves of Southeast Alaska. Only half of the Aleuts returned to the Aleutians. Of the eight prewar villages, Attu village, and Biorka, Kashega, and Makushin on Unalaska were never resettled.

The Eleventh Air Force (11 AF) is a Numbered Air Force of the United States Air Force Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). It is headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska.

11 AF plans, conducts, controls and coordinates air operations in accordance with the tasks assigned by the commander, Pacific Air Forces, and is the force provider for Alaskan Command, the Alaska North American Aerospace Defense Command Region and other unified commanders. The Commander, Eleventh Air Force, also serves as Commander, Alaskan Command, and as commander of the Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region. The NORAD mission is accomplished largely through the PACAF Regional Support Center (PRSC), the 611th Air and Space Operations Center, and units of the Alaska Air National Guard (AK ANG). Together, they carry out air surveillance, and command and control forces that provide tactical warning and attack assessment in defense of Alaska.

Established on 28 December 1941 as the Alaskan Air Force at Elmendorf Field, Alaska Territory. it was initially part of the United States Army Air Forces. It provided air defense of Alaska during World War II and fought in the Aleutian Islands Campaign. It was re-designated as the Alaskan Air Command in late 1945, and became responsible for the air defense of Alaska. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was transferred to the control of PACAF in 1990 and reduced to the status of a Numbered Air Force.

History

Early in 1940, the question of air defense of the Alaska Territory came into the limelight when President Roosevelt pointed out in his message to Congress requesting funds for fortification of Guam and Wake Islands and other strategic points in the Pacific that airfields were needed in Alaska. The original request for $12,000,000 to be appropriated for the construction of Alaskan defenses was cut to $600,000, but still was sufficient to begin the construction of an air base at Anchorage, Alaska. Thus was begun the construction of Elmendorf Field, primary fourth-echelon base for all future Eleventh Air Force operations. Construction of the airfield began on 8 June when 25 locally hired men began clearing brush, the Army intending it to be a permanent airfield.

The first "troops" of the Alaskan Air Force advance echelon to arrive in Alaska included a six-year-old Martin B-10 on 12 August 1940. On 12 December the Army designated the base Fort Richardson and flying field Elmendorf Field. The post was named for Brig Gen Wilds P. Richardson, former head of the Alaska Road Commission; the airfield and flying facilities were named Elmendorf Field in honor of Captain Hugh M. Elmendorf, killed in 1933 while flight testing an experimental fighter near Wright Field, Ohio.

The first Air Corps unit to be assigned to Alaska was the 18th Pursuit Squadron, which transferred to Elmendorf from Hamilton Army Airfield, California on 21 February 1941 with Curtiss P-40 Warhawks. The 23d Air Base Group was assigned shortly afterwards to provide base support. The 36th Bombardment Squadron arrived less than a month later from Lowry Field, Colorado, equipped with Douglas B-18 Bolo medium bombers.

A major problem was the training of personnel and the preparing of equipment for operation in the cold Alaskan climate. Mechanical things showed unusual behavior at 40 degrees below zero. Oil became almost solid, metal and rubber brittle and fractured easily. At the same time, Texas-trained pilots had to learn to fly in a country where sudden fogs could close out airports in less than 10 minutes and high-velocity "williwaws" could tear the wings off combat planes.

The first months activities of the new command were spent in reconnaissance for a rim of defense bases. The hub of this defense "wheel" was to be at Elmendorf Field near Anchorage. In the meantime, plans for the establishment of bases were moving slowly. Certain planned fields had to be constructed in summer, because the severe Alaskan frost in winter made construction impossible, but equipment for the construction of fields north of Nome and around Anchorage failed to arrive, and construction was postponed until the following summer. Construction had been completed, however, on two important coastal fields in southeastern Alaska, Annette Army Airfield at Annette Island and Yakutat Army Airfield at Yakutat, and the first direct all-weather air route to Alaska from Seattle was open.

An extremely fortunate accident took place in October 1941, which possibly changed the whole course of World War II in Alaska. Equipment for the construction of a CAA-DLA (Civil Aeronautics Authority-Defense Land Appropriation) airfield at McGrath, on the mainland, arrived too late to begin construction of the field, since the ground already had become frozen, and General Buckner requested and received permission to divert the equipment and men to Cold Bay on the Alaskan Peninsula and Otter Point on Umnak Island, to build two airfields for the defense of the Naval Base at Dutch Harbor. To conceal their purpose, both fields were organized as ostensible business enterprises concerned with fishing and canning. The two cover names were: "Blair Packing Company" and "Saxton & Company", whose peculiar canning equipment consisted of bulldozers, power shovels and similar construction equipment. The top holding-company for these enterprises was the "Consolidated Packing Company" of Anchorage, known in military circles as the Alaskan Defense Command. Security was complete. Japanese intelligence never learned of the existence of these airfields and the Japanese tactical decisions were based on the assumption that their attack on Dutch Harbor would not be opposed by land-based aircraft.

All through the winter of 1941–1942, men worked at the construction of these two air bases, and by spring, two 5,000-foot airstrips were completed, one at Cold Bay (Fort Randall Army Airfield), the other at Otter Point on Umnak (Fort Glenn Army Airfield). Another vital factor in the construction of the Umnak field was the use of perforated steel matting. No other medium could have been used to build that runway in the time required, since Umnak has no natural construction material. The matting was laid over a graded gash in the tundra and set the pattern for the construction of future Aleutian runways.

Early in 1940, the question of air defense of the Alaska Territory came into the limelight when President Roosevelt pointed out in his message to Congress requesting funds for fortification of Guam and Wake Islands and other strategic points in the Pacific that airfields were needed in Alaska. The original request for $12,000,000 to be appropriated for the construction of Alaskan defenses was cut to $600,000, but still was sufficient to begin the construction of an air base at Anchorage, Alaska. Thus was begun the construction of Elmendorf Field, primary fourth-echelon base for all future Eleventh Air Force operations. Construction of the airfield began on 8 June when 25 locally hired men began clearing brush, the Army intending it to be a permanent airfield.

The first "troops" of the Alaskan Air Force advance echelon to arrive in Alaska included a six-year-old Martin B-10 on 12 August 1940. On 12 December the Army designated the base Fort Richardson and flying field Elmendorf Field. The post was named for Brig Gen Wilds P. Richardson, former head of the Alaska Road Commission; the airfield and flying facilities were named Elmendorf Field in honor of Captain Hugh M. Elmendorf, killed in 1933 while flight testing an experimental fighter near Wright Field, Ohio.

The first Air Corps unit to be assigned to Alaska was the 18th Pursuit Squadron, which transferred to Elmendorf from Hamilton Army Airfield, California on 21 February 1941 with Curtiss P-40 Warhawks. The 23d Air Base Group was assigned shortly afterwards to provide base support. The 36th Bombardment Squadron arrived less than a month later from Lowry Field, Colorado, equipped with Douglas B-18 Bolo medium bombers.

A major problem was the training of personnel and the preparing of equipment for operation in the cold Alaskan climate. Mechanical things showed unusual behavior at 40 degrees below zero. Oil became almost solid, metal and rubber brittle and fractured easily. At the same time, Texas-trained pilots had to learn to fly in a country where sudden fogs could close out airports in less than 10 minutes and high-velocity "williwaws" could tear the wings off combat planes.

The first months activities of the new command were spent in reconnaissance for a rim of defense bases. The hub of this defense "wheel" was to be at Elmendorf Field near Anchorage. In the meantime, plans for the establishment of bases were moving slowly. Certain planned fields had to be constructed in summer, because the severe Alaskan frost in winter made construction impossible, but equipment for the construction of fields north of Nome and around Anchorage failed to arrive, and construction was postponed until the following summer. Construction had been completed, however, on two important coastal fields in southeastern Alaska, Annette Army Airfield at Annette Island and Yakutat Army Airfield at Yakutat, and the first direct all-weather air route to Alaska from Seattle was open.

An extremely fortunate accident took place in October 1941, which possibly changed the whole course of World War II in Alaska. Equipment for the construction of a CAA-DLA (Civil Aeronautics Authority-Defense Land Appropriation) airfield at McGrath, on the mainland, arrived too late to begin construction of the field, since the ground already had become frozen, and General Buckner requested and received permission to divert the equipment and men to Cold Bay on the Alaskan Peninsula and Otter Point on Umnak Island, to build two airfields for the defense of the Naval Base at Dutch Harbor. To conceal their purpose, both fields were organized as ostensible business enterprises concerned with fishing and canning. The two cover names were: "Blair Packing Company" and "Saxton & Company", whose peculiar canning equipment consisted of bulldozers, power shovels and similar construction equipment. The top holding-company for these enterprises was the "Consolidated Packing Company" of Anchorage, known in military circles as the Alaskan Defense Command. Security was complete. Japanese intelligence never learned of the existence of these airfields and the Japanese tactical decisions were based on the assumption that their attack on Dutch Harbor would not be opposed by land-based aircraft.

All through the winter of 1941–1942, men worked at the construction of these two air bases, and by spring, two 5,000-foot airstrips were completed, one at Cold Bay (Fort Randall Army Airfield), the other at Otter Point on Umnak (Fort Glenn Army Airfield). Another vital factor in the construction of the Umnak field was the use of perforated steel matting. No other medium could have been used to build that runway in the time required, since Umnak has no natural construction material. The matting was laid over a graded gash in the tundra and set the pattern for the construction of future Aleutian runways.

Administratively speaking, the Eleventh Air Force also was born in that winter of 1941–1942. First conceived as the Air Force, Alaskan Defense Command, it emerged as an integral unit as the Alaskan Air Force on 15 January 1942, and was redesignated the Eleventh Air Force on 5 February. In May 1942, a field headquarters was established at Fort Morrow Army Airfield, Port Heiden, Alaska, and planes of the 73d Bombardment Squadron were deployed at Fort Randall Army Airfield, Cold Bay and the 21st Bombardment Squadron at Fort Glenn Army Airfield, Umnak.

Ladd Field near Fairbanks became a secondary major air base in Alaska. It was named after Major Arthur K. Ladd, killed in a flying accident near Dale, South Carolina on 13 December 1935. Unlike Elmendorf, Ladd Field came the jurisdiction of Ferrying Command, which was a part of the Lend-Lease Program. Through Lend-Lease, the United States transferred nearly 8,000 aircraft to the Soviet Union though Ladd Field during the course of World War II. The aircraft were flown into Ladd from Great Falls Airfield, Montana by American civilian aircrews; Soviet crews then flew the planes west through Nome (Marks Field) and on to Siberia. The pilots leaving Great Falls flew along a route of small airfields that became known as the Northwest Staging Route. One of those airfields, Big Delta Army Airfield, southeast of Fairbanks, became Fort Greely.

Aleutian Campaign 1942

In mid-1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy laid plans to attack Alaska in conjunction with an attack on Midway Island in the central Pacific. The Japanese Northern Area Fleet's attacks on Dutch Harbor and Adak Island resulted in the Aleutian Islands Campaign. But because United States Naval intelligence had broken the Japanese naval cypher code, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas in Hawaii, learned of Japanese plans by 21 May 1942. As of 1 June 1942, United States military strength in Alaska stood at 45,000 men. On that day the XI Intercepter Command, activated earlier, in March, was redesignated the XI Fighter Command. However, Eleventh Air Force operational strength was small. It consisted of 10 B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers and 34 B-18 Bolo medium bombers at Elmendorf Airfield, and 95 P-40 Warhawk fighters divided between Fort Randall AAF at Cold Bay and Fort Glenn AAF on Umnak.

When the first inklings of a possible Japanese attack on the Aleutian Islands were known, the Eleventh Air Force was ordered to send out reconnaissance aircraft to locate the Japanese fleet reported heading toward Dutch Harbor and attack it with bombers, concentrating on sinking Hosogaya's two aircraft carriers. Once the enemy planes were removed, Task Force 8/North Pacific Force of the Navy, under Rear-Admiral Robert A. Theobald, would engage the enemy fleet and destroy it. On the afternoon of 2 June a naval patrol plane spotted the approaching Japanese fleet, reporting its location as 800 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor. Eleventh Air Force was placed on full alert. Shortly thereafter bad weather set in, and no further sightings of the fleet were made that day.

Attack on Dutch Harbor

The first aerial bombing of the American continent during World War II took place on 3 and 4 June 1942, when two Japanese raids were made on the Dutch Harbor in the city of Unalaska, Alaska. While the first did little damage, the second destroyed the base's oil storage tanks, part of the hospital, and damaged a beached barracks ship. Although American pilots had finally located the Japanese carriers, attempts to destroy them proved fruitless. As bad weather again set in, all contact with the enemy fleet was lost.

In all, the Japanese raid claimed 43 U.S. lives, of which 33 were soldiers. Another 64 Americans were wounded. Eleven U.S. planes were downed, while the Japanese lost ten aircraft. During the two-day fight, Naval Task Force 8 had remained south of Kodiak Island, taking no part in the action. On 5 June, it received a report of enemy warships in the Bering Sea heading south toward Unalaska Island, which was interpreted to be a landing force intent upon seizing Dutch Harbor. While Task Force 8 entered the Bering Sea, Hosogaya's fleet moved south to join Yamamoto, who had just suffered the loss of his four large carriers at the Battle of Midway.

Possible attack at Nome

By mid-June the Joint Chiefs of Staff theorized that the attack on the Aleutian Islands and the occupation of its westernmost islands might be part of a holding action designed to screen a northward thrust by Japanese forces into Siberia's maritime provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula. As a result of their concern about a possible Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union that might also include the occupation of St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea and of nearby Nome and its adjacent airfields on the Alaskan mainland.

Supporting the possibility of an invasion of the Alaskan mainland were reports of a Japanese fleet operating in the Bering Sea. Three separate sightings placed an enemy fleet somewhere between the Pribilof and St. Lawrence Islands, suggesting that either an enemy raid on or an outright invasion of the Alaskan mainland was imminent, with Nome the likely objective. As a result, within thirty-six hours, Eleventh Air Force using commandeered civilian aircraft flew nearly 2,300 troops to Nome, along with artillery and antiaircraft guns and several tons of other equipment and supplies. Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers of the 404th Bombardment Squadron were sent to the Air Transport Command Marks Army Airfield with a mission to locate and attack the Japanese Fleet.

Not until late July when United States intelligence reported with some certainty the departure of Hosogaya's fleet from the Bering Sea did the threat of invasion of the Alaskan mainland decline, allowing for the redeployment of many of the troops hastily assembled at Nome.

United States response

On 30 August 1942, in the face of a howling gale, American Army troops went ashore on Adak Island, some 250 miles east of Kiska. Adak affords a good fleet anchorage, a sheltered harbor and as was revealed later, a superlative site for quick construction of an airfield. The 807th Army Aviation Engineering Battalion set to work constructing a dike and draining the tidal flat between Kuluk Bay and the Sweeper Cove areas to create an airfield. Only ten days later engineers built a runway, and on 10 September the first aircraft, a B-18, landed at "Longview Army Airfield". Three days later there were 15 B-24s, a B-17, 15 P-38s and 16 P-39s on the island. On 12 September, the first air attack from Adak, consisting of 12 B-24s, 14 P-38s and 14 P-39s, was launched under the command of Major John S. Chennault of the 343d Fighter Group. The attack was launched against Japanese positions on Kiska. The airfield on Adak was renamed "Davis Army Airfield" in honor of Colonel Everett S. Davis, the first Commander, Eleventh Air Force, killed in an aircraft accident on 28 November 1942.

Throughout the winter of 1942–1943, the Eleventh Air Force bombed Kiska and Attu whenever possible, although the flyers were extremely handicapped by the almost constant fog which covered the island. At the same time, the bases to the east of Adak were consolidated and built up. In October, the Field Headquarters of the Eleventh Air Force was closed at Kodiak and moved to Davis AAF.

On 11 January 1943, American Army troops went ashore on the unoccupied Amchitka Island, barely 75 statute miles from Kiska, and a month later, on 16 February, the first aircraft, a P-38 and a P-40, landed on Amchitka Army Airfield, a quickly-built airstrip. The first mission against Kiska was flown on 18 February.

By March, both medium and heavy bombers could make the short hop from Amchitka to Kiska and on good days, rare enough, crews flew as many as four and occasionally six sorties per day. It was said that the Japanese needed no air warning system on Kiska, because they could hear the Eleventh Air Force bombers warming up on Amchitka, and knew from the sound of the engines when the raids were taking off.

Throughout this period, the striking power of the Eleventh Air Force included only three squadrons of medium bombers, three squadrons of heavies and four squadrons of fighters. An additional squadron of P-39 Airacobras operated in the Aleutian theater for a short while, but their light landing gear was unsatisfactory for use on the rough fields and they were returned to the States.

Tactically, the Eleventh Air Force was operating under the jurisdiction of the Navy, since Alaska was still in the situation of a "fleet-opposed invasion". The air arm, designated Task Force "X", was commanded by General Butler, and included the Air Striking Group (Eleventh Air Force) and the Air Search Group (Naval Fleet Air Wing Four). Overall command was vested in Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, Commander, North Pacific Force, abbreviated to ComNorPacFor or ComNorPac.

Recapture of Attu and Kiska

On 1 April, a plan to by-pass Kiska and capture Attu was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was approved, and on 11 May, American troops went ashore on Attu. In a short and fierce battle, the Japanese garrison was wiped out, and on 29 May, the island was declared secure. The first plane, a hospital C-47, landed on a newly completed runway at Alexai Point Army Airfield, Attu, on 7 June. The operation against Attu also included the occupation of the Semichi Islands, an archipelago of three tiny bits of land some 35 miles east of Attu. The flattest of these, Shemya, was to be the site of the most important American air base for future operations. Barely four miles long and only two miles wide, Shemya Army Airfield became, literally, a stationary aircraft carrier. These islands were taken without opposition, on 29 May.

With Kiska cut off by the occupation of Attu, the Japanese made plans to evacuate the Aleutian Islands. Numerous sorties were made by the Japanese Fifth Fleet, based at Paramushiru, but finally on 28 July, under cover of a thick fog, destroyers were able to enter Kiska Harbor and remove all occupation troops. When American troops went ashore on 15 August, the island was deserted, ending the Aleutian Campaign.

Six million pounds of bombs had been dropped on Kiska and Attu in Eleventh Air Force operations. The Japanese had been prevented from building an air field and from bringing in reinforcements. 'Rufe' seaplane fighters were shot out of the air as soon as they came up to give combat. Air Force fighters and bombers had played an instrumental part in driving Japanese out of the Aleutian Islands. Illustrative of the challenges omnipresent in Alaska, only 35 aircraft were lost in combat compared to 150 operational accidents. It was the highest American combat-to-accidental loss ratio for any theater in World War II. Weather was the prime culprit. The Eleventh Air Force accounted for approximately 60 Japanese aircraft, one destroyer, one submarine and seven transport ships destroyed by air operations.

With the Aleutian Campaign completed, the Eleventh Air Force had the following units reassigned to other combat areas between 20 August and 1 September: the 21st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 36th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 73d Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 406th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) and the 407th Bombardment Squadron (Dive Bomber).

Operations against Japan

More than a month before the unopposed landing on Kiska, the Eleventh Air Force began a new phase of operations against the Japanese. On 10 July 1943, six Eleventh Air Force B-25 Mitchells made the long flight to Paramushiru Island in the Kuriles and made the first direct attack on the Japanese home islands since the famous Doolittle raid in April 1942. From Alexai Point AAF on Attu, eight Mitchells of the 77th Bomb Squadron. (28th BG) struck Paramushiro bases principally. All returned safely.

A week later, B-24 Liberator heavy bombers from Attu bombed the Kuriles and secured pictures of the Japanese installations, the first pictures taken of northern Japan home-island defenses. The next Kurile raid, carried out on 11 August, was a diversionary raid prior to the landings on Kiska. On this mission, the first plane was lost over the Kuriles and Lieutenant James C. Pottenger and his crew made a forced landing in Russia.

These operations led to a joint mission on 11 September 1943, when Eleventh Air Force dispatched eight B-24 Liberators and 12 B-25s. However the Japanese were alert and reinforced their defenses. 74 crew members in three B-24s and seven B-25 failed to return. Twenty two men were killed in action, one taken prisoner and 51 interned in Kamchatka, Russia. It had proven that the Kurile Islands could be attacked, but new methods had to be devised as the raid lost Eleventh Air Force over half its offensive striking power. No more combat missions were flown in 1943.

Several changes took place following the occupation of Kiska. The Eleventh Air Force became a component of Task Force "Y", still under Navy jurisdiction. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was named ComNorPac and Major General Davenport Johnson relieved General Butler as commander of the Eleventh Air Force. One of General Johnson's first acts was the establishment of the Eleventh Air Force Instrument flying school and the promotion of an intensive training program in navigation and instrument flying, as well as the accelerated development of radio and navigation aids in the Aleutian Islands. Because of the tremendous advances brought about by intensive instrument training and the increased aids to navigation and radio, planes that used to be grounded by weather, were now flying regular schedules. Troop Carrier Command and Air Transport Command planes were operating in the Aleutian Islands with airline regularity.

In November 1943 a second airfield, Casco Cove Army Airfield was constructed on Attu for long-range bombing operations. Eleventh Air Force carried out another bombing mission against northern Kurils on 5 February 1944, when it attacked with six B-24s from the 404th Bomb Sqdn. (28th BG) and 16 P-38s from the 54th Fighter Sqdn. (343d FG). March 1944 saw Eleventh Air Force bombers over the Kuriles on daylight armed reconnaissance missions. Not many, but a sufficient number to convince the Japanese that there were aircraft in the Aleutian Islands and that the Kuriles were in constant danger of air attack. During the crucial period, while other United States forces were advancing in the South Pacific, the Japanese were forced to keep much-needed aircraft, in the Kuriles and Hokkaido as defense against possible attack from the North.

Operations against Northern Japan became the new mission of the Eleventh Air Force, and it was being successfully carried out. Except for July 1944, when the weather was especially bad, each month of 1944 showed a steady increase in operations against the Kuriles. Each month's record showed planes turned back short of their targets, weather again protecting the Japanese. Often, too, B-24 Liberator bomb loads were dropped through the undercast by aid of the newly installed radar bombing equipment, a far cry from the timed runs made on the Kiska main camp area using the Kiska volcano as an initial point when the target was closed in. The record month, June 1945, for the Eleventh Air Force showed a record number of tons of bombs dropped.

The B-25 Mitchell medium bombers, too, were playing their part in operations against the Kuriles. They had been kept on shipping alert since the abortive 11 September raid, but in May, two planes on a gasoline consumption test west of Attu, discovered and sank two armed Japanese trawlers. From that time on, the Mitchells, made sweeps against shipping when weather permitted, and by fall were bombing land targets in the Kuriles.

The Aleutians Campaign

The Official US Army Air version

ON 3 JUNE 1942 planes from the Japanese carriers Ryujo and Junyo bombed Dutch Harbor; after a two-day attack the 2d Mobile Force, which they spearheaded, withdrew. Thus, six months after Pearl Harbor, war had come to the North Pacific, and in the same guise. Yet here the element of surprise had been lacking; forewarned, the Eleventh Air Force and Navy air units had struck back. Damage to U.S. installations had been slight, casualties few.

But Army and Navy air forces had not foiled a full-scale invasion of Alaska as was once popularly believed. It is now known that the enemy's thrust in the North Pacific was subsidiary to his main stab at Midway; his occupation troops, never destined for Dutch Harbor, were set down at Kiska and Attu to forestall any American advance across the Aleutians. Forces involved on either side were small; air combat activities were severely hampered by weather; the objective of both the Japanese and the Americans was essentially defensive; and the crucial area was the Aleutian chain, not mainland Alaska. In all these respects the action of 3-4 June set a pattern for war in the North Pacific which was to remain pretty constant until V-J Day.

Northern apex of the Panama-Hawaii-Alaska defense triangle, Alaska had been strengthened only as war grew imminent, and when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, forces and installations on the peninsula were inadequate even by existing standards.† Since the days of Billy Mitchell airmen had been especially interested in the area, and eventually the War Department had come to believe that the most serious threat to Alaska was from the air and that its defense required numerous air bases, properly defended, and an effective air striking force. This change in concept enhanced the strategic significance of the Aleutians. With the advent of war the prospect of a carrier raid came to be regarded as highly probable and Japanese seizure of a base area as possible; such strengthening of defenses as was then feasible was effected, both in new base construction and in deployment of combat units. Though chances of attack seemed great, the strategic risks seemed less grave than in other areas and in the fierce competition for the limited forces and supplies then available, Alaska suffered from a low priority. Even when reinforced by units hastily dispatched in late May after Japanese plans for the Dutch Harbor attack became known through U.S. familiarity with enemy codes, the Eleventh Air Force was still woefully weak.

Its striking force included: one heavy bomber squadron (36th); two medium bombardment squadrons (73d, 77th); three fighter squadrons (11th, 18th, 54th); and one transport squadron (42d). The bomber squadrons were organized into the 28th Composite Group. In anticipation of the strike at Dutch Harbor, these units had been disposed for the most part in that area at bases hastily prepared and barely usable. There were also in the theater U.S. Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force planes.

These AAF units operated at the end of a complicated chain of command. The Eleventh Air Force (Brig. Gen. William 0. Butler) was assigned to the Alaska Defense Command (Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr.), which in turn was under the Western Defense Command (Lt. Gen. John L. De Witt), designated a theater of operations at declaration of war. Because of the Navy's special defense mission, Admiral Nimitz in the emergency of late May had placed all Army, Navy, and Canadian forces in the Alaska theater under Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald, and it was under his over-all strategic command that the Eleventh was to operate during the succeeding months.

Alaska was like other Pacific theaters in that its role in mid-1942 was strictly defensive; unlike other areas, it was so to remain. Seldom questioned seriously among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this concept was not always appreciated by the armchair strategists. The Aleutians, jutting out like a dagger aimed at the heart of the Japanese Empire, seemed to provide convenient steppingstones along a ready-made "short-cut to Tokyo." But an all-out invasion--or even a sustained air attack--along this route in either direction would have involved difficulties incommensurate with the strategic gains. Military operations, inevitably conditioned by geographical factors, had to be conceived in terms of distance, terrain, and weather. For the airman, repeat weather.

Distances within the theater were of continental dimensions. Alaska itself contained some 586,000 square miles and had 25,000 miles of coast line to be defended. Its important bases lay hundreds of miles from industrial cities in the States-sources of supply or targets, depending on the point of view. Air bases were widely scattered. From the Eleventh's headquarters at Anchorage to the advanced base on Umnak it was over 800 miles, and the Aleutian chain stretched far to the west-its tip some 2,400 miles from southeastern Alaska; Attu was closer to Tokyo than to Ketchikan.

The terrain of much of continental Alaska was rugged, with mountain ranges separating inhabited regions and rendering large-scale troop movements impracticable. The Aleutians, where most of the fighting was to occur, were rocky islands of volcanic origin whose few level areas were covered with a thick layer of tundra or muskeg, incapable of supporting a runway.

This sprawling and inhospitable area was not self-supporting, even before the war its sparse population of 70,000 imported roughly 90 per cent of what it consumed, and now practically all supplies for its rapidly expanding installations and 150,000 troops had to be brought from the States. Transportation facilities were inadequate. Ports on the southeast coast were suitable, but those in Bering Sea were icebound from October to April; the Aleutians offered few good harbors.1 In 1940, Alaska had only 652 miles of railroads and about 11,000 miles of roads and permanent trails. Distance, isolation, and terrain had long since given the airplane a prominent role in this frontier transportation system, and war needs had accentuated the importance of air transport. But air transport-like air warfare-was hampered by distance, terrain, and weather.

During the war each theater tended to think its weather the world's worst, but certainly none had a more just claim to that dubious honor than Alaska. There is of course a considerable variety within the area. The mainland coast of the Gulf of Alaska has weather comparable to that of the Middle Atlantic States, though foggier; even as far north as Anchorage, winter temperatures colder than 100 below zero are rare.2 The Fairbanks area, inland, suffers from hot summers and extremely cold winters. Along the Bering Sea coast, where the Eleventh's planes had to fly constant patrols, icy gales and very low temperatures are encountered during much of the year.

In the Aleutians, the weather is characterized by persistent overcast condition.3Pilots found forecasts of limited value since weather is extremely local and exhibits varying conditions within a small area. Occasional breaks in the overcast occur in spots, but clear weather over large areas is most rare. Attu may enjoy in a whole year no more than eight or ten clear days. Gusty winds blowing across from the great Siberian land mass accentuate difficulties in air navigation caused by fog. The irregular topography of the Aleutians aggravates the unsteadiness of the winds. A special hazard of the region is the "williwaw," a wind of hurricane velocity which sweeps down from the naked hills along the north fringe of the islands. Though high winds and fog are an unusual combination elsewhere, they frequently persist together for days in the Aleutians. And always-wind or no wind-there is fog, mist, and overcast to plague pilot, navigator, and bombardier alike. Such weather discouraged naval operations-General Buckner had written earlier that "the naval officer had an instinctive dread of Alaskan waters, feeling that they were a jumping-off place between Scylla and Charybdis and inhabited by a ferocious monster that was forever breathing fogs and coughing up 'williwaws' that would blow the unfortunate mariner into uncharted rocks and forever destroy his chances of becoming an admiral."4 But the same weather also imposed strict limitations upon air warfare, for Japanese as well as for Americans. Perhaps the enemy enjoyed a certain advantage in that North Pacific weather generally moved from west to east, though it is doubtful that the Japanese--as was once believed--could follow a weather front in from the Kurils.

Perhaps it was the weather, in the last analysis, that relegated the Alaska-Aleutians area to the place of a relatively inactive theater. As it was, no strategic offensive was attempted by either side. That was not wholly for lack of an objective; either side might have found some objective (though probably not of first rank) had sustained air operations been possible. But whereas the advance of the Japanese and the counterthrust of the Americans along the Aleutians bore some superficial resemblance to those in the South and Southwest Pacific. It was in each case island-hopping to secure ever more-advanced air bases--the the tempo of air operations in the North Pacific was slow and indecisive. And so war in that theater, after beginning dramatically at Dutch Harbor, tapered off into anticlimax. Planes and military reputations could be lost in the fog; honors and promotions were hard to find. But however hard it may have been to persuade combat crews or ground crews that their part of the war was important, it was a job that had to be done and they did it with such grace as they could.

Dutch Harbor to Amchitka

After the attacks of 3-4 June, the Japanese force retired to a position some 600 miles south of Kiska, cruising about for some ten days or so to intercept any US. carriers which might come up from Midway to contest the Japanese landings on Kiska and Attu. US. patrols sought in vain for the fleet, but the landings could not be easily hidden; shipping in Kiska harbor offered a profitable target for Eleventh Air Force planes.

On the night of 10 June, pilots of five B-24's were briefed at Cold Bay. Taking off early next morning, they bombed up at Umnak and headed for Kiska. There the leading R-24, piloted by Capt. Jack F. Todd, was hit by AA fire and exploded. The four other heavies bombed from 18,000 feet but were unable to observe results.6 Later in the day, Col. William O. Eareckson took five B-17's over the harbor in a high-altitude attack. Crews "believed" they had hit two cruisers and a destroyer.

Next day the heavies were over again, this time claiming two direct hits on a cruiser and a near miss on a large destroyer. Claims could not be authenticated with any assurance. Now and throughout the Aleutian campaign much of the bombing was through holes in the overcast, and in the seconds between "bombs away" and impact the cloud pattern might change to blot out or obscure the target. In attacks on the 13th and 14th, results were again indeterminable.

By this time the pattern of long-range attacks on the enemy had begun to emerge. At early morning a B-17 would go out on a weather mission, reporting current conditions at half-hour intervals. If weather at target and base was favorable, the handful of heavies at Umnak would take off for an attack. More frequently, the daily report would read "Mission canceled due to weather." Between 11 and 30 June only six successful missions were run. Three times the heavies sortied but had to turn back short of the target. Once, trying desperately to best foul weather, a flight of three planes bombed through overcast after making a time-distance run from Kiska volcano.7 Over Kiska harbor the bombers usually found the flak uncomfortably intense, with shore batteries reinforced by guns on ships. The vessels were sometimes moored close together to gain maximum firepower and their gunners usually aimed at breaks in the overcast through which bombing was done.

The tactics employed by the heavies bore little resemblance to doctrines of precision bombardment upon which crews had been nourished, nor were operational conditions reminiscent of training command days. For the 1,200-mile round trip between Umnak and Kiska, B-17's and B-24's had to carry bomb-bay tanks, and bomb loads were thus reduced to 3,500 pounds. Air bases at both Umnak and Cold Bay were unsatisfactory. Umnak had a strip only 150 feet wide and scant parking space; B-17's used the runway like a carrier deck, each plane landing and taxiing back to park with wheels on the strip's edge so that another bomber might follow in. Cold Bay had a wider strip but little room for dispersion.8 Such conditions might be tolerated since there were hopes that they would be remedied; the weather showed little sign of improvement.

Charged in Admiral Theobald's directive to inflict "strong attrition" upon the enemy at every favorable opportunity, the Eleventh found few such occasions. During July, bombing missions were dispatched on fifteen days. Seven times the planes were turned back by solid overcast. On one of the eight "successful" missions hits or near misses were claimed on an enemy transport and destroyer, but in no other case could the results of the attack be seen9 Postwar interviews with Japanese officers indicate that US. bombing interfered somewhat with base development at Kiska and sank at least one transport in June.10 Early in the campaign, however, it became obvious that Japanese installations at Kiska and Attu could not be neutralized by long-range bombardment as currently conducted. Finally Admiral Theobald ordered the Eleventh to discontinue bombing through overcast, asserting that "calculation bombing" hardly repaid bomb expenditure.

While striking ineffectively at Kiska, the Eleventh had run reconnaissance and patrol missions. Photographic missions were flown over the Japanese-held islands and those lying between Kiska and Umnak in search of enemy activities.12 Heavy bombers at Nome and Naknek patrolled the long stretches of Bering Sea coast. Entailing over water flights of eight to ten hours in persistently bad weather, these patrols taxed the endurance of pilots and crews.13 Along the Aleutian chain, P-38's of the 54th Fighter Squadron flew patrols from Umnak. Though long and tedious, these searches were not always uneventful. In summer the Japanese patrolled eastward out of Kiska in Kawa 97's-four-engine flying boats. On 4 August two of these were shot down over Atka.14 But in general it was war against nature, not against a rival air force.

When air attacks failed to shake the enemy's hold in the western Aleutians, Admiral Theobald decided to try naval bombardment. Kiska was to be shelled on 22 July, with the Eleventh Air Force providing daily reconnaissance from B minus 4, harassment of the Kiska area during the attack, and air coverage for the fleet during withdrawal.15 Forced back by fog on the 22d, the surface task group tried again on the 27th and the 28th, only to meet the same weather obstacle. The group then retired for refueling. It approached Kiska a fourth time on 7 August and in spite of fog maneuvered into position with the aid of radar and a spotting plane. The ensuing bombardment lasted half an hour. It was strictly Navy day; weather kept the Eleventh out of the show. Damage reports were indecisive, and Rear Adm. William W. Smith, task group commander, concluded that results from naval guns hardly justified the risk to big ships (there had been two collisions during earlier sorties) and that with good visibility a squadron of bombers might do more damage.

Good visibility, however, was not to be had and the failure of both aerial and surface bombardment gave more point to a view currently held in the theater-that the Japanese should be ejected from the Aleutians by a joint operation. As early as 14 June, General De Witt had requested the War Department to set up a joint expeditionary force for that purpose. Stressing the danger of permitting the enemy to consolidate his holdings, he had repeatedly urged that the Eleventh Air Force be augmented.17 For any major operation, such augmentation must be along generous lines.

Already the War Department had done what it could, reasonably, to reinforce the Eleventh. Soon after the Dutch Harbor attack the 406th Bombardment Squadron (M) had flown its B-25's into Elmendorf. On 1 July the Provisional XI Bomber Command, comprising the 28th Composite Group and its assigned squadrons, was activated with Colonel Eareckson in command. A week later the 404th Bombardment Squadron (H) arrived. Its B-24's, originally designated for Africa and daubed with desert camouflage ("Pink Elephants"), were sent to Nome for the Bering Sea patrol.18 The 54th Fighter Squadron, sent up for temporary duty in the emergency of May, was attached to XI Fighter Command, which had been established on 15 March.

The new tactical units were supported by an increased flow of supplies, equipment, and service personnel. In both June and July, AAF technical supplies delivered practically doubled the previous month's receipts. Additional transport aircraft arrived. Six radar sets, with appropriate personnel, were added to the ten originally planned--this in an effort to correct deficiencies in the warning system glaringly demonstrated at Dutch Harbor. General air force personnel were earmarked for Alaska in increasing numbers.19 The sum of these reinforcements was far from satisfactory. With only a handful of combat units to operate, the Eleventh was nevertheless short on assigned aircraft and crews, service units, experienced officers, and technical supplies. Such shortages, of course, existed in other theaters and would continue everywhere until production and training schedules reached peak loads. Some of the logistical difficulties in Alaska could be mitigated by a more efficient organization.

Intratheater distances and poor transportation handicapped distribution of supplies to and within the Eleventh Air Force. Plans had to be formulated and supplies and personnel delivered months ahead of actual use. On 20 March 1942, General Butler had recommended creation of a base service command to provide central control for the administration of the half-dozen bases scattered from Annette, in southeastern Alaska, to Umnak. The Japanese attack in June had highlighted the need of a unified logistical control. Informed of the impending attack, Butler had been able to satisfy his emergency requirements only by turning to a variety of agencies-the Alaska Air Base, G-4 of Alaska Defense Command, A-4 of the Eleventh Air Force, and the weather officer. Pending War Department approval of his request of 20 March, Butler on 21 June set up a provisional service command.20 His logistical needs were recognized in Washington. The Chief of Air Staff wrote on 3 July that "our units in Alaska are perilously close to failure in combat due to the inadequacy of senior personnel in Air Service activities," and directed the immediate transfer to Alaska of Col. Robert V. Ignico to head up the "Alaska Air Service Command."21 On the 18th, Colonel Ignico arrived in Alaska and set out at once on a personal inspection of key bases at Cold Bay and Umnak.

Activation of the XI Air Service Command, announced on 8 August, gave promise of a more efficient use of means at General Butler's disposal.

The organizational changes and the small reinforcements of June and July could not make an effective offensive force of the Eleventh. Nor was it likely that its strength would be greatly increased soon: Rommel was threatening Alexandria; Roosevelt wanted an autumn offensive against Germany, whether in Normandy or North Africa; the Japanese had to be stopped in the Solomons and New Guinea-and in each area air units would be needed more desperately than in Alaska. For the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the North Pacific was strictly a defensive theater; General Arnold, fervent supporter of the principle of concentration of power in decisive theaters of action, was looking toward Europe. On 30 June 1942, Operations Division of the War Department committed to Alaska for the period to 1 April 1943 the following Army air strength: two heavy bombardment squadrons (24 aircraft) and two medium squadrons (32 aircraft); one fighter group (100 aircraft); one observation flight (4 aircraft); and one transport squadron (13 aircraft). On 24 July, Arnold expressed strong distaste for any increase in this allotment. "Due to the great distances involved, the continuously bad flying weather, and the fact that approach must be made by sea," he wrote, "Alaska is a primary theater for surface naval craft, supported when weather permits, by long range bombers." Any additions to OPD's commitments "would be wasteful diversion from other theaters which are air theaters."

If these sentiments seem not wholly consistent with earlier views as to the defense of Alaska, they were reasonable enough in view of combat experience at and since Dutch Harbor. The nub of Arnold's argument lay not in air failures in Alaska; rather he was anxious to prevent further dispersal of air strength, now threatened by the imminent TORCH operation and by the Navy's effort to divert fifteen combat groups to the Pacific. Alaska he singled out as a typical example of wasteful diversion to a theater where no decisive action could be expected. "Here," he said on 21 August, "the total number of aircraft the Japanese had at any time was probably less than 100. Further due to the weather and few landing fields Alaska can in no sense be classed as an air theater. In spite of these things, today we have over 215 aircraft in that theater, being contained by less than 50 Japanese aircraft."In view of these strategic and logistical considerations it was not surprising that the War Department was unwilling to accept General De Witt's suggestion of 14 June for a joint expedition against the western Aleutians. In fact, Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, the air planner, had on 5 July recommended that the Joint Chiefs apprise De Witt of their strategic plans for the North Pacific. As an aggressive commander De Witt properly wished to carry the war to the enemy, but with the North Pacific rated a defensive theater, attrition was all that could be expected, and attrition must be inflicted within normal replacement rates.

Modifying his original request, De Witt on 16 July suggested as the best alternative the establishment of an airfield and garrison on Tanaga Island.26 On the 25th the Joint Chiefs directed him to investigate the relative merits of Tanaga and Adak Islands as air-base sites.27 Army and Navy judgments differed here. De Witt had named Tanaga on the assumption that an airfield could be developed more rapidly there-in three or four weeks as against as many months for Adak. The Navy favored Adak because of the superior harbor facilities offered by Kuluk Bay.28 No agreement was reached for several days, but on 21 August General Marshall advised the Army to accept Adak. Next day a formal directive fixed 30 August as D-day for assaulting that island.

The occupation of Adak was unopposed-as indeed were all such operations in the Aleutians by either contestant save when the Americans took Attu in May 1943. But in August 1942 U.S. intelligence of the enemy's order of battle in the Aleutians was spotty; whether he had garrisoned Adak, Seguam, Atka, Amchitka, and the Pribilofs was unknown. On D minus 2, Col. William P. Castner took ashore at Adak a reconnaissance party of two officers and thirty-five enlisted men.30 They found no Japanese; FIREPLACE, as the island had been coded, was not even warm.

Plans had called for a maximum concentration of P-38's and heavy bombers at Umnak by D minus 5. They were supposed to attack shipping and shore installations at Kiska and to provide daylight defensive coverage for landing parties.31 Aleutian weather vetoed these plans. From D-day through D plus 2 a terrific storm kept the Eleventh's heavies pinned down-and, fortunately, Japanese planes as well. Sailing from Cold Bay, the first assault wave went ashore according to schedule on 30 August. Next day a motley collection of craft-tugs, a yacht, barges, and fishing scows-put in at Kuluk Bay.32 Aboard were units of the 807th Engineer Aviation Battalion and their construction equipment. Debarking, the engineers immediately set to work on an airstrip, prime purpose of the invasion.

The island had never been properly surveyed or mapped; apparently the best source of information was a sourdough trapper familiar with local terrain and weather. With the time factor paramount, improvisation played an important part in the operation. After hurried surveys, the engineers adopted an ingenious but practical scheme for setting a fighter strip in a tidal basin in the lower valley of Sweeper Creek. By dint of tremendous effort during the next ten days, they diverted the course of the creek and installed a drainage system, thus eliminating both tide and creek water. The creek bed itself was leveled off, and on 10 September, Colonel Eareckson landed a B-18 on the tidal flats.33 When steel mat was laid, the Eleventh had an advanced base within 250 miles of the enemy at Kiska bay.

During construction of the Adak strip, B-26's, P-38's, and P-40's gave a continuous air coverage by day. Whether from their jealous guardianship or Aleutian weather, the entire operation went off without enemy interferene.34 Adak offered new possibilities to the Eleventh. On 13 September, the last Umnak-to-Kiska raid was run when an LB-30 and two P-38's photographed and strafed targets on the latter island. They shot down a float-type Zero, but the LB-30 and one Lightning, damaged by AA, had to make emergency landings at Adak.35 On the same day a more powerful force was assembling at the new forward base for a surprise blow at Kiska.

Tactics involved a low-level attack by both bombers and fighters. Twelve B-24's and crews, six each from the 21st and 404th Squadrons, were selected and given some training in deck-level bombing. Uncertain as to the most suitable armament, responsible officers loaded six Liberators with 1,000-pound GP bombs (eleven-second-delay tail fuzes) for attacking Kiska-harbor shipping and the other six with demolition and incendiary bombs for hitting ground installations in the main camp and submarine base.

The twelve heavies with twenty-eight fighters took off from Adak early on 14 September. Though they flew at minimum altitude to elude Japanese radar, they did not effect a complete surprise. Enemy coastal batteries opened up at a range of eight to ten miles, and returning pilots reported the harbor had been "lit up like a Christmas tree." In spite of heavy AA fire, fighters of the 42d and 54th Squadrons found good hunting. They strafed shore installations and batteries; P-3 9's from the 42d shelled three submarines with their 37-mm. cannon and fired a four-engine flying boat. Bombers obtained hits on three vessels in the harbor and apparently sank two mine sweepers. Other B-24's set large fires in the camp and submarine base areas with their bombing. Claims included four Zero float planes and one twin-engine float fighter detroyed.37 U.S. combat losses were limited to two P-38's, which, hot after the same Zero, collided and fell into the water off North Head. This first mission from the new base, highly successful-and especially so by comparison with earlier futile efforts-did much to remove the sense of frustration built up in combat units since Dutch Harbor. A fighter pilot observed in his private narrative that the "morale of the 42 Fighter Squadron is now terrific." But it was to prove difficult to repeat the success of the mission or to maintain the high morale.

For ten days after the low-level attack on Kiska, the Eleventh's planes were grounded by weather. A favorable report from a weather plane on 25 September sent out a force of nine B-24's, one B-17, and one B-24 photo plane, escorted by eleven P-39's and seventeen P-40's-including eleven Kittyhawks from the 11 Squadron, RCAF. Bombers reported hits on one transport and near misses on other vessels. A thorough strafing of Little Kiska caused fires and explosions in the camp area; claims included two Rufes destroyed and five to eight float biplanes probably destroyed in the water.

Mediums made their first attack since Dutch Harbor on 14 October when three B-26's attempted to torpedo a ship supposedly beached in Kiska harbor. In spite of favorable weather, no hits were registered either on this run or in a second attack on the same day.39 Two days later a PBY reported position on two Japanese destroyers. Six B-26's found the ships and dropped twenty 300-pound bombs; returning crews (one B-26 was shot down) claimed direct hits on both destroyers, which were thought to have sunk.40 No more medium missions went out in October. Fighters were weathered in and even the heavies were able to make only a few strikes at Kiska.

The increased weight of U.S. blows in September and October made it difficult for the enemy to maintain an air force on Kiska. Lacking facilities for land-based planes, he had only a few single-and twin-float planes for defense; these he found it difficult to keep at strength in the face of attacks. During the period 3 June to 31 October 1942, the Eleventh's claims included thirty-two planes shot down and thirteen destroyed on the water.41 According to their own accounts, the Japanese also lost heavily from noncombat causes.42 This was likewise true of U.S. forces. During the same period, the Eleventh lost seventy-two planes, of which only nine were destroyed in combat.43 Aleutian weather was the great killer, weather abetted by lack of radio and navigational aids and by lack of a familiarization program for pilots and crews entering the theater.

The Eleventh Air Force had been built around a handful of pilots experienced in Alaskan flying. In the emergency of late May this nucleus had been reinforced by hastily assembled pilots and crews who were dispatched from the States without administrative or squadron operations personnel and without sufficient equipment. They had been rushed immediately into combat with little or no chance for training under field conditions. Originally sent to Alaska on "temporary duty" which dragged on into months, combat crews of detached units began to think of themselves as forgotten men. Early enthusiasm tapered off perceptibly. A squadron commander summed up the prevalent gripes in a letter to a Fourth Air Force friend:

Since I arrived the target hasn't been visible. The weather is getting worse. The thing we can't understand is why we continue to send our men out into this god awful stuff against a target which can't be seen one tenth of the time and if hit isn't worth the gas burned up to get it. . . . I think everyone would like to have us remain in Alaska permanently. . . . God forbid. Don't let us stay up in this place.

The ad hoc arrangements for units on detached service enhanced difficulties in organization inherent in the wide dispersion of bases. The commanding officer of the 28th Composite Group was charged with tactical and technical control over detached units, but had administrative control only over units actually assigned. This meant that he lacked, among other powers, that of making promotions or changes in duty assignments; the resulting inequities hampered operations and hurt morale.

The complicated command setup aggravated difficulties in internal administration. Practically all combat had been in the air, yet the Eleventh was submerged beneath a tangle of commands and headquarters: the Navy's Task Force 8 (whose influence, properly for strategic control, extended in practice to tactical as well)46 and the Army's Alaska and Western Defense Commands. Routine matters as well as policy-making decisions were bucked haltingly along the involved chain of command.47 To cite a concrete example, a recommendation that a certain bomber be sent to the States for overhaul was turned down because securing permission for this simple operation would eat up a month of valuable time. The Eleventh Air Force would have to request permission to transfer the bomber through, first, the Alaska Defense Command; second, the commander of TF 8; and third, the Western Defense Command-which, in turn, might coordinate the request with the commander of the Pacific Fleet!

Whatever the command situation in the Aleutians, it was evident at the end of October 1942 that such operations as were conducted in the near future would be largely by AAF units. With a crisis approaching in the Solomons, the Navy had borrowed from TF 8 two cruisers, a tender, and five Canadian ships; twelve F4F-4's had also been transferred from the North Pacific.49 Believing that the Japanese had moved their Attu garrison to Gertrude Cove, Kiska, the Eleventh now conceived the isolation of the latter island as the primary task. This was the gist of Field Order 8 of 1 November, which directed also that daily reconnaissance of the outer Aleutians, fighter defense of key stations, and patrols in Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska were to continue.

November blew in with a terrific storm. With eighty-knot winds howling and a foot of water on the Adak strip, nothing flew.51 By 7 November a weather plane was up and over Atru, saw float-type Zeros in a creek bed-presumably washed in by the storm-and added what damage it could by strafing and bombing.52 Two days later four P-38's with a B-17 as guide found Holtz Bay. The Attu strafed eight float planes, left them burning, and went on to shoot up a small base camp. On the same day two B-26's bombed ineffectively at a freighter in Gertrude Cove; their escort of four P-38's strafed freighter and shore installations.53 Then the weather closed in again and through the rest of November and most of December the Eleventh was practically immobilized. One important chance was missed on 4 December. On reports of a surface force southeast of Amchitka, the Eleventh commander was ordered to attack with every available plane. This proved to be seven B-24's, nine B-26s, and sixteen P-38's, which sortied but never sighted the convoy.54 The enemy was busy on Kiska and was bringing small air reinforcements, but with the prevailing weather, he could not be stopped.

AAF units on Adak got back into the air on 30 December when three B-25's covered by fourteen P-38's attacked two large transports and three submarines in Kiska harbor with undetermined results. One Mitchell was shot down, and when nine float fighters intercepted, they took two Lightnings for a loss of one enemy plane. A second attack on the same day by five heavy and nine medium bombers reported hits on shipping in the harbor.55 On 31 December, six B-24's escorted by nine Lightnings damaged one small vessel.56 The new year opened foul but by 5 January the fog lifted enough to allow a weather plane over Attu to spot and bomb a 6,500-ton freighter in Holtz Bay. Mediums on the same day caught a freighter making for Kiska; they claimed to have sunk it. On the 6th and 7th, bombers struck at Kiska's submarine base through scattered overcast but could not see the results. Next day weather grounded Adak planes.

The operational record of the fall and winter months showed a noticeable improvement over that for the summer, with Adak proving a valuable base, weather consenting. But the frequent groundings pointed up the need for a field within an hour's flight of Kiska, whence momentary breaks in the weather might be exploited. Amchitka, some 200 miles west of Adak and only 80 miles short of Kiska, was a logical choice. In his Op-Plan 14-42, issued late in November, Admiral Theobald listed the early capture of Kiska and Amchitka as his primary strategic objectives, with Attu, Agattu, and Tanaga occupying a secondary place.57 Fear of enemy occupation of Amchitka, fanned by reports of Aleutian-bound Japanese convoys believed destined for the island, led the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) to advise its early occupation.

On 18 December the Joint Chiefs approved the move to Amchitka if reconnaissance should indicate suitable airfield possibilities.59 That same day a Navy PBY landed Lt. Col. Alvin E. Hebert and a small party of Army engineers on Amchitka. After a two-day survey, the engineers reported that a steel-mat fighter strip could be thrown down in two or three weeks; sites existed for a main airfield with some dispersion on which a runway 200 by 5,000 feet could be built in three or four months.60 On the 21st the Joint Chiefs formally directed the invasion, with D-day "as near as possible to 5 January 1943.

The air plan for the operation provided that bombardment aircraft, divided about equally between Adak and Umnak, should strike at Japanese naval forces and shipping at Kiska and at specific targets as designated by TF 8's Commander (Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced Theobald on 4 January), while running a daily reconnaissance westward to Attu. From D-day, XI Fighter Command was to maintain continuous daylight coverage at Amchitka with four or more fighters.

This air plan aborted. Brig. Gen. Lloyd E. Jones landed his Army troops in Constantine Harbor on 12 January with no enemy opposition.63 Engineers, the 813th Engineer Aviation Battalion and a detachment of the 896th Company, piled ashore and immediately went to work on a runway and base facilities.64 Bad weather which had fouled up the landings by grounding Jones' ship kept air operations to a minimum--a few P-38 patrols over Amchitka and no strikes at Kiska by the heavies.

The first break proved deceptive--and disastrous. On the 18th the weather appeared to lighten. Seven heavy and five medium bombers flew out of Adak with a six-fighter escort. Before they reached the target, the fog closed in and the planes turned back. The mediums and fighters were fast enough to reach Adak before the base was completely "souped in." Four of the slower Liberators had to seek an alternate landing field; the nearest possibility was Umnak, two and a half hours east of Adak. Two B-24's disappeared in the fog and were never heard from. A third, crash-landing on Great Sitkin, was damaged beyond repair. One reached Umnak and landed by the light of flares, but over-shot the runway and crashed into two P-38's, destroying them. Six planes were lost, no bombs were dropped, and no enemy was encountered--save fog.

Bad luck continued. On 21 January two B-17's, out of Umnak for Adak, collided in mid-air; one disappeared, the other landed, badly hurt. A P-40, out of control, crashed into Kuluk Bay the same day. On the 23d two B-2 5's tangled in a fog and went down.66 This was worse than the enemy's reaction, which began a fortnight late (24 January) with a futile attack on Amchitka by two planes. U.S. interception from Adak arrived too late. A Japanese strafing raid on the 26th cost U.S. troops three casualties. Again the enemy met no fighter opposition; Adak was closed down by weather. These raids, small-scale though they were, spurred on air-base construction on Amchitka.

The task was not easy. Bulldozers and graders had to hack away hills and fill gullies to level a landing ground. When the 464th Base Headquarters and Air Base Squadron arrived on 4 February to take over the field, about 500 feet of runway--plus huts and other buildings--had been completed. The squadron historian, with a flair for the man-bites-dog sort of news, recorded that it was a "beautiful, clear, sunny day,"adding reflectively that "perhaps the thing most appreciated by the group were the P-38's flying patrols above our ship."68 Appreciation turned out to be premature, for five enemy planes bored in for an ineffective raid soon after the patrol left.69 But fighters covering construction operations had little to do when U.S. bombers were able to harry Kiska. On 8 February and again on the 10th, heavies and mediums from Adak, enjoying P-38 escort, bombed the main camp area, AA positions on North Head, and a fighter strip now under construction. Fighter pilots estimated that the strip, southeast of Salmon Lagoon, was about half finished; with no heavy machinery showing up on photographs, thirty days' work might be required for completion. 70 February missions seldom met fighter opposition. As an exception, five Zeros were up to intercept fifteen mediums on the 13th; three fell to the escorting Airacobras, one to a B-25.

On 16 February, thirty-five days after the first troops had waded ashore, Amchitka's fighter strip received its first plane. Later that day seven additional P-40's and a transport landed, and the field was declared safe for limited operations.72 Within a week, P-40's were running reconnaissance patrols over Kiska, gathering local weather data and spotting and strafing minor installations. On 3 March the P-40'S on Amchitka made their first bombing run at Kiska installations, but without observable results.73 The 18th Fighter Squadron's P-40's were joined on 12 March by ten Lightnings of the 54th--more effective as fighter-bombers with their twin engines and greater bomb load.

Meanwhile, Adak-based bombers continued, weather permitting, to strike at Kiska's main camp, submarine base, radar positions, and gun sites. This was with negligible interruption from fighters. An attempt by the Japanese to intercept an attack on 16 March cost them two planes, and this was their last such effort until the battle for Attu in May.75 Occupation of Amchitka, while producing no immediate spectacular results, helped make the Japanese hold on the Aleutians eventually hopeless. Systematic supply of the enemy garrisons by surface craft became hazardous, requiring a powerful task force to drive a convoy through the air and naval blockade. Just such an effort was foiled by the Navy on 26 March, and the Japanese doom was sealed.76 Two cargo vessels with heavy escort were contacted by a smaller Navy task group on that day south of the Komandorskie Islands. After a long engagement, the enemy withdrew, leaving the Salt Lake City and the DD Bailey wounded.77 Enemy sources later listed shortage of ammunition and fuel and fear of air attack as reasons for their flight. On the last score, unfortunately, there was little to fear: the Eleventh Air Force, though informed of the enemy's approach, had failed to contact him.

In Washington, General Arnold wanted to know why six hours had elapsed between sighting of the Japanese fleet and the fruitless take-off of planes.78 Maj. Gen. William O. Butler's reply disclosed a series of hapless incidents. 79 When the contact report came in, all bombers on Adak were armed with GP bombs and poised for a mission to Kiska. Air officers, the Navy command concurring, decided on a coordinated attack by heavies at medium altitude and mediums at deck level. This required that armor-piercing projectiles be substituted for GP bombs and that the mediums have bomb-bay tanks installed. Men had to be rounded up from other jobs, and bombs had to be gathered from temporary storage places where they were frozen to the ground. Four hours were spent in these tasks; then a snow storm hit, bringing zero ceiling and visibility. After nearly two hours the squall had passed and the bombers took off. They found the U.S. fleet, but the Japanese were gone, and with them a golden opportunity. The horse stolen, Butler locked the door with an order that six B-25's equipped with bomb-bay tanks and AP bombs be kept on shipping alert. That alert was to bear no fruit, but the failure of 26 March could soon be forgotten in new offensive operations.

Attu and Kiska

In the months after Dutch Harbor, Washington had curbed the offensive designs of commanders in the Alaskan theater. Projects for the recapture of Kiska and Attu had been vetoed because they would divert troops from more decisive areas; approval of the occupation of Adak and Amchitka had been contingent upon the completion of those tasks with forces locally available. By autumn 1942, however, the War Department had consented to the drafting of plans for clearing out the Aleutians-in fact, the JCS directive of 18 December which had set up the Amchitka show indicated that the island was to provide an advanced base for an assault on Kiska, and General De Witt of Western Defense Command was ordered to train a force for the operation. A joint Army-Navy planning staff had assembled in San Diego and the 7th Infantry Division was undergoing amphibious training at Fort Ord when Roosevelt and Churchill met with their chiefs of staff at Casablanca in January to formulate Allied strategy for 1943.

The JCS had approached the conference intending to announce their plan of ejecting the Japanese from the Aleutians. Marshall, however, came to fear that such a declaration might be misconstrued by the British to imply large-scale operations in Alaska, to the detriment of their understanding of US. over-all strategy in the Pacific81 The Joint Chiefs agreed therefore to limit their North Pacific activities to "operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be."82 This phrase was included in the final report of the CCS to the President and Prime Minister. 83 Its connotations and rationale had already been explained by the Joint Chiefs in their paper on conduct of war in the Pacific in 1943: because offensive operations in the Aleutians had been-and would probably continue-profitless for both Japanese and Americans, such operations should not be undertaken in 1943 unless the U.S.S.R. joined in the war against Japan. By their formula, the JCS meant that the Japanese should be kept from further expansion or consolidation of holdings and that attrition against them should be continued and intensified. Meanwhile preparations should be made to aid the Russians if they entered the war.

In accordance with this conservative attitude, the JCS informed Admiral Kinkaid that ships required for the Kiska campaign would not be available and that preparations other than planning and training should be delayed.85 The joint planning staff at San Diego proposed as a temporary expedient a heavy air offensive against Kiska. This was not enough for the field commanders. On 3 March, Kinkaid recommended that available forces be used to by-pass Kiska, capture Attu, and occupy the Semichi Islands. He believed that the small garrison and light fortifications of Attu could be handled by available forces and shipping; the move would isolate Kiska from Kuril bases and provide the Eleventh Air Force with an excellent airfield site on the flat-topped island Shemya.

The Joint Chiefs liked this plan, if conducted with the promised economy of forces, and on 11 March, CINCPAC informed Kinkaid that he might proceed, but only with planning and training.86 Four days later Task Force 8 became Task Force 16 and Admiral Kinkaid, as commander of North Pacific Force, was put in charge of the projected operation. General Butler's shore-based air group was redesignated Task Group 16.1 and his field headquarters was moved from Kodiak to Adak.87 On the 24th, the JCS gave final approval to the Attu operation. CINCPAC and the commanding general of the Western Defense Command added details in a joint directive of 1 April. D-day was set for 7 May. The objectives were those previously outlined by Kinkaid, with a forward-looking clause that the force occupying the Near Islands (Attu and Agattu) should "create a base of operations there for possible future reduction and occupation of Kiska."88 With Admiral Kinkaid in supreme command, Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell of Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet would control landing operations and Army troops would be led by the commanding general of the 7th Division.89 The Eleventh Air Force was charged with harrying enemy installations on Attu and conducting photographic reconnaisance.

During the next six weeks or so, the Eleventh reached its highest peak of operational activity. In an exceptionally good stretch of weather in April the force, with an average of 226 aircraft in commission, flew 1,175 sorties.91 Kiska was the chief target. In part this choice derived from the desire for tactical surprise and the need of preventing Attu's reinforcement from the east. But weather played its part; bombers sent to Attu frequently found the island closed in and unloaded on Kiska on their return trip, so that in April only about thirty sorties were actually against Attu. These did important work, however, in getting pictures of the Massacre Bay shore line and beaches adjacent to enemy-occupied areas; aerial photographs constituted almost the sole source of intelligence of the Japanese troop strength.

Air operations against Kiska were most intense during the fortnight 8-21 April, with an average of sixty planes per day over the island.92 On the 15th, in attacks spread out over a twelve-hour working day, 112 planes dropped 92 tons of demolition and fragmentation bombs. These April scores were made possible by the use of P-38's and P-40's as fighter-bombers. With Amchitka only eighty-five miles from Kiska bay, seven or eight fighter missions a day could be dispatched, weather permitting. Loads varied: Lightnings would carry two 500-pound bombs, and P-40's a single 500-pounder and six 20-pound frags or incendiaries tucked under their wings. Occasionally 1,000-pound or 300-pound bombs were used. Employing glide-bombing tactics, fighter-bombers bored down through moderate AA fire to score direct hits on small scattered buildings of the camp, radar, and hangar areas-sometimes when low ceilings prevented high-altitude bombing. After the bombing runs, fighters usually strafed gun positions and camp and runway areas. In some 685 April sorties, fighter-bombers dropped 216 tons of bombs, as compared with 506 tons in 288 medium and heavy bomber sorties.93 No enemy air opposition was met in this period. One P-40 and one B-24 fell to Japanese flak, and nine fighters were listed as operational losses.

Admiral Kinkaid's Operation Order 1-43, issued on 21 April, pro- vided the over-all plan for Operation LANDGRAB. The naval attack force (TF 51) included the old battleships Pennsylvania, Idaho, and Nevada, the carrier Nassau, and several DD's. The Southern and Northern Covering Groups were cruiser forces. Two submarines were to land scouts on Attu before the main assault. Training for the scouts was handicapped by late arrival of the subs, and for the Nassau's thirty planes-largely F4F-4's-by rough weather.

Carrier-based planes were to be used primarily for cover and observation, and ship-based observation planes for spotting naval gunfire. Butler's shore-based air group included the air striking unit (Eleventh Air Force) and the air search unit (Patrol Wing 4). Coordination of the Eleventh's air support of the landings would be maintained by the AAF member of the joint staff, airborne over the battle.96 Field Order 10, 25 April 1943, provided a detailed plan for the Eleventh's participation. Its missions for the ten days preceding D-day were to intercept and destroy shipping, to photograph BOODLE (Kiska) and JACKBOOT (Attu), to harass enemy garrisons, to destroy key installations (beginning D minus 5), and to destroy enemy air forces.97 All P-38's would move out to Amchitka during the period D minus 10 to D minus 6 and lay it on Attu. (The 54th Fighter Squadron was told that Attu was its "meat.")98 The 11th and 18th Squadrons on Amchitka, flying shorter-range P-40's, would concentrate on Kiska.99 On 1 May, XI Bomber Command moved its advanced command post to Amchitka.

During the preparatory period, planes on Adak and Amchitka were maintained on shipping alert but no enemy sightings were reported. During the first days of May, the Eleventh continued to photograph Attu. Its vertical and oblique photographs, still almost the sole basis of intelligence on the enemy's installations and order of battle, made possible an estimate of Japanese forces which proved substantially correct.101 With no enemy air opposition developing, counter-air force operations were practically nil--one float-type fighter destroyed on the water being the only score.102 The main weight of the pre-invasion attack was directed at garrisons and installations, the 10-day total including 155 tons of bombs dropped on Kiska, 95 tons on Attu.103 During the last four days before the assault, weather canceled all attack missions, and while previous bombing had probably hindered enemy efforts to improve defenses, the Eleventh's softening-up program was far from decisive.

The tactical plan for LANDGRAB called for two widely separated main landings: the larger, by Southern Force, in the Massacre Bay area; a lesser, by Northern Force, in the west arm of Holm Bay. Subsidiary landings were to be made by parties of scouts and reconnaissance troops-one at Alexai Point, east of Massacre Bay, the other in the north. The last-named party, sailing independently of the main convoy, was to be landed by the submarines Narwhal and Nautilus. Stripped of detail, the plan contemplated that the two main forces would effect a junction and advance eastward to drive the enemy from the island.104 For this task the Americans had a comfortable margin of force, employing about 11,000 troops in the assault against a Japanese garrison of about 2,200.105 The disproportion of air forces was even greater. Against a probable maximum of fifteen Japanese planes in the Aleutians (and the possibility of air attacks from the Kurils), the Eleventh Air Force had in May an average of 229 aircraft in commission,106 deployed chiefly at the forward island bases.* In spite of this predominance of power, Attu proved a hard nut to crack. Weather minimized the advantages of overwhelming air superiority, and the invasion evolved into a stubborn infantry battle between a fanatical Japanese garrison and U.S. forces trained in the sunny end of California and not yet inured to Aleutian weather and terrain.

The landing force, out of San Francisco, arrived at Cold Bay on 30 April.107 There bad weather delayed its final sailing and D-day was postponed from 7 May to the 8th. Nearing Attu the convoy again met adverse winds, which prevented a landing, and the naval force steamed northward into Bering Sea to escape detection. On the basis of weather forecasts, D-day was finally set for 11 May

On 11 May, the forward disposition was as follows:

	P-40's	P-38's	B-25's	F-5A's	B-24's	Total
Unmak	35	1	1			37
Adak	22	1	10		12	45
Amchitka	23	24	20	3	16	86
TOTAL	80	26	31	3	28	168

The initial landings early on the 11th were on Beach Scarlet, where scouts debarking from the submarines met no enemy resistance-the Japanese, alerted from 3 to 9 May, had apparently been deceived by the Americans' enforced delay and had left the beaches unsecured.109 Fog, not predicted for D-day, shrouded Attu, delaying the main landings; it was late in the day before Northern Force got ashore and pushed southward against small enemy patrols. Similarly Southern Force, putting its main strength ashore on Beaches Blue and Yellow, advanced some 2,500 yards up Massacre Valley before encountering light enemy resistance.

A detailed air plan for D-day assigned various duties to the Eleventh Air Force, laying emphasis on softening up enemy defense positions in the key areas and on rendering close support for ground troops as directed by the commander of the assault force. This support would be provided by Amchitka-based Lightnings of the 54th Squadron, which were to maintain a constant daylight patrol over Attu--working in flights of six with a B-24 "mother ship" to afford liaison with ground and naval forces and to relay messages to the fighters.

Once more, in a fashion already traditional for Aleutian D-days, best-laid plans went agley. Colonel Eareckson, air coordinator for the operation, got off first with a reconnaissance mission. During the morning, planes from the Nassau made a brief attack against a Japanese observation post near Holtz Bay.112 In the afternoon one B-24 from the 36th Bombardment Squadron made a successful drop of supplies to a scout company at Beach Scarlet. But this was accomplished under difficult circumstances, the pilot, Lt. Martin J. Brennan, reporting the weather as "ceiling 0, top 2,000 with an overcast at from 8 to 10,000."113 Close support was impossible, and of nine B-24's and eleven B-25's dispatched to bomb Attu, only two Liberators dropped on the primary target--all others unloading over Kiska.

With weather clearing sporadically on D plus 1, air support went according to schedule, with Colonel Eareckson flying the air-ground liaison plane.115 Almost all action was in support of Northern Force. Four flights of six P-38's each dropped 500-pound bombs and 23-pound parafrags on targets between Holtz Bay and Chichagof. Bombing from low altitudes (100 to 1,000 feet), the fighters followed through with strafing attacks. Four were damaged by heavy AA fire and one was knocked into Chichagof Harbor, where the pilot was rescued by a friendly DD.116 One flight of six B-25's dropped 38 × 300-pound bombs on the runway and gun positions in the east arm of Holtz Bay while another flight expended 48 × 300-pound bombs on gun batteries beyond the west arm. Six Liberators dropped 250 × 100-pound bombs on AA batteries in the same general area, and another B-24 parachuted supp1ies.117 Nassau planes also got off one bombing-strafing mission at Holtz Bay.

On the 13th, Colonel Eareckson, up again for his liaison job, found Attu weather too bad for observation of either friend or foe. The sole support mission sent out that day, a flight of six B-24's, was ordered to divert to Kiska; two planes, failing to receive the message, bombed the Holtz Bay area.119 Next day weather also prevented direct support. Six B-24's and five B-25's were dispatched to Attu; of these only a single Liberator dropped on that island. The first air casualties of the Attu campaign occurred on the 14th when the supply Liberator smashed into a mountain ten miles west of its dropping zone.120 Little could be done in the air on the next two days. Mediums and heavies went out to find ceilings too low and to circle for hours fruitlessly waiting for a hole in the overcast. P-38's got in limited blows. Six of them dropped parafrags around Holtz Bay on the 15th and two flights came in at mast-height on the following day to obtain hits on barges and installations.121 Weather canceled all air support missions on the 17th and 18th.

Meanwhile the ground forces, after wading ashore unchallenged, had run into stiff resistance on all fronts. Southern Force, attempting to move up Massacre Valley, walked into well-organized defensive positions. Between D-day and 16 May, the force made five unsuccessful attacks on Jarmin Pass; the Japanese main line was hardly dented. Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, commanding the landing forces, recommended calling for reinforcements-specifically, the 4th Infantry, trained in Alaska. Admiral Kinkaid, terming progress of the ground forces "unsatisfactory," relieved Brown on the 16th and appointed in his stead Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum.

Northern Force had made better progress. By the 16th it had cleared the high ground around Holtz Bay's west arm, forcing the enemy to withdraw to the east arm. Fearing an attack from the rear, the Japanese commander opposing Southern Force withdrew, and the Americans walked through Jarmin Pass unhindered to join Northern Force on the 18th.

On the 19th, air operations were resumed on a small scale. Six B-24's bombed installations in Chichagof Harbor, with a Navy Kingfisher reporting some hits in the target area. Two flights of B-25's dropped 87 × 300-pound bombs from altitudes of 4,000 to 4,500 feet on enemy positions in Sarana Valley.125 On the 20th, weather prevented even limited support operations.126 By this time, all Japanese troops were concentrated in the Chichagof Harbor area, and in that restricted field of operations bombing had to be visual and accurate to avoid hitting friendly ground forces. On the 21st, weather improved enough to allow fighter operations. Under direction of Col. John V. Hart, air liaison officer for the day, eighteen P-38's in three flights swept in at minimum altitudes to lay parafrags on Attu village and installations south of Chichagof. Several hits and large fires were observed. B-24's were less fortunate; six of them hovered over Attu for four hours vainly waiting for a break in the overcast and then turned back to unload blindly but hopefully on what they "believed" to be the submarine base at Kiska.

Next day, the 22d, came the first Japanese air reaction. A dozen or more Mitsubishi bombers roared out of the fog in a torpedo and strafing attack on the Charleston and Phelps, patrolling the entrance to Holm Bay. The torpedoes missed, strafing caused only minor damage, and Navy AA knocked down one bomber.128 Actually the enemy had done well even to find a target-the Eleventh's operational headquarters had judged weather at Adak and Amchitka too bad to allow any U.S. planes to take off.

The Mitsubishis were over again on the 23d. A Navy PBY sighted a flight of sixteen west of Attu and contacted the air liaison plane.130 Five P-38's on patrol found the Japanese over the center of Attu. The bombers jettisoned their loads and closed formation as the Lightnings came in. Five enemy planes were destroyed; Lt. Col. James R. Watt and Lt. Harry C. Higgins each got one, and Lt. Frederick Moore shot down three. Seven bombers were claimed as probables.131 Two P-38's were lost. Lt. John K. Geodes belly-landed in Massacre Bay and was rescued by a Kingfisher from the Idaho.132 After twenty-five minutes of combat the flight leader, Colonel Watt, radioed that he was hit and would return to the base. He was never seen again.

Captured documents later indicated that the enemy had scheduled another mission for 29 May but had to scratch it because of weather.

Northern Force, starting up the steep mountain slopes to Chichagof on the 19th, made slow progress against strong opposition. Southern Force, after cleaning out Massacre Valley and surrounding heights, pushed off on 21 May, forcing a high point (Sarana Nose) at the junction of Sarana and Chichagof valleys next day.135 General Landrum, continuing his tactic of seizing surrounding ridges before moving along the valleys, next threw one battalion against Fishhook Ridge, between Chichagof and the east arm of Holtz Bay. This attack, on 23 May, was stopped cold. So was another on the 24th, though the assault troops were reinforced by a battalion from Northern Force which had pushed through after several days of hard fighting.

The attack on the 24th had received some direct air support. Colonel Hart in the weather plane, after scouting Kiska, Buldir, and the Semichis, dropped 6 × 500-pound bombs on enemy strongpoints near the front line. Five B-24's in a number of bombing runs at 5,600 to 6,000 feet bombed positions west of Lake Cories with 100-pounders, then strafed enemy trenches without drawing AA fire. Five B-25's dropped 40 × 300-pound bombs on enemy strongpoints and AA positions.137 During one run (presumably by a B-24) some bombs fell on U.S. front-line positions; this error, the only one of its kind charged to the Eleventh, happily caused no casua1ties.138 Fighters, patrolling on the 24th against expected enemy air attacks, got in a little strafing.139 They repeated the same program the next day, when continued good weather brought out one flight of B-24's and two of mediums which dropped eighteen tons of bombs in the battle area.140 Even heavier air action followed on the 26th, with the air liaison plane directing the activities of eight B-24's, two flights of B-25's, and two of patrolling P-38's.

By 28 May, U.S. ground forces had crowded the enemy into a small pocket of flat ground around the Chichagof Harbor base. Landrum, with his superior forces perched on the surrounding heights, determined to wind up the campaign with a full-scale attack next morning. During the night a PBY dropped surrender leaflets among the Japanese lines.142 It was not a fruitful mission.

Rather than surrender or wait to be pushed into the sea, the Japanese commander, Col. Yasuyo Yamasaki, elected to stake all in a desperate counterattack. He could hardly have been optimistic, but if he could penetrate the valley under cover of darkness and seize American gun positions, he might destroy the U.S. main base at Massacre Bay and force a general reembarkation. Such at any rate seems to have been his reasoning, and on the 29th he ordered the counterattack.

A thousand shrieking Japanese rushed along the valley, pushed aside a surprised infantry company, and swept headlong toward Masacre-Saran Pass. There engineers and service troops, with ten minutes' warning, hastily organized defense lines and in desperate hand-to-hand fighting broke the force of the attack. A few enemy detachments won through the pass but were brought up just short of a battery of 105-mm. howitzers. Fighting continued in isolated pockets throughout the day, but the banzai attack had failed.144 By afternoon of the 30th the Japanese, with the exception of a few scattered groups, had been wiped out-many killed in a nasty orgy of suicide and murder.

Captured documents indicated something of the fanatical spirit of the enemy. So also did casualty lists, for the enemy's smaller force had killed 550 Americans and wounded 1,140. Exposure had also taken its toll: the GI's leather combat boot gave little protection against frost-bite.

U.S. planes were back over Attu on 30 May but Colonel Eareckson, air-ground liaison officer, was able to inform them that there was "no need for bombing or strafing and no indication of a visit from the west."147 The Attu campaign ended, as it had for the most part been throughout, a doughboy's war. The Eleventh had carried out missions under hazardous conditions and with some success. When supported by air attack and artillery, ground forces had made substantial gains with few losses; deprived of such support, they had been pinned to the ground and punished severely. Unfortunately, persistent fog and high winds had hampered air operations each day, and on eleven of the twenty critical days had prevented any effective support.148 Navy flyers, unfamiliar with Aleutian weather, also found the going tough. Rarely could the Nassau operate more than four planes and never could it launch an all-out attack.149 The Navy lost seven planes and five pilots, the Eleventh three planes and eleven men.

U.S. forces began to cash in immediately on their new possessions. On 30 May, Brig. Gen. John E. Copeland landed troops and engineers, unopposed, on Shemya, thirty-five miles east of Attu. By 21 June they had completed a fighter strip. Dissatisfied with the location of the Japanese airfield on Attu, U.S. engineers began construction at a better site on Alexai Point, and on 7 June, barely a week after organized resistance had ended, the first C-47 landed to evacuate the wounded.

Victory on Attu confirmed earlier designs against Kiska. When operations had taken a favorable turn on 18-19 May, General De Witt asked CINCPAC to join him in a request to the Joint Chiefs for approval of the Kiska operation.152 The JCS reply of 24 May directed that planning and training begin at once but reserved final decision pending review of a detailed plan.153 Such a plan was provided and was found acceptable. Target day was 15 August, with the choice of D-day left to Admiral Kinkaid's discretion. The Kiska attack (COTTAGE) was planned on a larger scale than LANDGRAB since the Japanese garrison was estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 troops, enjoying strong defensive positions. The invading army included 34,000 ground force troops, including some 5,000 Canadians. The assault convoy was supported by three BB's, one CA, one CL, and nineteen DD's. In light of Attu experiences, Kinkaid laid down a realistic training program for Army and Navy personnel which included acclimatization to Aleutian weather.

Aerial and naval bombardment were to be used to soften up enemy defenses, with the Eleventh giving priority to gun positions and the air-strip on Kiska. By mid-June apparent cessation of work on the runway lessened its significance as a target, but post-invasion inspection of the island justified the earlier concern for gun positions. Coastal defense guns (up to 6-inch bore), AA, and machine guns were plentiful in the several Japanese base areas. Many gun positions and buildings possessed heavy blast walls which offered protection against anything but a direct hit.

For its task the Eleventh Air Force had been reinforced. The average number of aircraft on hand rose from 292 in June to 352 in July and reached an all-time high of 359 by August.156 About 80 per cent of the planes were operational. Besides combat planes, these figures included transports of the 42d and 54th Troop Carrier Squadrons, which in intratheater flights landed a monthly average of 7,500 tons of freight and 15,000passengers.157 New strength in planes was bolstered by new bases; fields on Attu and Shemya offered alternative landing facilities when Amchitka and Adak were closed in.158 Weather stations recently sited in the Near Islands promised more accurate forecasts for Kiska.

The weather, incidentally, was execrable during June, and sorties for the month dropped to only 407.159 But in spite of low-hanging summer fogs which concealed targets, the Eleventh expended 270 tons of bombs. On occasion, radar-equipped PV's from the Navy led AAF bombers in for area bombing through overcast.160 Japanese documents captured later suggested that strikes with 600-pound demolition bombs with long-delay fuzes were effective in keeping enemy personnel holed up for long periods. Flak in June was plentiful but ineffective, knocking down no U.S. plane and damaging only thirteen.

Somewhat better weather came in July, and U.S. bombers began to find more holes in the overcast. On the 2d, eighteen B-24's and as many B-25's, plus bomb-loaded P-38's and P40's, dropped some fifty-five tons of explosives.162 Heavy but inaccurate flak wounded two officers and damaged three planes but scored no kill. Navy Venturas that had guided the AAF in by radar also bombed.163 Four days later when the Navy sent in a cruiser force to lob a hundred tons of shells against suspected coastal and AA batteries, six B-24's bombed the main camp area in support.

Medium bombers stationed at the new Alexai Point runway on Attu now maintained an antishipping alert. The new field brought those planes within striking distance of the northernmost of the Japanese home islands, the Kurils (Chishima Retto), some 750 miles westward. With Japanese air power in the Aleutians practically nil, the invading force might expect a repetition of the May raids from the Kurils. The Eleventh Air Force planned therefore to carry the war to the enemy with the first strike at the Japanese homeland since the Doolittle raid of April 1942.

With weather breaking right on 10 July, seven B-24's and eight B-25's were preparing to take off for the first Kurils strike when a Navy Catalina reported sighting a four-ship Japanese convoy. Since shipping held priority over other targets, the B-24's were sent after the convoy. Eight B-25's of the 77th Bombardment Squadron, led by Capt. James L. Hudelson, went on for the Kurils. Solid cloud over the target balked their design for a minimum-altitude attack. Making dead-reckoning runs at 9,000 feet, the Mitchells dropped 32 × 500-pound bombs presumably on the southern part of Shimushu and the northern part of Paramushiru. No enemy planes or flak were encountered and all the B-25's returned safely after a nine-hour flight.

Meanwhile six B-24'S (36th Bombardment Squadron) and six B-25's (73d Bombardment Squadron) went after the convoy off Attu. Laid on target by two Catalinas (which had relieved the original sighting patrol), the Mitchells chose the two largest ships and let go their bombs at deck level. Pilots of the Navy Catalinas reported that one ship sank; the other, burning and in a sinking condition, they had strafed and depth-bombed and felt certain that it eventually went down. Following the mediums in, the B-24's attacked the two other Japanese ships with 500-pound bombs and machine-gun fire; only near misses were claimed.166 Attempts to contact the two vessels on the following day failed.

On 18 July the Eleventh hit at the Kurils again, this time with six Liberators drawn from the 36th, 21st, and 404th Bombardment Squadrons. For a change, they found CAVU (ceiling and visibility unlimited) weather over target. Three planes dropped 18 × 500-pound bombs at the Kataoka naval base on the southwest coast of Shimushu. The other heavies attacked shipping anchored in the strait between Kataoka and Kashiwabara on Paramushiru. Near misses, but no direct hits, were reported. The bombers secured an excellent and much-needed set of photographs which vastly extended the meager information gleaned from P/W interrogation at Attu. The photos showed a considerable amount of military activity, with two airfields and a sea-plane base on Shimushu and one airfield on Paramushiru in various stages of construction.

On 22 July the Navy and AAF joined in another bombardment of Kiska. The Navy sent in two task groups, one containing a couple of battleships, for a twenty-minute pounding of key installations.168 Eighty planes--heavies, mediums, and fighters--struck before and after the Navy attack, dropping eighty-two tons of bombs on coastal defense, AA, and other installations.169 Intense, accurate, heavy flak damaged several planes and knocked down one Mitchell, whose crew was rescued by a Catalina. General Butler, after an afternoon flight over Kiska, reported that the entire area from north of Salmon Lagoon to south of Gertrude Cove was on fire as a result of the joint Navy-AAF attack.

An exceptionally clear day on 26 July brought out every combat plane the Eleventh could fly. They dropped on Kiska 104 tons of bombs, their heaviest load so far, and lost one plane to flak but saved the pilot. Next day twenty-two tons of bombs were released over the main camp area. Four idle days followed.171 The Eleventh was back in the air with a moderate-scale mission on 1 August. On the 2d, eight Liberators, nine Mitchells, and eight Lightnings cooperated with another naval bombardment by attacking targets on North Head and Little Kiska.

The climax of the air offensive was reached on 4 August with 134 sorties and 152 tons of explosives. The 407th Bombardment Group (Dive),* sent to the Aleutians especially for the Kiska campaign, flew its first combat mission to drop 46 × 500-pound bombs on two AA batteries in the main camp area.173 Results of the day's bombing were generally rated excellent. Most returning crews reported only meager and inaccurate AA and small-arms fire.174 This fact was of more than passing importance. On 6 August the Eleventh Air Force issued a bomb-damage report based on photos taken from 27 July to 4 August. The Japanese had made no attempt to fill some thirty-odd craters in the Kiska runway but had moved both radio stations from previous locations. In the submarine-base area nine buildings had been destroyed or moved; in the main camp area twenty-three buildings had been destroyed, five severely damaged, and both radar stations had been damaged or were being dismantled. "It is significant," the report added, "that most of the buildings affected show no evidence of having been bombed or shelled. . . . It is also significant that the photographs of 2 August and 4 August show all the trucks in identical positions and show 10 to 12 less barges than usual in the Kiska harbor area.

The weather closed in to interrupt both bombardment and reconnaissance, and for four days all missions from Aleutian bases were canceled. Then on 10 August the Eleventh began its final phase of softening-up operations. On the next day nine B-24's went out in a third attack on the Kurils, dividing nineteen tons of bombs between the Kataoka naval base and the Kashiwabara army staging area. This tie the bombers encountered intense flak and stirred up a hornets' nest of fighters-some forty Zekes, Rufes, and Oscars, of which five were reported shot down for a loss of two B-24's destroyed and three damaged.

On 12 August the Navy moved in a task group for the last pre- invasion bombardment, which spotting planes reported had covered the target well. The Eleventh was still busy, dropping 355 tons of bombs between the 10th and D-day. On the 15th, troops went ashore on the north side of the island.

Once more D-day turned out foul, with planes grounded at Amchitka and Shemya. One B-17, with the alternate air coordinator (Redesignated 407th Fighter-Bomber Group on 15 August 1943.) aboard, took off from Adak but returned after an hour and a half over Kiska during which overcast completely blanketed all ground operations.177 Initial assault parties had made no contact with enemy forces. Landings set up for D plus 1 were dispatched according to schedule, but again without air support; combat planes were weathered in. The Kiska air campaign ended in anticlimax on D plus 2 when a single Liberator flew out of Shemya carrying the air coordinator who reconnoitered such areas on Kiska as were visible. This was to prove the last mission flown in August.

Fortunately no air cooperation was needed. Such aircraft as had been over Kiska since D-day had seen no enemy forces nor had ground troops made any contacts, even in occupying key positions. This inactivity, certainly not customary with the Japanese, might seem to have confirmed earlier suspicions of a general withdrawal, but Navy commanders persisted in their assumption that the enemy had merely moved to prepared positions on the high ground back of the beaches.179 This proved a false estimate of the situation. Not a single Japanese was ever encountered by ground forces on Kiska. The enemy had vanished silently into the fog.

It is now known that Vice Adm. Tetuo Akiyama had issued on 8 June the original order for the evacuation of Kiska.180 About 700 persons were moved out by submarine, but when this method proved too slow and hazardous, the job was assigned to surface ships. A light surface force sallied out of Paramushiru several times but drew back because the weather was not thick enough. Finally on 28 July (Tokyo time) the force ran for Kiska under friendly clouds, onloaded the garrison of 7,000 in two hours, and was back at Paramushiru on the 31st.

Kiska had come cheap (though cases of mistaken identity had cost twenty-six casualties)182 and, remembering Attu, Americans had reason to be thankful. But responsible commanders in the North Pacific gained little prestige by combat-loading over 30,000 men to send them against an island, vigorously bombarded, which had been deserted for a fortnight. Evidence of some important changes in the Japanese situation had been abundant (though undoubtedly it has seemed more significant in retrospect). Against such intelligence was balanced the stubborn fact that, with Attu athwart the escape path and with surface and air patrols giving what coverage the weather would allow, no evacuation fleet had been sighted.183 Radio transmission from Kiska had ceased after 27 July. This was considered at first to indicate only a change in station, though possibly something more important. 184 Aerial photos in the period 27 July to 4 August showed extensive demolitions and alterations in the island's defenses.185 After the former date flak had been noticeably less severe, with none reported by a bombing mission on 1 August and only a small amount thereafter-perhaps the work of a rear guard later evacuated by submarine. Eleventh Air Force pilots had said repeatedly that the island looked deserted, and indeed formal reports had suggested wholesale or partial evacuation. Air intelligence had discharged its responsibility by pointing out these possibilities, but it had not stated conclusions forcefully. Navy and ground force commanders, discrediting the possibility of mass evacuation by surface ship, adhered to the theory of changes in position on the island itself. The question might have been solved by commando patrols landed on the island, but no such action was taken.

Aftermath

The total expulsion of the enemy from the Aleutians left North Pacific forces without an immediate mission. From Dutch Harbor on, American policy in the area had been dictated by the presence of Japanese forces in the archipelago. There they constituted a menace to the northern U.S. flank, and for political as well as military reasons it was expedient that the Japanese be chased from American soil, even though it was only tundra and muskeg. Now that the enemy had pulled out, the way was less clear. The Aleutians dominated a region which had strategic possibilities, of interest alike to Japan, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. Experience had shown the difficulty of military operations in the area. Japan was hardly likely to attempt another invasion, and on the past record it seemed probable that the United States could utilize available resources more profitably elsewhere. But so uncertain were Soviet intentions in the North Pacific, either as a possible ally in the war or a possible rival after the war, that the region retained an importance in strategic planning wholly out of proportion to the fighting which occurred there. Fighting indeed was to be sporadic and on a minuscule scale; not so the discussions of strategy.

In a meeting of the Joint Chiefs on 7 September 1943, General Marshall broached the practical problem of future commitments to the Alaskan theater. He questioned the continuing justification for the large garrisons built up under impact of the Japanese invasion.

Discussion indicated that the AAF would welcome retrenchment in that theater (this had been Arnold's desire a year earlier) but that the allocation of troops must be contingent upon agreed strategy-specifically, according to Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., upon a decision as to whether the United States should mount an operation against Paramushiru. Consequently, the Joint Planning Staff was directed to review the problem and make recommendations as to the proper size for Alaska-based garrisons under current conditions and for a task force if the Paramushiru assault were set up.

Representatives from the theater commands came in to consult with the JPS in Washington on 15 September. They elaborated on operational and logistical difficulties inherent in the theater's geographical features, and while the Army's General Buckner stressed the need for air units and air bases, both he and Navy officers discounted the probability of any strong offensive by the Japanese. Actually it was an exaggerated view of the enemy's capabilities which had allowed him to tie up, with a force of only 10,000, well over 100,000 US. troops and a strong naval task force. As to a westward expedition out of the Aleutians against Paramushiru, that would have to be followed by further advances to accomplish decisive results.

Armed with these theater views, the Joint War Plans Committee (to whom the problem had been referred for consideration) came up with a recommendation on 18 September. After paying tribute to the strategic importance of the area and the need for its early organization for defense and offense, the report got down to brass tacks. With Japanese offensive capabilities in the area slight, U.S. defense forces might be cut to pattern. The Eleventh Air Force had already felt the scissors: since Kiska it had lost two heavy bomber squadrons (36th and 21st), two medium squadrons (73d and 406th), one troop carrier squadron, and three signal air warning companies--about 2,400 bodies in all. This left only one heavy and one medium squadron, a fighter group (four squadrons), and one troop carrier squadron. These units would meet minimum defense requirements and might serve as a nucleus for an expanded offensive air task force, but they could hardly support a regular bombing program against Paramushiru. Approximately 10,600 air force service personnel would be needed in support. Should no offensives be planned, ground troops should be reduced from the existing force of 121,345 to 80,000 by 1 July 1944 and further thereafter. Of 31,382 Navy personnel now assigned, 21,330 were Seabees, most of whom were scheduled to return to the States by 1 March 1944. The Seabees should be detained in the theater if they could expedite work on the Adak base; and other current Navy personnel schedules should be continued.189 As for the force required for the seizure of Paramushiru, that question was less readily answered. Investigation of the possibilities of such an operation had been directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the recent QUADRANT conference (Quebec, 12-24 August 1943).190 The planners had set two possible target dates for the attack-spring of 1944 or spring of 1945. If the former date were chosen, the current Alaska garrisons should be maintained without diminution; if the latter, they should be reduced according to the schedule outlined above and the operation be staged with a task force made up of fresh troops drawn from the States. In contrast with this policy of probable retrenchment in the near future, the JWPC argued for a long-term strengthening of the area regardless of the progress of the war--whether the Paramushiru operation jelled, whether Russia entered the war against Japan, or whether indeed "Russia or Japan or both are strong or weak, friendly or unfriendly in the post-war period." Specifically, the committee recommended development of an Army base at Adak and of VLR bomber bases in the area. At QUADRANT the AAF had announced the early combat readiness of the B-29, with four groups probably available early in 1944, and the planners suggested that two groups constitute the first--though not the ultimate--VLR contingent.

When on 20 September the theater representatives again met with the JPS, they found the JWPC paper not to their liking: General Buckner felt that four heavy bombardment squadrons should be kept in the Aleutians, Rear Adm. John W. Reeves that the Alaska sector should be kept active to capitalize on expenditures already made, either by a spring 1944 assault on Paramushiru or by air operations out of Attu with current types of aircraft.192 These comments went on to the JCS with the basic paper but without concurrence by the planners, who were inclined to favor a 1945 date (if any) for the Paramushiru show and who pointed out that recent reductions of air strength in the Aleutians precluded any substantial bombardment program.193 Before approving the JWPC proposals, the Joint Chiefs, at Admiral King's suggestion on 21 September, referred them to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for review.194 The committee in general favored retrenchment in the North Pacific. In respect to garrisons, it recommended that the defense classification195 of the several pertinent areas be downgraded," with a corresponding reduction, on or before 1 July 1944, of their troop bases. Target date for Paramushiru should be no earlier than spring 1945, and base construction for that operation should be restricted to providing staging areas and supply facilities. Air bases to accommodate two or three groups of B-29's should be ready for operations by spring 1944.

Discussed by the JCS on 28 September, these recommendations were approved on 5 October with an amendment sponsored by Arnold that the number of B-29 groups contemplated for the Aleutians be not specified.197 Any theater hopes for large-scale operations in the North Pacific were further dampened by a report on the Adak base development submitted by the JPS on 30 September.198 In agreement with a partially completed study of the Combined Planning Staff, it assumed that a main attack against the Kurils was unlikely unless Russia entered the war against Japan, and that task forces should not be retained in the Alaska-Aleutian area against that contingency. The base at Adak, the JPS report concluded, should be of a size to support some 50,000 troops with a three-month level of selected supplies. Only the B-29 project, then, offered much hope of a return to the offensive, and that was to prove an illusory hope.

As for immediate air operations, nothing more than harassing raids against the northern Kurils had been intended for the one B-24 and one B-25 squadron remaining to the Eleventh. This token force was further diminished by heavy combat losses sustained in a mission on 11 September. Finding CAVU weather over the target area, seven Liberators and eleven Mitchells dropped twenty tons of bombs on the Kashiwabara staging area, on northern Shimushu installations, and on enemy shipping. Excellent photos were secured. Strikes were observed on Kashiwabara and on shipping. One freighter and one large transport were believed sunk; one transport, one small and one large cargo vessel were reported damaged, and smaller vessels were strafed. The bombers ran into intense and accurate flak and brought up a swarm of Japanese fighters, a score of them attacking the B-25's and about forty going for the B-24's. After a running fight which lasted some fifty minutes, U.S. crews claimed twelve enemy aircraft destroyed and three probables. But the cost was great. Of nineteen U.S. bombers which reached the target area, seven B-25's and three B-24's failed to return. Seven of these planes got to Petropavlovsk in Soviet Kamchatka, but seven of the planes returning to base were damaged.199 In a single mission the Eleventh had lost about half of its striking power and it recuperated slowly. Five months were to elapse before another mission would be dispatched against the Kurils.

In the meanwhile, air forces in the Alaska-Aleutian area had been reorganized in a fashion more suited to their current strength and mission, and efforts had been made to improve operational efficiency. On 11 September, General Butler, who had led the Eleventh Air Force through the whole of the Aleutian campaign, was transferred to the European theater, and two days later Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnson assumed command.200 He was placed in charge of shore-based aircraft, newly designated Task Group 90.0 in Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid's Op-Plan 9-43 of 23 September 1943. His force included: the air striking unit (Task Unit 90.1), composed of one heavy and one medium bombardment squadron and one group of fighters; and the air search unit (Task Unit 90.2, Cdre. Leslie E. Gehres), with two squadrons of Venturas and as many Catalinas.201 These forces seem small, even for purely defensive purposes, but in an estimate of 27 December, Japanese aircraft in the Paramushiru-Shimushu area were listed as thirty-seven fighters, thirteen seaplanes, and six patrol bombers.

During autumn and winter strenuous efforts were made to reduce operational hazards, which between 3 June 1942 and 30 September 1943 had claimed 174 aircraft, as opposed to only 40 lost in combat.203 Inadequate facilities were responsible for some of the losses-steel-mat runways which buckled under the weight of bombers and a complete lack of radio ranges, lighting facilities, and other navigational aids west of Umnak.204 Part of the difficulty lay in training, for in the early part of the war there had been no time-and for that matter, no real provision for instrument flying training in AAF schools. General Butler took the first corrective step in Alaska by charging Capt. John G. Coulter on 1 September 1943 with the organization and development of Link-trainer departments in all Eleventh Air Force bases and with making a survey of range facilities and let-down procedures. By the end of 1943 standard procedures had been established at all bases, a number of radio range stations were functioning, and fourteen Link trainers were in service in the Aleutians.205 An Instrument Flying Training School (Prov.) was set up in November 1943 at Elmendorf Field for four months, but it proved so successful that its life was extended. Captain Coulter and his instructors indoctrinated pilots in various aspects of instrument flying as adapted to Alaska weather. Eventually all pilots, whether old hands in the theater or newcomers, were required to take a two-or three-week course at the school.

During the fall and winter of 1943-44 crews of the Eleventh trained for operations against the Kurils. Navy Catalinas and Venturas carried out photographic reconnaissance missions over Japanese islands. In January four missions were completed, and fifteen tons of bombs were dropped by radar.207 But it was 5 February 1944 before the Eleventh got back into action with its first combat mission since the costly attack of 11 September. Sixteen P-38's and six B-25's in relays covered the retirement of the North Pacific Force after it had attacked the Kurils with gunfire. No enemy aircraft appeared, but two P-38's were lost.208 On 24 February the 404th Squadron sent six B-24's against the Kurils. Five aborted and the only one to reach the target had to jettison its bombs because of overcast. Other efforts to bomb the Kurils were similarly foiled by weather on 2 and 3 March. By the end of that month, B-24's had been over the Kurils on eight occasions, but with uniform lack of results. In the meanwhile, B-25's and fighters were active only on local patrol. April brought somewhat better weather and eighteen missions were executed, twelve by the Liberators and six by Navy Venturas. For the most part they were night reconnaissance missions, entailing in all only sixty-five aircraft dispatched and twenty-eight tons of bombs expended.

The tempo of operations increased only slightly during the spring. The mediums got back into combat on 18-19 May by sinking two small picket boats west of Attu. They went farther west to sink a picket boat and a patrol boat off the Kurils on 22 and 29 May. The month's seventy sorties included two very successful reconnaissance missions: one over Matsuwa by Lt. Seymour B. Weiner's plane on the 12th, and one by Capt. Lorenzo E. Dixon's which on the 19th reached Buroton Bay, the Eleventh's deepest penetration down the Kurils.

In June, Task Group 90.0 dispatched twenty-five missions, ten from the Eleventh, the others from the Navy contingent. But they were small, averaging about three sorties per mission and were for the most part armed reconnaissance flights. One photographic mission was particularly successful. In April four specially equipped B-24's (F-7's) of the 2d Photo Charting Squadron had been directed to photograph all islands in the Kurils group.211 After completing the theater's instrument flying course, the four crews with their F-7's ("Blue Geese'' because of aquamarine camouflage) were sent to Attu for familiarization flights.212 On 14 June they got over the Kurils to find CAVU weather and take some 2,000 photos. In spite of this fine start, it was late August before the task had been finished. Interpretation of the photographs merely served to confirm previous impressions-that there were a number of minor installations but only three comparable in size to U.S. bases in the Aleutians: the Kataoka-Kashiwabara area, the Kurabu Cape airfield on Paramushiru, and Tagan Point airfield on Matsuwa.

As for AAF installations and organization, there had been further reduction during 1944. This process, affecting all the Eleventh's bases east of Adak (save Elmendorf), had begun in December 1943, when Yakutat, Annette, Fort Greeley, Naknek, and Atka were reduced to the status of airdromes and Juneau, Cordova, Gulkana, McGrath, Port Heiden, and Ogliuga were designated AAF airways stations. Naknek, the largest of these, had an allowance of twelve officers and ninety-five men; some garrisons had been reduced to one officer and ten men. By fall 1944, the Eleventh had been reduced from 17,000 to 11,000 men.214 With these reductions came corresponding changes in the command structure. As the center of gravity shifted westward, the Eleventh Air Force headquarters became less attached to Elmendorf and command activities increasingly centered at Adak. Much of the administrative work of the XI Air Force Service Command was divided between the Eleventh's own headquarters and the Alaskan Air Depot, and on 3 August the service command headquarters was abolished.215 Months earlier, on 3 March, the XI Fighter and XI Bomber Commands had met the same fate, with their headquarters personnel being absorbed by the 343d Fighter Group and the 28th Bombardment Group (C), respectively.216 For operational control over all combat units in the Near Islands, the XI Strategic Air Force had been activated at Shemya on 1 March-a small headquarters without administrative duties.

Amid the gloom of this general contraction there had remained one cheerful prospect-the B-29. Commanders in Alaska, as in every other theater, had special reasons why the assignment of the VLR plane would be particularly appropriate, and like commanders elsewhere they had no fields answering minimum specifications for the huge bomber. Aleutian airfields were, indeed, notoriously bad, and as early as 19 August 1943 the Eleventh had outlined a general paving program. When on 5 October the Joint Chiefs had approved the possible assignment of VLR units to the Aleutians, they had suggested that appropriate fields be ready by spring of 1944. Early in December authorization was given for paving Adak, Shemya, and Amchitka according to B-29 specifications, and construction was begun.218 In January, theater authorities tried to obtain from Washington a definite statement as to contemplated deployment, that they might shape construction plans accordingly.219 It was a question being posed by other theaters and it was not an easy one to answer. Tentative commitments for the earliest VLR groups had been made at the SEXTANT conference in Cairo in December, but those were not acceptable to all interested headquarters in Washington and in the several theaters, and the JWPC had been directed to prepare a study on the optimum use and deployment of B-29 units.220 The debate over the committee's findings continued through the early months of 1944.

There was never serious consideration of assigning the early B-29 units to the Aleutians-only of whether any groups should be deployed there later. In a mid-February conference in Washington, representatives of the Alaskan Department were informed that although the first eight B-29 groups were allotted elsewhere, some VLR units would eventually be assigned to the Aleutians, and they were encouraged to expedite work on installations to accommodate four groups.221 A week later this promise was withdrawn; no future commitments, however tentative, could be made since deployment would depend upon the strategic situation when the units were ready.222 When the joint planners finally presented their study on optimum deployment of B-29's on 2 March, they recommended that the first twenty groups be based in India and the Marianas. Consideration might be given for use of the next two groups in the Aleutians.223 This formula the Joint Chiefs accepted on 10 April and with it the Alaska theater had to abide.224 This meant effectively that no VLR units would be sent to the western Aleutians before the spring of 1945 at earliest, and that even thereafter the chances would be slim. Airfield construction was continued, with the prodigality demanded by global war, on the off-chance that the future might bring some need for runways capable of handling VHB planes. By early summer 1944 the North Pacific area was inactive, practically moribund; with the Marianas under siege and MacArthur's plans for his return to the Philippines taking shape, there was little reason to hope for any revival of activity in the north.

Yet the western Aleutians had achieved at least a considerable nuisance value. With their seizure and the turn of affairs elsewhere, the initiative in the north had passed from Japan to the United States. The tables were turned. It was now a reduced U.S. force which contained, through threat of attack or invasion, a considerable enemy force in the northern islands-Hokkaido and the Kurils. Japanese reinforcements had moved northward with the loss of Attu; their extent may be indicated in a list of approximate totals of the garrisons:

 Japanese reinforcements approximate totals of the garrisons

	1943	1944	1945
Kurils	8,000 to 14,200	41,000	27,000
Hokkaido	17,000 to 28,000	34,000	17,000

Even more important was the disposition of enemy air strength. In spite of desperate needs elsewhere, the Japanese kept over 400 aircraft (army and navy) based in the Hokkaido-Kurils area against the possibility of an invasion.

No invasion would come, only raids by light U.S. surface forces and by Army and Navy planes out of the Aleutians. The planes would keep pecking away in harassing raids and reconnaissance missions. The long flights were wearing and hazardous on crews and the results negligible. Whether the crews could take comfort in the knowledge that Japanese forces were immobilized in the northern islands is uncertain. Early in the war, General Arnold had deplored the dearth of combat units in the north, saying, "This is one hell of an air force you have up in Alaska." In 1944 the crews might have retorted, "This is one hell of a war we have up here too.

DECEMBER 1941

 SUNDAY, 7 DECEMBER 1941

ATO - AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA: Upon learning of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Command's 6 B-l8's and 12 P-36's take to the air to avoid being caught on their fields.

 MONDAY, 8 DECEMBER 1941

ATO - AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA: Starting today, B-18's fly armored reconnaissance each morning from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Kodiak Island in the Aleutian Islands.

 MONDAY, 29 DECEMBER 1941

ATO - AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA: In response to repeated requests by this Command to the War Department for additional aircraft to defend Alaska, the 77BS(M), 42BG(M), arrives at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage with 13 B-26's.

 TUESDAY, 30 DECEMBER 1941

ATO - AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA: The 11PS (Interceptor), Western Theater of Operations, US Army, arrives at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage with 25 P-40's.

JANUARY 1942

 THURSDAY, 15 JANUARY 1942

ATO - AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA: The Alaskan AF is activated at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage. The commander is Lieutenant Colonel Everett S Davis.

 THURSDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 1942

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALASKA (Alaskan AF): Alaskan AF is redesignated 11AF.

FEBRUARY 1942

 MONDAY, 9 FEBRUARY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Ft Greeley, Kodiak Island, Aleutian Islands with B-18's.

 TUESDAY, 17 FEBRUARY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Colonel Lidnel R Dunlap arrives from the ZI and becomes Commanding Officer of the 11AF.

MARCH 1942

 SUNDAY, 8 MARCH 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Colonel William O Butler assumes command of the 11AF with HQ at Ft Richardson, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska.

 SUNDAY, 15 MARCH 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): XI Interceptor Command is activated at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska, Colonel Norman D Sillin commanding. Its operational components are the 11th and the 18PS (Interceptor).

APRIL 1942

 SATURDAY, 18 APRIL 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 18PS (Interceptor), 28th Composite Goup, transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska to Ft Greely, Kodiak Island, Aleutian Islands with P-40's.

MAY 1942

 WEDNESDAY, 20 MAY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): CBI - INDIA-BURMA THEATER (10AF): 11BS(H), 7BG(H), arrives at Karachi, India from the US with B-17's; first Mission is 3 Jun.

 MONDAY, 25 MAY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 11FS, 28th Composite Group, based at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska with P-40's sends a detachment to Cold Bay.

 TUESDAY, 26 MAY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 11FS, 28th Composite Group, based at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Hawaii sends a detachment to Umnak Island, Aleutian Islands with P-40's.

 THURSDAY, 28 MAY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-17 flies the first armed reconnaissance from the secretly constructed airfield at Unmak Island, Aleutian Islands over the Aleutian Chain, but finds no sign of the enemy. XI Fighter Command elements are not deployed at Unmak (P-40's and P-38's), Cold Bay (P-40's), Kodiak (P-39's), and Elmendorf Field [P-38's and Royal Canadian AF (RCAF) Kittyhawks].

 SATURDAY, 30 MAY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 77BS(M), 28 Composite Group, based at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska, begins operating from Umnak Island, Aleutian Islands with B-26's.

 SUNDAY, 31 May 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 54FS, 55FG (attached to XI Fighter Command) arrives at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska with P-40's.

JUNE 1942

 MONDAY, 1 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During Jun 42, 11FS, 28 Composite Group, moves from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Ft Glenn, Umnak Island with P-40s.

During Jun, 406BS(M), 41BG(M), based at Paine Field, Everett, Washington, sends detachments to operate in Alaska with B-18s.

 WEDNESDAY, 3 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Japanese carrier-based bombers and fighters bomb and strafe Ft Mears and Dutch Harbor in several waves inflicting little damage but killing 52 US personnel. P-40s from Cold Bay trying to intercept them arrive 10 minutes after the last attack wave departs. Other P-40s at Umnak are notified too late due to communication failure. 9 P-40s and 6 B-26s fly a patrol but cannot find the fleet-l80 miles (288 km) S of Dutch Harborbut 2 of the P-40s engage 4 carrier-based aircraft, shoot down one and damage another.

 THURSDAY, 4 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A carrier-borne force strikes again as 11bombers, 10 fighters and 8 torpedo bombers attack Dutch Harbor in several waves. 2 P-40s intercept 4 bombers just before noon over Umnak Pass and shoot down 3.

During the afternoon P-40s intercept 9 fighters; a dogfight claims 1enemy aircraft and 1 P-40, the 11AF's first combat casualty. AA fire claims another Japanese bomber. During the afternoon 2 B-17s and 5 B-26s attack the carrier force, and 3 more B-26s strike the cruiser TAKAO; no hits are scored; 1 B-24 and 1 B-25 fail to return.

36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, based at Ft Greeley, Kodiak Island with B-17Es and LB-30s, sends detachments to operate from various bases in the Aleutian Islands.

 FRIDAY, 5 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 18 B-26s, 10 B-17s and 2 LB-30s search and attack sorties are flown against the carrier force, the B-26s splitting into 3 missions, the B-17s into 2. No contact is made. The B-17s using radar bomb targets which look like ships, but later turn out to be the Pribilof Islands.

 SATURDAY, 6 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Various bomber search-attack missions are flown in an attempt to contact the fleet reported near Seguam Island. No contact is made due to weather. 8 P-38s enroute from Cold Bay to Umnak Island mistakenly attack a Soviet freighter. The Japanese begin to land on Kiska Island.

 SUNDAY, 7 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Japanese troops invade Attu Island. More troops are put ashore on Kiska Island. An enemy airplane is sighted over Cold Bay but cannot be intercepted.

 MONDAY, 8 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1LB-30 flies armed patrol over Kiska and Umnak Islands and discovers Japanese naval units in Kiska Harbor.

 TUESDAY, 9 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Patrols are flown but encounter no aircraft.

 WEDNESDAY, 10 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Local patrol is flown at Umnak Island.

 THURSDAY, 11 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 11AF strikes at Kiska Island for the first time. 5 B-24's and 5 B-17s from Cold Bay load bombs at Umnak Island and hit Kiska harbor installations and shipping targets. Low-altitude runs score near misses on 2 cruisers and a destroyer. AA downs a B-24; the other B-24s are pursued by 4 fighters back to Unmak where US fighters drive them off. USN aircraft discover Japanese landing at Attu Island.

Air echelon of 21BS(H), 30BG(H), based at March Field, Riverside, California, begins operating from Umnak Island with B-24s.

 FRIDAY, 12 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-17s and 1 B-24 bomb shipping in the harbor at Kiska Island. A cruiser is heavily damaged and one destroyer is seen burning.

42FS, 54FG, based at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, begins operating from Kodiak, Alaska with P-39s.

 SATURDAY, 13 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): An LB-30 flies a weather mission and for the third straight day shipping in the harbor at Kiska Island is bombed by 5 B-17s and 3 B-24s; 2 heavy bombers turn back; the others bomb partially cloud-obscured targets. No effect is observed.

 SUNDAY, 14 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-17s and 3 B-24s bomb shipping in the harbor of Kiska Island from an altitude of 700 feet (213 m), lowest altitude yet. 2 cruisers are hit and one scout seaplane is downed. 2 B-17s are heavily damaged but return to base. The Japanese bomb Nazan Bay, Atka Island.

 MONDAY, 15 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A bombing Mission to Kiska Island by 3 B-17s and 2 B-24s is aborted due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 17 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A Kiska Harbor bombing Mission is cancelled due to weather as is a patrolling mission by heavy bombers.

 THURSDAY, 18 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1LB-30, 3 B-17s and 4 B-24s make a precision high-altitude attack on Kiska Harbor. A transport is left burning and sinking, another is mauled, and 2 scout planes are possibly shot down. 1 B-24 crashes at sea; part of its crew is saved.

 FRIDAY, 19 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): B-24s taking off to bomb Kiska Island abort due to fog. 1 of them and 2 of its crew are lost when forced to land in the water. A B-17 is dispatched to attack a reported submarine but makes no contact.

 SATURDAY, 20 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1LB-30, 1 B-17 and 7 B-24s take off on a search and bombing Mission over Kiska Island. 3 aircraft abort the mission due to weather, 3 bomb through an overcast with unobserved results, and 3 others search in vain for a B-24 lost on the preceding day.

56th and 57FSs, 54FG, based at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana begin operating from Nome and Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Alaska respectively with P-39s.

 SUNDAY, 21JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The War Department authorizes the XI AF Services Command, hitherto the Provisional Service Command, which is activated at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage. It is charged with maintaining and supplying all of the 11th's bases. Weather cancels all missions except an armed weather sortie over Kiska Island. Fighters fly local patrols.

 MONDAY, 22 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-17 weather reconnaissance aircraft flies over Kiska Island. Fighters fly air base patrols. A bombing Mission is cancelled due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 23 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather cancels a bombing mission. A B-17 flies a reconnaissance mission over Kiska Island. A P-40 on defensive patrol crashes at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage.

 WEDNESDAY, 24 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather cancels bombing. 1 B-17 flies a weather reconnaissance over Kiska Island. Fighters patrol airfields.

 THURSDAY, 25 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-17s, 4 B-24s and 1LB-30 fly bombing and weather missions over Kiska Island, bombing the N side of the harbor.

 FRIDAY, 26 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s drop incendiaries and fire bombs on Kiska Harbor installations.

 SUNDAY, 28 JUNE 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-17 weather aircraft flies over Kiska Island. A solid weather front cancels bombing. On this and the following day US advanced reconnaissance parties land on Adak Island from submarines.

JULY 1942

 WEDNESDAY, 1 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The XI BC (Provisional) comprising the 28th Composite Group and its assigned squadrons is activated, Colonel William O Eareckson in command. A B-17 flies weather reconnaissance over Kiska Island, Aleutian Islands and lands early due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 2 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24s and 1 B-17 fly photo and bombing missions to Attu Island, which appears deserted, and to Kiska and Agattu Islands; near misses are scored on a transport and a destroyer at Agattu.

 FRIDAY, 3 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24s and 2 B-17s bomb Kiska and Near Islands, encountering neither fighter opposition nor AA; results are not observed.

 SUNDAY, 5 JULY 1942

AMERICAN THEATER ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-17 flies a weather mission.

 MONDAY, 6 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s and 1LB-30 fly bombing and weather missions to Kiska Island; results are not observed.

 TUESDAY, 7 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-17 and 7 B-24s fly weather, bombing and photo missions to Kiska, Attu and Agattu Islands; all bombs are returned to base due to weather; 1seaplane is shot down.

 WEDNESDAY, 8 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 404BS(H), 44BG(H) arrives in the Alaskan Theater with B-24s, originally destined for N Africa; first Mission is 18 Jul. In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies 2 photo missions over the S shore of Kiska Island and over Little Kiska Island; the bombing Mission is cancelled due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 9 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s fly photo, weather, and bombing missions to Kiska Island but return with the bombs due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 10 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 aborts a reconnaissance mission to Kiska Island due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 11 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s taking off for weather, bombing and photo missions to Kiska Island are attack by seaplane fighters; no losses. A cruiser is bombed with unobserved results.

 SUNDAY, 12 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s dispatched on weather, photo and bombing Mission to Kiska Island abort due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 15 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s on a bombing Mission to Kiska Island turn back due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 17 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-17s and 7 B-24s fly weather, bombing and photo missions; shipping is bombed and North and South Heads of Kiska Island are photographed; fighters down 1 B-17.

 SATURDAY, 18 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-17 flying weather and photo reconnaissance over Kiska Island crashes on Umnak Island, Aleutian Islands.

 SUNDAY, 19 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Search missions are flown over Attu and Agattu Islands.

 MONDAY, 20 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Brigadier General William O Butler moves advance HQ to Umnak Island. 3 B-17s bomb Kiska Island (especially the barracks) with incendiaries and demolition charges. 4 P-38s try to intercept 4 fighters reported by USN (USN) aircraft but no contact is made.

 TUESDAY, 21 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s fly search and bomb missions over Kiska Island but make no contact because of weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 22 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 8 B-24s and 2 B-17s dispatched to Kiska Island, only 8 reach the target and due to fog drop only 7 bombs with unobserved results; 1 B-24 is missing on the return flight.

 TUESDAY, 28 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): An air coverage survey for Army ground operations to Adak and Tanaga Islands is flown. Weather cancels a bombing Mission to Kiska Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 29 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s and 5 B-17s bomb vessels and installations in the Kiska Harbor area with unobserved results due to clouds.

 THURSDAY, 30 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1LB-30, 9 B-17s and 3 B-24s fly photo reconnaissance and bombing missions to Tanaga and Kiska Islands; the mission s are unsuccessful due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 31 JULY 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 and 1LB-30 fly weather and photo reconnaissance; weather cancels a combat mission to Kiska Island.

AUGUST 1942

 SATURDAY, 1 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather and photo reconnaissance is flown by 1 B-24 and 1LB-30 over Korovin Bay and North Cape, Aleutian Islands.

 MONDAY, 3 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 3 B-17s, 2 B-24s and 1LB-30 fly a bombing and photo reconnaissance mission to Tanaga and Kanaga Islands and also bomb Kiska Island; 4 of the aircraft have mechanical trouble but all return.

 TUESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1LB-30 flies a photo mission and 2 B-17s and 3 B-24s covered by 8 P-38's escort USN (USN) tenders to Nazan Bay, Atka Island, Aleutian Islands; two 4-engine seaplane bombers and a possible third are downed near Atka Island by 2 of the P-38's, in their first aerial combat in any theater; weather cancels bombing Mission to Kiska Island.

 THURSDAY, 6 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s, 2 B-17s and 10 P-38s provide air coverage for USN tenders to Nazan Bay, Atka Island; photo reconnaissance is flown over Attu Island, Aleutian Islands.

 FRIDAY, 7 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s dispatched to bomb Kiska Island return with their bombs due to solid overcast; 4 more B-24s also depart for Kiska; 1 turns back with mechanical trouble, the others abort the mission over the target due to undercast; 1 B-24, 4 P-38s and an LB-30 fly 2 air coverage missions at Nazan Bay, Atka Island for USN tenders.

 SATURDAY, 8 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1LB-30, 3 B-24s and 8 P-38s on photo and bombing missions over Kiska Island cannot attack but Navy PBYs also operating over and off Kiska Island hit freighters and a transport, claiming 1 transport sinking, and score many hits on North Head and Main Camp.

 SUNDAY, 9 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 bombers fly armed reconnaissance over Kiska and Attu Islands and hit Kiska Island.

 MONDAY, 10 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-17s and 3 B-24s bomb Kiska Island targets; fighters and AA down 1 B-24 and only the pilot is saved.

 TUESDAY, 11 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over W Semichi Island and the N coast of Attu Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 12 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over Amlia and Atka Islands.

 THURSDAY, 13 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over Kiska Island.

 FRIDAY, 14 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-24 trying to fly photo reconnaissance over Tanaga and Adak Islands aborts over Kiska Island due to weather.

 SUNDAY, 16 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 aborts a photo reconnaissance flight over Adak Island because of mechanical failure.

 MONDAY, 17 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over Buldir, Kiska and Amchitka Islands, Aleutian Islands, despite heavy rain.

 TUESDAY, 18 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 takes oblique photos of Amchitka and Tanaga Islands; Heavy fog over Kiska and Attu Islands precludes armed reconnaissance.

 WEDNESDAY, 19 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Mechanical failure prevents a B-24 from flying reconnaissance over Tanaga Island.

 THURSDAY, 20 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over Kiska Island; a patrol is flown over Shumagin Island, Aleutian Islands.

 FRIDAY, 21 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 trying to fly reconnaissance over Kiska Island aborts due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 22 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A photo reconnaissance mission over Kiska Island is aborted due to overcast.

 MONDAY 24 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 404BS(H), 28th Composite Group, begins to operate from Umnak Island, Aleutian Islands with B-24s. A photo reconnaissance sortie is cancelled due to overcast.

 TUESDAY, 25 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A photo reconnaissance airplane flies over Kiska, Attu and Adak Islands, then turns back because of mechanical failure.

 WEDNESDAY, 26 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A photo mission is aborted over Atka Island due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 27 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-17s, 6 B-24s, and 2 P-38s fly weather, reconnaissance and patrol missions over Kiska and Atka Islands. The Japanese begin to transfer the Attu Island garrison to Kiska Island, which is completed on 16 Sep.

 FRIDAY, 28 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 3 B-17s bombing Kiska Island, 1fails to return; all available B-24s and 2 flights of P-38s fly naval cover at Nazan Bay, Atka Island; and an attack mission to Attu Island is cancelled due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 29 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A USN PBY reports a force of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers NW of Umnak Island; thereupon all aircraft of the 11th go on attack alert; the surface force then identifies itself as friendly.

 SUNDAY, 30 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): US troops occupy Kuluk Bay, Adak Island, amidst a terrific storm and start building a runway. 5 B-24s photograph Kiska Island but do not bomb due to overcast, and then fly patrol and photo reconnaissance over Amchitka and Tanaga Islands. P-38s fly patrol between Great Sitkin and Little Tanaga Islands.

 MONDAY 31 AUGUST 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 2 B-24s flying weather, reconnaissance and patrol missions over Tanaga Island, 1returns due to weather.

SEPTEMBER 1942

 TUESDAY, 1 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): US forces complete the occupation of Adak Island, Aleutian Islands. During Sep, HQ 343FG moves from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Ft Glenn, Umnak Island, Aleutian Islands. The detachment of the 11FS, XI Fighter Command, operating from Ft Randall, Cold Bay, Alaska with P-40s, returns to base at Ft Glenn.

 WEDNESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 6 bombers and 12 P-38s fly cover and photo reconnaissance over Nazan and Kuluk Bays on Adak Island, and Amchitka and Semisopochnoi Islands.

 THURSDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, of 6 bombers and 5 P-38s off to bomb Kiska Island and flying air cover over Kuluk Bay, Adak Island, 5 bombers and 3 fighters abort due to weather; the others strafe seaplanes and boats in Kiska Harbor and nearby installations; between 1 and 4 seaplanes are claimed destroyed on the water; this is the longest over-water attack flight thus far in World War II; the 2 fighters which reach the target area return from the 1,260 mile (2,028 km) round trip with only 40 US gallons (151l) of fuel; and the 21BS(H), 30BG(under control of the 28th Composite Group), arrives at Umnak Island from the US with B-24s.

 FRIDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 bombers and 1 P-38 bomb and patrol Nazan and Kuluk Bays, but bombing of Kiska Island is cancelled due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 5 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s abort the bombing of Kiska Island due to an overcast.

 SUNDAY, 6 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flying patrol and armed reconnaissance over Tanaga Island, Aleutian Islands, sinks a mine layer and strafes a tender as well as nearby tents and buildings.

 MONDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s patrol and bomb Kiska Island Harbor and camp area and also patrol Tanaga Island; they are attacked by 3 sea fighters of which at least 1 is downed.

 TUESDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 and 1 B-26 fly photo reconnaissance over Agattu, Attu, and Kiska Islands; the detachment of the 42FS, 54FG, operating from Kodiak with P-39s begins a movement to Adak (the squadron is based at Harding Field, Louisiana).

 WEDNESDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-26 patrols Tanaga and Adak Islands.

 THURSDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather, photo reconnaissance, and patrol missions are flown during the morning over Nazan Bay, Tanaga, Adak and Amchitka Islands; poor weather is encountered at Kiska, Attu, and Agattu Islands; a detachment of the 42FS, 54FG arrives at Adak Island with P-39s (the squadron is based at Harding Field, Louisiana).

 FRIDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather, photo, and patrol aircraft draws AA fire over Chichagof Harbor, Attu Island and also covers Tanaga, Amchitka, and Semichi Islands, Aleutian Islands. HQ 343FG is actived at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage.

 SATURDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a weather and patrol reconnaissance aircraft finds overcast at Kiska Island but takes photos over Tanaga, Kanaga, and Attu Islands. The runway at Adak Island is completed.

 SUNDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 14 B-24s of the 21 and 404BS(H) move up to Adak Island. 1LB-30 and 2 P-38s fly a photo reconnaissance, antisubmarine coverage and strafing mission over Kiska Island lakes and harbor; a tender in the harbor is slightly damaged, 1float fighter is downed; a P-38 is hit by AA fire and fighters damage the LB-30.

 MONDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the first combined heavy mission over Kiska Island 13 B-24s, 1 B-17, 14 P-38s, and 14 P-39s fly low-altitude and photo runs; the P-39s shell 3 submarines in the harbor; the other aircraft bomb and strafe many installations including AA guns and the submarine base; a single aircraft also strafes Segula Island; enemy losses are 5 float planes shot down and 1flying boat destroyed on the water; 2 mine sweepers sunk and another vessel slightly damaged; while a large cargo vessel and several small barges and vessels sustain hits; 2 P-38s are lost, colliding head-on while after a fighter.

 TUESDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 fly armed reconnaissance over Kiska Island, and at Amchitka Island blast buildings in the Constantine Harbor area; fighters strafe Kiska Island Camp area and down 4 intercepting aircraft.

 WEDNESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The Japanese completes transfer of the Attu Island garrison to Kiska Island, begun on 27 Aug; 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 fly photo and reconnaissance runs over Adak Island.

 MONDAY, 21 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Bombers fly reconnaissance over Kiska Island and bomb and fire Constantine Harbor installations at Amchitka Island; and the 21BS(H), 30BG(H) (operating under control of the 28th Composite Group), based on Umnak Island, begins operating from Adak Island with B-24s.

 TUESDAY, 22 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24s, 2 B-17s, and 1LB-30, accompanied by 15 P-39s and 20 P-40s, abort a Kiska Island bombing Mission due to weather; photo reconnaissance suggests that Chichagof Harbor, Attu Island is abandoned.

 WEDNESDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather causes a mission abort to Kiska Island; photo reconnaissance over Attu Island confirms it's abandonment by the enemy; a USN (USN) PBY escorted by 2 P-38s lands off Amchitka Island with a scouting party which determines that the island is unsuited as an airfield; the P-38s also bomb a radio shack and sink a submarine at Amchitka Island.

 THURSDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Kiska Island, 3 B-24s bomb Main Camp, storage dumps, and dock areas, starting several fires.

 FRIDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24s, 1 B-17, and 1 B-24 photo airplane, escorted by 11 P-39s and 17 P-40s, fly he first of 2 missions to Kiska Island; Royal Canadian AF (RCAF) Kittyhawks participate in this first combined Canadian-American Mission of the 11AF; later 2 B-24s and a B-17, escorted by 15 P-39s, pound Little Kiska and Kiska Islands; radar installations at Little Kiska Island are destroyed and explosions and fires are caused in the Main Camp area; other targets include shipping, stores, and tents; the P-39s also strafe 2 submarines; 2 float planes are downed; 5 to 8 biplanes are probably destroyed on the water; 1large transport vessel is hit and lists badly; and 150 personnel are believed killed.

 SATURDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 destroyer and 1 freighter are bombed N of Atka Island at 53-30N 174-20E; 2 near misses are scored on the freighter.

 SUNDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Shore and harbor areas of Kiska Island are bombed: 8 B-24s and 1 B-17, escorted by 1 P-38, 13 P-39s and 4 P-40s take off first, and are followed by 6 unescorted B-24s; weather turns back 13 of the fighters; an LB-30 flies photo-weather reconnaissance over Attu, Buldir, the Semichi, Agattu, and Amchitka Islands.

 MONDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 bombing missions are flown to Kiska and Attu Islands by 7 B-24s, 1 B-17, and 1LB-30, escorted by 17 fighters; installations on Kiska Island and a freighter nearby are bombed; 1 of the B-24s and the LB-30 bomb the village and Chichagof Harbor on Attu Island and on returning silence AA guns on a freighter; 5 floatplanes are shot down, and 1 submarine is sunk; 1 P-39 is shot down.

 TUESDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A morning armed reconnaissance mission is flown by an LB-30 over Semichi and Attu Islands; it strafes a ship at Attu Island; 3 B-24s bomb and strafe sea transport, scoring no hits.

 WEDNESDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 9 B-24s off to bomb Kiska and Attu Islands, 2 turn back; the others blast the Attu Camp area, and at Kiska Harbor score at least 1direct hit and near misses on a ship; 8 fighters intercept over Kiska and Little Kiska Islands but inflict no losses; the detachment of the 57FS, 54FG operating from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage moves to Kodiak with P-39s (the squadron is based at Harding Field, Louisiana).

OCTOBER 1942

 THURSDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a Japanese reconnaissance airplane over Adak Island establishes US occupation of the island; 7 B-24s on a search-attack and photo reconnaissance mission over Kiska Island hit hangars and ramps, starting several fires; 4 fighters appear and are engaged; 1probable victory is claimed; 2 other B-24s take off, after a Navy PBY contact a transport, but cannot locate it.

 FRIDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Kiska Island, 11 B-24s and 6 P-39s bomb 2 cargo ships in the harbor (no hits observed), drop demolition charges throughout the Main Camp area, and hit a hangar S of the seaplane ramp; 4 floatplanes and 1biplane are shot down. Enemy aircraft bomb the Adak Island airfield without inflicting damage.

 SATURDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s, 4 P-38s, and 8 P-39s bomb and strafe 7 vessels in and around Kiska Island Harbor hitting a beached cargo vessel and the camp; the fighters down 6 float fighters attempting interception; the enemy bombs Adak Island Airfield but inflicts no damage. The 77BS(M), 28th Composite Group, moves from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Adak Island (the squadron continues to operate from Umnak Island with B-25s and B-26s until Dec 42).

 SUNDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s abort weather, bombing and photo missions over Kiska Island due to weather and instead attack a cargo vessel; the ship's rudder is probably damaged; 1 B-24 is damaged.

 MONDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s, 3 P-38s and 3 P-39s abort a bombing, weather, and photo mission over Kiska Island due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-24s, 1 B-17, 10 P-39s, and 8 P-38s fly bombing and weather missions over Kiska Island; a large transport is bombed in the harbor which is left sinking; hits are scored on a corvette and on a large freighter at Gertrude Cove and on a hangar in Main Camp; the radio station is damaged; a float fighter is strafed and set afire, and 6 Zekes are hit on the water.

 WEDNESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 3 B-24s taking off to bomb Kiska Island and patrol Near Island abort mission due to mechanical failure and instead fly reconnaissance over Agattu, Attu, and Semichi Islands with negative results.

 THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24s, 3 B-17s, and 12 P-38s blast Kiska Island Harbor installations (starting fires in Main Camp), and strafe AA positions, hangars, a corvette (silencing her guns), and a freighter.

 FRIDAY, 9 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-17s and 10 B-24s escorted by 6 P-38s and 4 P-39s bomb the harbor at Kiska Island, installations, and shipping 6 times; targets include shipping in Gertrude Cove, small cargo vessels in Kiska Harbor, installations at North Head, a hangar, Main Camp area (hit several times), and various shore facilities.

 SATURDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 10 B-24s, 7 B-17s, and 4 P-38s fly 4 missions to Kiska Island; the third mission (3 B-17s) does not make contact; the others bomb and strafe the Main Camp area, hit shipping in Trout Lagoon and off South Head, where gun positions and installations are also blasted; fires are started in the Main Camp and hangar areas. The 344FS, 343FG, is activated at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage with P-40s.

 SUNDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Kiska Island is hit by 3 bombing and strafing missions flown by 10 B-24s and 3 B-17s; the B-17s make no contact; the B-24s blast harbor targets and Main Camp.

 MONDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s abort bombing of Kiska Island due to overcast and instead fly shipping search W of Attu Island.

 TUESDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A search mission is not completed due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24s, 6 B-26s, 1 B-17 and 12 P-38s bomb and strafe Kiska Island installations and shipping; fire bombs are dropped on hangars and the Main Camp area where a large fire is started; 2 torpedo attacks on shipping in Gertrude Cove score no hits; the P-38s destroy 3 floatplanes on water; 1 P-38 is shot down.

 THURSDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-26s bomb and 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over Kiska and Attu Islands; the B-26s hit a large cargo ship in Gertrude Cove, Kiska Island, starting a fire, and hit buildings on Attu Island; AA claims 1 B-26.

 FRIDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-17, 6 B-26s, and 4 P-38s bomb Kiska Island and lowlevel bomb and sink 2 destroyers just N of there; duds hit a large freighter beached off Trout Lagoon; 1 B-26 is shot down.

 SATURDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s bomb the Main Camp area on Kiska Island and a beached vessel in Trout Lagoon; the results are unobserved due to clouds; 1 B-24 flying weather reconnaissance finds no trace of 2 destroyers, confirming their sinking on 16 Oct.

 SUNDAY, 18 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, on Kiska Island 4 B-24s bomb Main Camp, score near misses on a beached vessel in Trout Lagoon, and hit a gasoline storage area; weather aircraft flies reconnaissance over Attu, Segula, Little Sitkin, and Gareloi Islands.

 MONDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-17 flies weather reconnaissance and bomb runs over Attu, Semichi, Kiska, and Amchitka Islands; 6 B-24s dispatched to bomb Kiska Island abort the mission due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 20 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s take off for Kiska Island but return due to weather; reconnaissance is flown to 70 miles (113 km) E of Attu Island; a negative search is made for a missing C-53. The detachment of the 56FS, 54FG, moves from Nome to Elmendorf Field, Alaska with P-39s (the squadron is based at Harding Field, Louisiana).

 WEDNESDAY, 21 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather reconnaissance aircraft returns twice due to fog.

 THURSDAY, 22 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather reconnaissance aircraft reports a submarine at 52-08N 177-21W; a USN (US) aircraft later makes contact and drops depth bomb; the result is unknown.

 FRIDAY, 23 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Armed reconnaissance by 7 bombers, escorted by 6 P-38s, is flown over Kiska Island installations, chiefly the submarine base and Main Camp; visibility is excellent and direct hits are scored, including 1on the submarine base. A detachment of the 56FS, 54FG, based at Harding Field, Louisiana, begins operating from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage with P-39s.

 SATURDAY, 24 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-17s hit the Kiska Island submarine base; results are not observed; and a weather reconnaissance flight is made over Attu Island.

 TUESDAY, 27 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s flying an attack on the Kiska Island submarine base turn back due to weather; a weather aircraft flies reconnaissance over Gareloi, Segula, Kiska, and Attu Islands, Aleutian Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 28 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s turn back from an attempted attack on the Kiska Island submarine base because of adverse weather; a B-17 bombs Attu Island with unobserved results and flies weather reconnaissance over Kiska, Amchitka, and Tanaga Islands, Aleutian Islands.

 THURSDAY, 29 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The Japanese reoccupy Attu Island; a special reconnaissance flown with Lieutenant General Simon B Buckner, covers Tanaga, Amchitka, and Kiska Islands.

 FRIDAY, 30 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 twice flies reconnaissance over Kiska and Agattu Islands; there are no bombing Mission as all bombers are on alert for possible naval targets.

 SATURDAY, 31 OCTOBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weather and reconnaissance flight over Attu and Kiska Islands; over Kiska Island, the weather aircraft draws AA fire from Little Kiska Island; no other missions as all combat aircraft are alerted for a possible naval target.

NOVEMBER 1942

 WEDNESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, bad weather at Umnak Island and Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and a flooded field at Adak Island preclude missions; a new Adak Island runway permits an air alert.

 THURSDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands weather reconnaissance is flown over Kiska and Little Kiska Islands.

 FRIDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather aircraft is forced back near Kiska Island.

 SATURDAY, 7 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 6 B-24s and 2 B-26s attack the submarine base in Kiska Island Harbor, slightly damaging float fighters and a seaplane beached by storm; a B-17 flies reconnaissance over the airfield W of Holtz Bay on Attu Island, and bombs the submarine base and a previously-damaged freighter in Gertrude Cove on Kiska Island.

 SUNDAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, there is an intermittent air alert; the weather aircraft returns due to icing.

 MONDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-26s and 4 P-38s bomb a cargo ship in Gertrude Cove, Kiska Island; no hits; 2 P-38s then strafe the harbor area on Kiska Island; 1 B-17 and 4 P-38s attack Holtz Bay, Attu Island Island and Attu Island Airfield, destroying 8 float Zekes; 1 B-17 flies weather reconnaissance over Attu, Kiska, and Segula Islands.

 TUESDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance is flown over Attu, Semichi, Segula, Alaid, and Kiska Islands; 5 B-24s and 1 B-17 bomb Kiska Island, but they cannot bomb the Kika submarine base and return with some bombs; 2 P-38s and 1OA-10 fly local air coverage.

 WEDNESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 3 B-26s, 3 B-17s, and 3 B-24s are over Kiska Island; the B-26s make unsuccessful runs on a ship in Gertrude Cove; the B-17s and B-24s find the submarine base closed by weather.

A weather aircraft flies over Attu and Amchitka Islands.

 THURSDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, bombers are on alert at Umnak and Adak Islands to attack any reported naval targets; intermittent fighter patrols fly over Adak Island. The 344FS, 343FG, based at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, sends a detachment to Cold Bay, Alaska with P-40s.

 FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance over Attu and Agattu Islands reveals 5 landing barges in Chichagof harbor on Attu Island.

 SATURDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies armed reconnaissance over Kiska and Attu Islands and bombs Holtz Bay and Chichagof on Attu Island with negative results; bombers at Adak and Umnak Islands are alerted for shipping targets.

 SUNDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 21BS(H), 30BG(H) (under control of the 28th Composite Group), ceases operating from Adak Island and returns to base on Umnak island with B-24s.

The 406BS(M), 41BG(M): (attached to 28th Composite Group), arrives at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage from the US with A-29s and B-18s (the squadron has been operating from Alaska since Jun 42).

 MONDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a weather reconnaissance flight is flown over Kiska and Attu Islands. On Attu Island, demolition charges are dropped on Holtz Bay, AA guns, and on a village; results are not observed.

 TUESDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, weather a reconnaissance aircraft is forced back by weather W of Kiska Island; bombers are on alert to attack surface vessels.

 WEDNESDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, armed reconnaissance is flown over Kiska and Attu Islands; no bombs are dropped.

 THURSDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance aircraft over Attu and Agattu Islands sights 2 unidentified float monoplanes E of Buldir Island.

 FRIDAY, 20 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A reconnaissance aircraft over Kiska Island draws heavy AA from Gertrude Cove.

 SATURDAY, 21 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Attu, and Agattu Islands.

 SUNDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-24 flies reconnaissance over Kiska, Attu, and Agattu Islands; bombers and fighters are alerted for a 23 Nov Mission to find and destroy a reported 5-vessel convoy.

 MONDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Attu, Agattu, and Amchitka Islands.

 TUESDAY, 24 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies reconnaissance over Kiska Island; weather precludes the westward continuation of reconnaissance; a scheduled Mission of 8 B-24s and 4 B-26s to Kiska Island is called off due to icing conditions.

 WEDNESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Attu and the Semichi Islands.

 THURSDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-24 reconnoitering Holtz Bay harbor on Attu Island spots shipping targets which are subsequently hit by 4 B-26s escorted by 4 P-38s; 1large vessel is claimed afire and sinking; reconnaissance is flown over Rat Island, Kiska Island shipping, Agattu and Semichi Islands and the N coast of Attu Island; 2 P-38s and 1 B-26 sustain minor damage.

 FRIDAY, 27 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Photo reconnaissance covers Kiska, Amchitka and Attu Islands; a ship attacked in Holtz Bay on Attu Island on the previous day is observed lower in water and still burning.

 SATURDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 photographs a beached freighter at Holtz Bay, Attu Island drawing no AA fire during 10 runs over the bay, and flies reconnaissance over Kiska Island.

 SUNDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 over Holtz Bay, Attu Island reports the vessel bombed and damaged on 26 Nov as still sinking; 1 B-26 flies an uneventful reconnaissance over the S shore of Kiska Island.

 MONDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 1942

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies reconnaissance over Semichi and Attu Islands; other flights are prevented by weather.

DECEMBER 1942

 TUESDAY, 1 DECEMBER 1942

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (6 and 7AFs): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-24 flies reconnaissance over the Semichis and Attu Islands. Weather prevents any other flights.

The detachment of the 52FS, 32FG that has been operating from Seymour Island, Galapagos Islands with P-40s since 5 Jun 42 returns to France Field, Canal Zone.

The detachment of the 57FS, 54FG with P-39s that has been operating in Alaska since 20 Jun 42 returns to it base at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

 SUNDAY, 6 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): Reconnaissance is flown over Attu, Agattu, Amchitka, Kiska and the Semichis Islands.

The 18FS, 343FG with P-40s transfers from Alaska to Adak Island, Aleutian Islands.

 SATURDAY, 12 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, an attempted photographic reconnaissance mission over Kiska Island by a B-24 and two P-38s returns without result due to weather.

Another reconnaissance B-24 is turned back by a weather front west of Buldir Island.

The detachment of the 42FS, 54FG, which has been operating in Alaska with P-39s since Jun 42, returns to its base at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

 SUNDAY, 13 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a largely negative reconnaissance is flown over Attu, Agattu, Kiska, Amchitka and the Semichis Islands by two B-24s and two P-38s.

 THURSDAY, 17 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a reconnaissance sortie is flown over Attu, Agattu, Kiska, Amchitka and the Semichis Islands. Two attacks by five B-24s, two B-25s and four B-26s--the second attack escorted by eight P-38s--take off for Kiska Island. On the first mission, four B-24s, gets through and hit the submarine base area, marine railway, buildings, and communication facilities. The second Mission aborts due to weather. P-38s and B-24s also fly offshore patrol between Vega Point and Little Kiska.

 FRIDAY, 18 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 flies reconnaissance over Kiska, Attu, Agattu and Semichis Islands.

 SATURDAY, 19 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, two B-24s fly reconnaissance and patrol over Amchitka and Kiska Islands. Four escorting P-38s turn back due to weather and mechanical difficulties.

 SUNDAY, 20 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, four B-26s, five B-24s, five B-25s and nine P-38s make a coordinated bombing, strafing, and incendiary attack on Kiska Harbor installations and vicinity, especially on the submarine base and near the marine railway and gun emplacements. A direct hit is scored on a probable ammunition dump. P-38s also strafe a previously damaged cargo ship off Trout Lagoon. One B-24 and two P-38s fly photographic and reconnaissance patrol over Attu, Agattu, Semichis and Amchitka Islands.

 MONDAY, 21 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, one B-24s flies an uneventful reconnaissance over Amchitka, Kiska, Semichis and Attu Islands. A B-24 and two P-38s abort a photographic Mission due to weather.

A detachment of the 56FS, 54FG, which has been operating P-39s in Alaska since 20 Jun 42, returns to its base at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

 TUESDAY, 22 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, all missions including a B-24 weather reconnaissance weather run are cancelled due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 24 DECEMBER 1942 (CHRISTMAS EVE):

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the reconnaissance aircraft over Kiska finds shipping there unchanged. Weather cancel all other missions.

 FRIDAY, 25 DECEMBER 1942 (CHRISTMAS DAY):

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 takes photographs of Kiska and Attu Islands and unsuccessfully bombs five barges between Gertrude Cove and Kiska Harbor.

The B-24 then sights eight float Zekes; three Zekes unsuccessfully attempt to attack the B-24.

HQ 344FS, 343FG with P-40s transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Ft Randall, Cold Bay.

 SATURDAY, 26 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, six B-24s and nine P-38s attack Holtz Bay but do not find the eight float Zekes seen there yesterday; the P-38s strafe Attu installations at minimum altitude. while the B-24s bomb Sarana Bay. AA fire downs on P-38 and damages another. Later, six B-25s and four P-38s over Kiska and Gertrude Cove abort due to low ceiling. An OA-10 flies reconnaissance over northeast Kiska.

 SUNDAY, 27 DECEMBER 1942

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, two B-24s flying reconnaissance over Kiska and Amchitka Islands abort in bad weather.

 MONDAY, 28 DECEMBER 1942

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (2AF and 11AF's): In the Aleutians, icing conditions and low visibility prevent all flying.

 WEDNESDAY, 30 DECEMBER 1942

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Second and 11AFs): In the Aleutians, B-25s and 14 P-38s approach Kiska Harbor at minimum altitude for a bombing and strafing attack. Two ships and three submarines, newly arrived, are covered by Zekes. Four of the Zekes engage the approaching P-38s in a dogfight; two P-38s are shot down and four Zekes are listed as probables. The B-25s meanwhile attack the ships with unobserved results; one B-25 is shot down off Little Kiska. A Navy PBY picks up survivors, but fails to return to base. Kiska Harbor is then attacked once more by five B-24s, four B-25s and four B-26s. They claim hits on both vessels observing explosions on the smaller ship. A B-24 photographs Amchitka while a weather reconnaissance of Near Island is cancelled due to weather. Aerial reconnaissance observes for the first time Japanese use of a smoke screen at Kiska Harbor.

 THURSDAY, 31 DECEMBER 1942 (NEW YEAR'S EVE):

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, six B-24s covered by nine P-38s, attack Kiska Harbor, hitting two cargo vessels; one of six intercepting Japanese aircraft is probably shot down. A B-25 searching for the Navy PBY missing since yesterday also flies reconnaissance over Semisopochnoi, Segula, Little Sitkin, Gareloi and Amchitka.

JANUARY 1943

 SATURDAY, 2 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aluetian Islands, three B-25s, three B-26s and eight P-38s heading for Kiska are forced back by bad wether. The weather aircraft cannot see into Kiska Harbor or Gertrude Cove. Two B-24s fly photographic reconnaissance over Amchitka and encounter poor weather. An OA-10 unsuccessfully searches the islands east of Segula for a missing OA-10.

 MONDAY, 4 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, six B-24s, three B-25s, three B-26s and ten P-40s en route to Kiska, are forced back near Segula by snow squalls and low ceiling. The weather aircraft flies unsuccessful reconnaissance over Kiska and photographic reconnaissance is flown over Amchitka. An OA-10 investigates flares reported near Kagalaska Strait.

 TUESDAY, 5 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, three B-25s sink a 6,500-ton cargo vessel previously sighted by a PBY off Holtz Bay, where a weather and armed reconnaissance B-24 with a direct bomb hits and sinks another freighter shortly afterwards. A B-24 flies photographic reconnaissance over Amchitka, concentrating on Constantine Harbor. A Kiska attack mission of six heavy bombers, six medium bombers and 12 fighters is cancelled due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 6 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, reconnaissance is flown over Amchitka, the Semichis, Agattu and Attu. Flotsam sighted outside of Holtz Bay confirms that the freighter bombed yesterday sank. Six B-24s, six B-25s and 12 P-38s take off to attack Kiska; the P-38s and one B-24 turn back due to weather. The B-25s find the target obscured and five Zekes waiting to intercept them, whereupon they turn back without attacking. The five remaining B-24s circle Kiska without contacting enemy aircraft; one of the B-24s, exploiting a break in the cloud cover, bombs the Kiska submarine base area which the others then bomb through the clouds.

 THURSDAY, 7 JANUARY 1943

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (6AF and 11AF): In the Aleutians, six B-25s and 12 P-38s dispatched to Kiska turn back due to cloud cover. Six B-24s circle over Kiska for two hours until four can bomb the submarine base. AA fire damages three of the attackers.

Negative reconnaissance is flown over Amchitka, Kiska, Agattu and Attu.

Photographs taken reveal use of smoke pots by the defenders and also suggest construction of a fighter strip along the ridge south of Salmon Lagoon.

 FRIDAY, 8 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 flies photographic reconnaissance over Amchitka.

Another B-24 aborts a weather run over Kiska because of instrument trouble.

 SATURDAY, 9 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): The first flight of the Lockheed Constellation, lasting 58 minutes, is made from Lockheed Air Terminal, Burbank, California. The aircraft, Lockheed Model 49-46-10, serial number 049-1961, registered NX25600, is flown by Eddie Allen. Later today, the aircraft is flown to Muroc Flight Test Base (now Edwards AFB), Muroc, California, for additional tests.

After numerous tests, the aircraft is delivered to the USAAF (Lockheed says 28 Jul 43; the USAAF says 29 Jul 43) as C-69-LO, USAAF serial number 43-10309, and is immediately loaned back to Lockheed for further tests and development; redesignated XC-69E in Jan 46 when re-engined. The aircraft is sold to Howard Hughes in mid-46 for $20,000; later sold to Lockheed in May 50 for $100,000 with 404 hours on the airframe. After years of being used for Constellation development work, the aircraft is sold to California Airmotive in Dec 58 for spare parts; the nose section up to the leading edge of the wings is used to repair another Connie; the remainder of the aircraft is eventually scrapped. (ANOTHER ONE LOST!!!, JEM): In the Aleutians, 50+ knot winds at Adak ground all missions.

 TUESDAY, 12 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, two B-24s cover a small US Army and Navy force landing unopposed at Amchitka. Two B-25s and four P-38 escorts alson on the cover Mission turn back due to weather. Weather reconnaissance is flown over Attu, Agatuu, Semichis and, lastly, over Kiska Harbor, where four ships are observed.

 WEDNESDAY, 13 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, three bombers and four fighters are in the air. The weather reconnaissance aircraft returns west of Kiska due to high winds.

Constantine Harbor is patrolled until weather forces aircraft to return.

An attack on Kiska is cancelled.

 FRIDAY, 15 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a total of eight P-38s, three B-25s and a B-24 patrol Constantine Harbor, fly reconnaissance over Kiska, where one ship is sighted, and fly negative armored reconnaissance runs over Attu, the Semichis and Buldir.

 SATURDAY, 16 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, six B-24s off to hit Kiska return due to weather. A B-24 flies negative reconnaissance over Buldir, the Semichis, Attu and Agattu.

 MONDAY, 18 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 on reconnaissance reports two vessels in Kiska Harbor. Thereupon four B-24s, four B-26s, one B-25 and six P-38s fly out of Adak. Mechanical trouble forces two B-26s to return. The bomb run is negative. Meanwhile bad weather closes in on Kiska and Adak. Six aircraft are lost; one B-24 lands in a 20 mph downwind and crashes into two P-38s while three other B-24s are missing on the return flight.

 TUESDAY, 19 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the crew of one of the three B-24s missing yesterday, which had crashlanded at Great Sitkin Island, is picked up by a Navy tender. Weather prevents missions and searches.

 WEDNESDAY, 20 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather aircraft aborts shortly after takeoff. A B-24 and a Navy PBY search without results for the two B-24s missing since MONDAY.

 THURSDAY, 21 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather reconnaissance aircraft flies. An attack run over Kiska and a patrol over Amchitka are call off due to weather. Air searches for the two B-24s missing since MONDAY continue.

 FRIDAY, 22 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance aircraft finds Kiska closed in and flies a negative search for the two B-24s missing since Monday. For the first time the weather aircraft draws AA fire through the overcast at Kiska, suggesting that the Japanese have fire-control radar.

 SATURDAY, 23 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather reconnaissance over Kiska and a search mission for the two B-24s missing since Monday reveal nothing. Enemy aircraft appear over Amchitka twice but inflict no damage. Durint the period of 18 to 23 Jan, a period of continuous storms and sudden changes to extreme foul weather, non-combat losses are exceptionally high as 13 aircraft are lost; no losses result from enemy action.

 MONDAY, 24 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, six heavy bombers and six medium bombers attempt an attack on Kiska Island. The medium bombers abort over Semiscopochnol. The heavy bombers circle Kiska until the weather closes in. Two Japanese aircraft bomb the Amchitka harbor area before US interceptors, six P-38s, and one B-24 arrive. Two P-38s return due to mechanical troubles; the others fly a negative search over Kiska.

 MONDAY, 25 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, P-38s are dispatched too late to engage two floatplanes bombing Amchitka. Reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Buldir, Semichis, Attu and Agattu. One B-24 and two P-38s fly two patrol missions over Amchitka. An attack mission to Kiska is turned back by weather. B-25s unsuccessfully search for missing aircraft.

 TUESDAY, 26 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, all missions are cancelled due to weather. Two Japanese aircraft strafe Constantine Harbor, Amchitka Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 27 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a negative weather reconnaissance sortie is flown over Kiska Island. Four P-38s fly protective patrol over Amchitka Island. Upon their departure, three Japanese aircraft appear and unsuccessfully bomb shipping but cause three casualties.

 THURSDAY, 28 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather aircraft encounters poor visibility over Kiska Island. Two patrols fly over Amchitka. The second runs into poor weather and aborts. An attack on Kiska is cancelled due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 29 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather reconnaissance over Kiska and a patrol over Rat Island, flown by one B-24, two B-25s and four P-38s, are recalled early due to weather. All other missions are cancelled.

 SATURDAY, 30 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, two patrols, each composed of one B-25 and four P-38s, fly over Amchitka Island and are recalled early due to weather. One B-17, upon an alleged submarine sighting, drops four depth charges and one bomb whereupon a whale breaks water. Weather cancels other missions.

 MONDAY, 31 JANUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather and photographic reconnaissance aircraft flies twice over Kiska Island. During the first Mission near Attu Island, the aircraft is jumped by 6 fighters which it eludes. Four B-17s, 2 B-24s, 6 B-25s, 4 P-38s and 4 P-40s then attempt an attack on Kiska; P-40s turn back with mechanical troubles; the other aircraft find Kiska closed in and abort the mission . Two patrol missions, each by 1 B-25 and 4 P-38s, fly over Amchitka Island; two enemy floatplanes bomb Constantine Harbor on Amchitka without results.

FEBRUARY 1943

 MONDAY 1 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, all missions are cancelled due to weather. Enemy aircraft bomb and strafe Amchitka harbor and shipping without inflicting damage.

 THURSDAY, 4 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance aircraft over Kiska, jumped by 3 fighters, shoots 1down. It is followed by 3 B-17s, 3 B-24s, 3 B-25s, 4 P-38s and 8 P-40s. The B-24s blast the North Head submarine base, and score near misses on a cargo ship. The B-25s hit the vicinity of the Main Camp area; 3 of 5 floatplanes which intercept are shot down. The P-40s strafe Kiska ground installations and sight a fighter strip southwest of Salmon Lagoon. Two Amchitka fighter patrols are flown; the first also strafes gun emplacements on Vega Point. Five enemy bombers strike Amchitka.

 SATURDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather reconnaissance is flown over Kiska and Attu Islands.

 SUNDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 1 B-17 flies weather reconnaissance over Kiska.

 MONDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Agattu, and Attu Islands. Five B-24s and 5 B-25s bomb the Kiska Camp area and hit a water tank and buildings. Two B-25s bomb North Head through the overcast.

 WEDNESDAY, 10 FEBRUARY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance aircraft aborts the mission due to radio failure. Four B-24s, 2 B-17s, 8 B-25s and 8 P-38s attack Kiska Island; hits are observed on the landing strip and near the hangar and buildings. Two patrol missions, each by 4 P-38s and 1 B-25, are flown over the American-held Amchitka Island.

 FRIDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather reconnaissance and attack missions against Kiska Island and a fighter patrol over Amchitka Island are broken off due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Attu, Agattu, the Semichis, and Buldir Island. Five heavy bombers, 6 medium bombers and 10 P-38s bomb and strafe Kiska targets including the Camp area, landing strip, and shipping. Of 5 float-type fighter which attack, P-38s shoot down 3. Four P-38s and 1 B-25 fly a patrol Mission over Amchitka Island and Little Kiska; a B-25 shoots down a floatplane.

 SUNDAY, 14 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance aircraft turns back due to weather, as does the morning patrol of 1 B-25 and 4 P-38s flying over Allied held Amchitka Island. Other missions from Adak are also called off.

 MONDAY, 15 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather reconnaissance B-24 is soon called off due to weather. All other missions are cancelled. Six float-type Japanese aircraft bomb and strafe Allied held Amchitka Island, hitting the runway and causing casualties.

 TUESDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather reconnaissance aircraft flies over Kiska, Attu, Agattu, the Semicis and Buldir Islands. Five B-24s, 6 B-25s, 6 P-38s and 1 B-25 photographic aircraft take off for Kiska but do not attack due to weather. One P-40, accompanying several P-38s on the Amchitka Island fighter patrol, lands on Amchitka strip; an afternoon patrol of 7 P-40s and 1 transport also land at the strip which is now safe for limited operations.

 WEDNESDAY, 17 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather cancels all missions and also the laying of mat at the Amchitka Island airstrip.

 THURSDAY, 18 FEBRUARY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather reconnaissance determines that 3 ships at Attu Island to be friendly. P-40s on local patrol over Amchitka Island encounter and shoot down 2 enemy fighters.

The 21BS(H), 30BG(H): operating under control of the 28th Composite Group with B-24s from Umnak Islands begins operating from Amchitka Island.

 FRIDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather cancels all missions except limited weather reconnaissance.

 SATURDAY, 20 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, reconnaissance over Kiska Island finds weather favorable and 5 B-24s, 7 B-25s and 8 P-38s take off to attack. The fighters hit the Main Camp area; the bombers bomb North Head, the Main Camp area and the runway.

The 11FS, 343FG with P-40s transfers from Fort Glenn on Umnak Island to Adak Island.

 SUNDAY, 21 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather prevents all flying from Adak Island. Fighters based on Amchitka Island patrol Kiska.

 MONDAY, 22 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 16 bombers and 8 fighters abort a mission against Kiska Island due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 23 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 17 bombers and 8 fighters bomb the Main Camp area on Kiska Island while an F-5A flies a photographic mission.

 WEDNESDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, all except one Mission of 4 P-40s, to Kiska Island, are called off. The P-40s make no contacts, however.

 THURSDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 P-40s sweep Kiska Island. Six B-24s and 5 B-25s bomb the Main Camp and North Head areas of Kiska.

 SATURDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-24s, 6 B-25s and 4 P-38s bomb and strafe the Main Camp area on Kiska Island. On the return trip, a weather aircraft flies reconnaissance and makes a bombing and strafing run on Attu Island and nearby barges with negative results.

 SUNDAY, 28 FEBRUARY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, reconnaissance is flown over Kiska, Buldir, Semichis, Attu, and Agattu, with negative results. Six B-24s and 6 B-25s bomb the Main Camp area on Kiska Island.

MARCH 1943

 MONDAY, 1 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, P-40s jettison their bombs when bad weather prevents a sweep over Kiska Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 3 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 P-40s sweep Kiska Island dropping demolition and fragmentation bombs.

 THURSDAY, 4 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 P-40s fly over Kiska Island but drop no bombs due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 4 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 P-40s fly over Kiska Island but drop no bombs due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 5 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 1 B-24 flies negative weather reconnaissance over Kiska, Semichis, Attu, Agattu and Buldir Islands.

 SATURDAY, 6 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 1 B-24 flies uneventful reconnaissance over Kiska, Attu, Agattu, Buldir, and the Semichis Islands.

 SUNDAY, 7 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): The first flight of B-25s is brought up to Amchitka Island. This enables stepped-up raids on Kiska. Nine B-24s and 4 P-38s bomb and strafe the Chichagof Harbor area and Holtz Bay installations on Kiska. A fighter sweep, 6 B-24s, and 10 B-25s hit North Head and the Main Camp area on Kiska.

HQ 343FG transfers from Elmendorf Field, Alaska to Adak, Aleutian Islands.

 MONDAY, 8 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 344FS, 343FG with P-40's transfers from Ft. Randall, Alaska to Ft. Glenn, Alaska.

 TUESDAY, 9 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-24s, 10 B-25s, 12 P-38s and 4 P-40s attack Kiska Island. The P-40s and 6 of the B-25s return to base due to bad weather; the other bombers bomb the Main Camp area, North Head and the submarine base.

 WEDNESDAY, 10 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a reconnaissance airplane is attacked by 5 enemy aircraft. The Kiska attack mission is flown by 10 B-25s, 6 B-24s, 12 P-38s (4 of them flying top cover), and 1F-5A. Eight of the P-38s strafe ground installations; the B-25s bomb a radar site and pound North Head, silencing AA fire; the B-24s hit the Main Camp area. Four Amchitka-based P-40s bomb the submarine base.

 FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 12 Amchitka-based P-40s scout Kiska Island.

The 54FS, 343FG with P-38's transfers from Adak Island to Amchitka Island.

 SATURDAY, 13 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 on reconnaissance returns early because of adverse weather. Twelve P-40s strike the Kiska Island beach, camp and runway. Hits are observed on these targets and among 14 parked airplanes. Eight P-38s with 8 P-40s flying top cover again take off for Kiska. Only 3 of the P-38s reach the target and strafe aircraft on the beach. Another sights a submarine SW of Rat Island.

 SUNDAY, 14 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): HQ 28th Composite Group transfers from Elmendorf Field, Alaska to Adak Island.

 MONDAY, 15 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-25s, with 4 P-38s flying top cover, bomb North Head on Kiska Island, hitting the Main Camp and gun emplacements. Six B-24s with 4 P-38s for top cover then bomb Main Camp. Revetments and the hangar area are strafed by the P-38s one of which is lost to AA. Next, 5 B-24s and 16 P-38s bomb and strafe the Main Camp area and North Head. Four P-40s then unsuccessfully search for 3 enemy fighters which had earlier attacked a weather plane. Main Camp is hit two more times, by 3 B-25s and by 8 P-38s.

 TUESDAY, 16 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 16 B-25s, 13 B-24s, 8 P-40s and 32 P-38s (cover/escort): sorties are flown to Kiska Island in one weather reconnaissance and 2 attack missions from Adak Island, and in 3 more missions from Amchitka Island. Targets hit are North Head, the Main Camp area, radar sites, and the submarine base. On the last Amchitka mission 1enemy floatplane is shot down and 2 more are probables. Four heavy bombers are hit and 1 B-25 does not return.

 WEDNESDAY, 17 MARCH 1943 (ST. PATRICK'S DAY):

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 8 P-38s patrol Kiska Island without making contacts.

 THURSDAY, 18 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, taking off from Adak Island, 6 B-24's bomb the Main Camp area, 6 B-25's bomb North Head, and 12 P-38's fly top cover and strafing attacks. Twelve Amchitka-based P-38's then blast the Kiska runway and Main Camp area, starting fires. At Amchitka, the 54FS is reinforced by several F-5A's.

 FRIDAY, 19 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): All missions are cancelled due to weather except local fighter patrols. HQ XI BC is activated on Adak Island.

 SUNDAY, 21 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 13 B-24's, 9 B-25's, 50 P-38's, 16 P-4O's, and 2 F-5A's fly 8 bombing and strafing missions to Kiska Island. Some of the mission s abort due to weather. The others hit the Main Camp area, while 2 P-40's make no contact when trying to intercept reported enemy aircraft.

 MONDAY, 22 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-25's, 12 B-24's and 22 P-38's attempt 3 missions to Kiska Island. Only 8 of the P-40's get through but fly uneventful patrol.

The 404BS(H), 28th Composite Group with B-24's transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Alaska to Adak Island.

 TUESDAY, 23 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather grounds all missions except the weather reconnaissance flight and an unsuccessful intercept attempt of an enemy reconnaissance airplane by 2 P-40's.

 WEDNESDAY, 24 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 10 B-24's, 3 B-25's, and 12 P-38's fly 5 attack missions to Kiska Island. North Head runway and the Main Camp area are bombed.

 THURSDAY, 25 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a weather airplane take photos of Holtz Bay and Chichapof Harbor. Fourteen B-24's, 3 B-25's, 12 P-38's, and 2 P-40's fly 4 missions to Kiska Island. The targets include the beach, runway, hangar area, North Head, the Main Camp and submarine base.

 FRIDAY, 26 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a reconnaissance aircraft covers Attu, Agattu, Semichi and Alaid where a cabin is strafed. Upon report of Navy contacts with enemy surface force (Battle of Komandorskies), 13 B-24's, 11 B-25's and 8 P-38's are ordered to hit the enemy, reported 150 mi (240 km) west of Cape Wrangell (Attu). Because of mechanical failures and weather, airplanes cannot take off until 6 hours after the surface force is sighted. Thus, Japanese ships have fled when aircraft arrive at the interception point. Some of the returning B-25's bomb a radar site, hangar, and Main Camp area on Kiska.

 SATURDAY, 27 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 7 B-24's from Adak and 6 Amchitka-based B-25's attempt unsuccessfully to attack naval targets. From Amchitka, 1 B-25 and 6 P-38's (of which 1turns back with mechanical trouble) provide cover for US surface force until 1300 hours local. Six P-38's and 1 B-l7 depart Adak for a second cover mission, but do not find the surface force.

A detachment of the 11FS, 343FG based on Adak with P-40's begins operating from Amchitka Island.

 MONDAY, 29 MARCH 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 7 heavy and medium bombers, with fighter escort, bomb and strafe the Kiska runway and nearby Main Camp area. Heavy AA fire damages 6 bombers and 2 P-38's.

 TUESDAY, 30 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 missions are dispatched against Kiska and Attu Islands. From Adak, 6 B-24's, 6 B-25's, and 4 P-38's are over Kiska at 1200 hours local but cannot bomb due to weather. Four B-24's, 4 P-38's, and 2 F-5A's then bomb the runway at Attu. Next, 5 B-24's and 4 P-38's bomb the Main Camp; intense AA fire downs 1 B-24. From Amchitka, 4 P-38's bomb Little Kiska. Next, 4 P-38's bomb Kiska through the overcast, followed by 6 B-25's bombing and strafing radar, radio installations, Main Camp, runway, and personnel.

 WEDNESDAY, 31 MARCH 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a reconnaissance airplane finds impenetrable weather and returns to base. Two P-38's make an uneventful sweep.

APRIL 1943

 THURSDAY, 1 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A joint directive by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commanding General Western Defense Command orders preparations for Operation LANDGRAB, the invasion of Attu Island.

In the Aleutians, 16 B-24, 5 B-25, and 12 P-38 sorties are flown against Kiska Island from Adak and Amchitka Islands. Targets include a ship in Gertrude Cove, the North Head area, the Main Camp and the beach. AA fire damages 2 bombers. Reconnaissance covers Kiska, Attu, Buldir, and Semichis Islands.

During April, the 73BS(H), 28th Composite Group with B-25's transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Alaska to Umnak Island.

 FRIDAY, 2 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 18 B-24's bomb Kiska targets including North Head. Six B-25's, 16 P-38's, and 24 P-40's in 6 missions from Amchitka to Kiska, bomb the Main Camp and submarine base areas. Four B-24's bomb the runway at Attu. All aircraft, including 2 B-25's colliding in the air, return safely.

 MONDAY, 5 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, reconnaissance covers all islands W of Kiska with negative results. 16 B-24's and 6 B-25's bomb the Attu runway and Kiska's Main Camp and runway. 4 P-38's fly top cover. Later, 3 B-25's, 16 P-4O's, and 16 P-38's bomb Kiska again.

 WEDNESDAY, 7 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the reconnaissance airplane aborts shortly after takeoff due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 8 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, The weather airplane scouts Kiska and islands W of it with negative results.

 FRIDAY, 9 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a B-24 flies reconnaissance over Kiska, Attu and the Semichis. P-40's fly reconnaissance over Kiska.

 SATURDAY, 10 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance B-24 observes 4 unidentified aircraft near Segula. Three B-25's, 17 P-40's, and 6 P-38's fly 5 attack missions to Kiska, and negative searches for the unidentified airplanes at Segula. The last Mission finds Kiska closed in and returns with bombs.

 SUNDAY, 11 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 B-25's, 22 P-40's, and 8 P-38's hit Kiska 5 times.

The last Mission aborts due to weather. The other 4 missions bomb various targets starting large fires. Some fighters strafe Little Kiska.

 MONDAY, 12 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 3 B-25's, 24 P-40's, and 13 P-38's fly 7 missions to Kiska. The fighters also strafe Little Kiska. AA fire damages 1 P-40 and 1 P-38. The P-38 force-lands safely.

 TUESDAY, 13 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 15 B-24's, 15 B-25's, 28 P-38's and 20 P-40's fly 11 attacks to Kiska; 43 tons of bombs are dropped on the Main Camp, North Head, and runway. Fighters attack the Main Camp causing large fires, and also strafe aircraft on the beach. Heavy AA fire damages 2 P-38's, 1 of which later crashes into the sea, and 1 B-25.

 WEDNESDAY, 14 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 30 P-40's, 17 P-38's, 9 B-24's and 6 B-25's fly 10 missions to Kiska, bombing and strafing the runway, North Head area, installations, parked seaplanes, and facilities on Little Kiska.

 THURSDAY, 15 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, reconnaissance over Kiska, Attu, Semichis, and Agattu spots no new enemy activities. Two bomber mission s from Adak and 11 fighter missions from Amchitka, composed of 23 B-24's, 20 B-25's, 25 P-38's, and 44 P-40's, hit Kiska; 1F-5A takes photos; 85 tons of bombs are dropped. Fires result on North Head and Little Kiska. One B-24 is shot down in flames and 4 bombers receive battle damage.

 FRIDAY, 16 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, Kiska is bombed and strafed 13 times. A total of 13 B-24's, 12 B-25's, 32 P-40's, 29 P-38's, and 2 F-5A's cover targets which include installations in the Holtz Bay area and gun positions on North Head.

 SATURDAY, 17 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 7 B-24's bomb and score 8 direct hits on the runway and gun emplacements at Attu. One B-24 and 2 F-5A's abort due to weather. 4 B-25's, 31 P-38's, and 14 P-40's hit Kiska 9 times, bombing installations and strafing gun emplacements and 3 parked airplanes.

 SUNDAY, 18 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 22 P-38's (some flown by RCAF pilots) and 37 P-40's hit Kiska 9 times. The submarine base and gun emplacements on North Head are bombed and gun emplacements near the submarine base are silenced.

 MONDAY, 19 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 9 missions involving 14 B-24's, 12 B-25's, 32 P-40's, and 23 P-38's are flown to Kiska. The first Mission is weathered out of the primary target, Attu, and directed to Kiska. Bombing and strafing concentrates on 4 grounded ships and the submarine base area where fires are started. One ship, believed to serve as a power station, is set afire.

 TUESDAY, 20 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 10 bombing and strafing missions by 15 B-24's, 16 B-25's, 10 P-38's, and 32 P-40's hit shipping in the harbor at Kiska and gun positions in North Head. Other targets include buildings in the Main Camp area and the runway.

 WEDNESDAY, 21 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, Commander North Pacific Forces (NORPACFOR) places all Army and Navy AFs [Task Group (TG) 16.1] under Brigadier General William O. Butler, Commanding General 11AF. The Army Air Striking Unit (11AF) is designated Task Unit 16.1.1 (TU16.1.1) and the Naval Air Search Unit (Patrol Wing Four) is designated TUl6.l.2.

Two P-38's take off for Kiska but abort the mission.

 SATURDAY, 24 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 2 P-38's bomb Kiska and strafe personnel near Mutton Cove. Weather cancels other missions.

 SUNDAY, 25 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 15 B-24's, 12 B-25's, 32 P-40's, 23 P-38's, and 1 F-5A fly 12 missions to Kiska and Attu. Targets include Holtz Bay, North Head, South Head, the beach areas, the runway, shipping, and the submarine base.

 TUESDAY, 27 APRIL 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 1 B-25 unsuccessfully investigates a reported submarine 4 mi (6.4 km) W of Bay Island. Four P-38's bomb the Main Camp, then scout Buldir.

 FRIDAY, 30 APRIL 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 4 B-25's, 17 P-38's, and 7 P-40's fly 4 missions to Kiska. Only the P-38's get through and blast Gertrude Cove, Main Camp, the submarine base and a ship.

MAY 1943

 SATURDAY, 1 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 16 attack missions on Kiska and Attu are flown by 16 B-24's, 15 B-25's, 35 P-38's, 38 P-40's, and 4 F-5A's. Kiska targets include the Main Camp, hangar, submarine base (where a fire is started), runway, radar, ship, North Head, AA guns and Gertrude Cove. Attu targets include E Attu, Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor installations.

 SUNDAY, 2 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-25's, 8 P-40's, and 8 P-38's fly bombing, photographic and attack missions to Kiska. Targets include North Head, South Head and buildings and AA gun batteries on Gertrude Cove.

 MONDAY, 3 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 7 B-24's, 11 B-25's, 20 P-38's, 27 P-40's and 2 F-5A's participate in a weather reconnaissance mission to Attu and in 9 attack missions to Kiska. Kiska targets include the Main Camp, North Head, radar, and runway.

 TUESDAY, 4 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 5 B-24's, 6 B-25's, 8 P-38's, 2 P-40's and 2 F-5A's take off on 2 Kiska and Attu missions. Missions to Kiska abort due to weather. At Attu targets include Chichagof Harbor, AA positions at Holtz Bay, and a floatplane.

The 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group with B-24's transfers from Fort Greeley on Kodiak Island to Amchitka Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 5 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the weather reconnaissance airplane over Attu observes a floatplane burning on the water. Fourteen B-24's, 17 B-25's, 16 P-38's, 32 P-40's, and 5 F-5A's fly 4 attack missions to Attu and 6 [partly with Royal Canadian AF (RCAF) pilots] to Kiska. Bombs are dropped on Attu installations and fighters strafe and set afire 1seaplane and silence AA guns. Targets include Main Camp, a radar site, North and South Head, runway, and Gertrude Cove installations.

 THURSDAY, 6 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, B-24's, B-25's and P-38's drop over 52 tons (47.2 tonnes) on Attu targets including Holtz Bay, Sarana Bay, and the Chichagof Harbor area and nearby gun positions. Kiska is also hit. Targets include radar gun positions and the Gertrude Cove and Main Camp areas. Returning P-38's also bomb and strafe a hut on Rat Island. P-40's blast Kiska and Little Kiska.

 FRIDAY, 7 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, an attempted Mission to Kiska by 6 P-40's is aborted due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 11 May 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, the following missions are flown to support US forces landing on Attu: 1air-ground liaison sortie by 1 B-24; a B-24 supply sortie dropping supplies to ground forces; and 5 attack missions, flown by 11 B-24's and 12 B-25's. The first attack mission cannot find the target and instrument-bombs targets which include the runway, radar, submarine base, and camp area. Because of poor visibility the next 2 missions hit Kiska, where the runway and Main Camp are attacked. Two B-24's then bomb the Chichagof Harbor area through fog while another drops leaflets on Attu.

 WEDNESDAY, 12 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, a P-39 reconnaissance sortie over Kiska and Rat Island encounters poor weather and turns back. At Attu, an air-ground liaison B-24 watches US forces land on beach "Red" while another B-24 drops supplies. Seven attack missions flown by 10 B-24's, 12 B-25's, and 24 P-38's bomb and strafe assigned Attu targets. Four barges are set afire in the W arm of Holtz Bay.

 THURSDAY, 13 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, bad weather keeps the air-ground liaison B-24 from observing or hearing friendly ground forces on Attu and it returns to base. An air-ground support Mission of 6 B-24's divert from Attu to Kiska; 2 of the bombers don't get the message, proceed to Attu, and bomb

Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay. The other 4 bomb the Main Camp area. Eight P-40's dispatched to Kiska in 2 waves cannot see the target and instead bomb Little Kiska installations.

 FRIDAY, 14 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, poor weather curtails bombings. The air-ground liaison B-24 flies reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance over Attu throughout the day. One B-24 carrying supplies for the ground forces hits a mountain side 10 miles (16 km) W of the drop zone. Six B-24 s and 5 B-25's fly ground support bombing missions over Attu. Two P-40's bomb Kiska through the overcast.

 SATURDAY, 15 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, weather again curtails operations. The air-ground liaison B-24 observes and directs air operations at Attu throughout the day as visibility permits and directs a supply drop for ground forces by another B-24 in 2 air-ground support missions. Six B-24's bomb Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor and 6 P-38's strafe AA installations in the Holtz Bay area.

 SUNDAY, 16 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, the air-ground liaison B-24 bombs Chichagof Harbor with unobserved results. Another B-24 drops supplies to ground forces on Attu. 8 B-24's, 12 B-25's, and 12 P-38's fly ground support missions to Attu; because of weather, only the P-38's get through and strafe AA guns, installations and barges, scoring several hits. The bombers are directed to bomb Kiska. 2 P-40's fly reconnaissance mission over Kiska.

 MONDAY, 17 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 2 attempted ground support missions to Attu by a B-24, 5 B-25's, and 6 P-38's are recalled due to weather.

The detachment of the 11FS (P-40's), 343FG that has been operating from Amchitka returns to it's base at Adak.

 TUESDAY, 18 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-24's, weathered out of Attu, bomb the Gertrude Cove area on Kiska Island leaving large fires. 4 P-40's reconnoiter Kiska and strafe barges. 1 B-25 flies photo reconnaissance over Kiska.

 WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-24's and 11 B-25's fly 3 air-ground support missions to Attu Island, bombing the Sarana Valley. 4 P-40's fly 2 reconnaissance missions to Kiska Island.

 THURSDAY, 20 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, all air-ground support missions to Attu are cancelled due to weather. 20 P-40's bomb the Main Camp and submarine area at Kiska, and strafe barges in the harbor. The remaining Japanese on Attu are concentrated in the Chichagof Harbor area.

 FRIDAY, 21 May 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 10 B-24's, 12 B-25's, and 24 P-38's are dispatched to Attu but only 3 missions, totalling 6 P-38's and 1 B-24, are able to bomb and strafe troops and installations. 4 other missions, after vainly waiting for a break in the overcast over Attu, bomb the Kiska submarine base through the overcast.

 SATURDAY, 22 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, bad weather forces cancellation of all missions. 15 enemy bombers make a torpedo attack on the gunboat USS Charleston (PG-51): and destroyer USS Phelps (DD-360) patrolling Attu. The ships suffer only negligible damage.

 SUNDAY, 23 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, 6 B-24's and 12 B-25's fly 3 air-ground support missions to Attu. Due to bad weather they are routed to Kiska. Weather there is also poor and only 1 B-25 bombs the Main Camp area. Next, 3 B-24's and 18 P-38's fly 3 air cover missions to Attu. The last of these missions is notified by a PBY that 16 Japanese bombers are W of Attu. 5 of the P-38's then intercept the bombers over Attu, which jettison their bombs and close formation. The P-38's score 5 kills and 7 probables. 2 P-38's are lost.

The 344FS, 343FG begins a movement from Fort Glenn, Umnak Island to Shemya Island, both in the Aleutians. The air echelon is operating with P-40's from Amchitka Island.

 MONDAY, 24 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 2 of 3 air-ground support missions to Attu, together 6 B-24's, 11 B-25's, and 1F-5A, bomb Attu. The third mission is cancelled, except for 2 B-25's which do not hear the cancelling order. 3 B-24's and 14 P-38's fly 3 more air cover missions over Attu but make no contacts.

 TUESDAY, 25 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 12 B-25's and 15 B-24's fly air-ground support and 4 B-24's and 20 P-38's fly air cover, all over Attu. 18 P-40's fly 1 reconnaissance and 2 attack missions to Kiska and Little Kiska.

 WEDNESDAY, 26 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 8 B-24's and 11 B-25's, flying air-ground support, bomb enemy positions. 2 B-24's and l2 P-38's fly air cover sorties and also patrol and strafe Attu. Kiska is covered by 3 F-5A's photo sorties and 3 attack missions, flown by 9 B-25's and 16 P-40's. Targets include gun emplacements on North Head and the E end of the runway.

 THURSDAY, 27 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, Attu is covered by 1 B-25 flying ground support, bombing and strafing troops and dropping photos taken on the previous day to friendly forces, and by 1 B-24 and 6 P-38's flying air cover. 6 P-40's fly an attack and reconnaissance mission to Kiska, concentrating on Little Kiska and on the Main Camp area.

 SATURDAY, 29 MAY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians, no missions are flown. All of Attu Island is secure after 19 days of fighting. US ground forces land on Shemya Island.

 SUNDAY, 30 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 8 P-4O's fly 4 reconnaissance missions to Kiska. 3 air-ground support missions to Attu by 7 B-24's and 12 B-25's drop no bombs there and instead bomb Kiska installations. 2 B-24's and 12 P-38's fly air cover missions over Attu and patrol the area. 3 F-5A's fly photo reconnaissance and 8 P-40's attack and strafe tents and troops and blast the runway at Kiska.

 MONDAY, 31 MAY 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutians, 5 F-5A's fly separate photo missions. 6 B-24's, 10 B-25's, 37 P-40's and 8 P-38's fly attack missions to Kiska. Their targets include Gertrude Cove, AA installations, trenches, the North Head runway, and a vessel.

JUNE 1943

 TUESDAY, 1 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 P-40's, 1 B-24, and 1F-5A fly weather reconnaissance and photo runs and 8 B-25's, 18 P-38's, and 20 P-40's, fly 7 attack missions to Kiska Island. Targets include parked aircraft and installations, runway, gun positions, radar, and tents on South Head, North Head, Gertrude Cove and Main Camp. The 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, based on Amchitka Island begins operating from Adak Island with B-24's. During Jun 43, the 73BS(H), 28th Composite Group transfers from Umnak Island to Amchitka Island with B-25's.

 THURSDAY, 3 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Weathered out from Kiska Island in the Aleutian Islands are 3 weather missions flown by 2 B-24's and 2 P-40's, as well as 2 attack missions by 2 B-24's and 6 fighters.

 FRIDAY, 4 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 6 B-24's following a Navy PV make a radar-bombing run over North Head. 14 P-40's and P-38's bomb North Head, Main Camp and Little Kiska Island. 4 P-38's and 1 B-24 flying air cover over Attu Island make no enemy contact.

The 404BS(H), 28th Composite Group based on Adak Island begins operating from Amchitka Island with B-24's.

 SATURDAY, 5 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24's, 6 B-25's, and 6 P-40's fly weather reconnaissance and radar-bombing missions over Kiska Island, being handicapped by poor weather and mechanical trouble.

 TUESDAY, 8 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a C-47 is the first USAAF airplane to land on Attu Island, landing fighters crews at Alexai Point. All other flying is cancelled due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 10 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24's, 8 B-25's, 12 P-40's, and 2 F-5A's fly weather reconnaissance, attack, and photo missions to Kiska Island and Little Kiska Island. Targets include gun batteries, runway, North Head and Main Camp.

 FRIDAY, 11JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24's, 8 B-25's, 10 P-40's, 4 P-38's, and 2 F-5A's fly weather, photo, reconnaissance, and attack missions to Kiska Island. Main targets are Gertrude Cove and Main Camp, South Head, North Head, runway, and offshore barges. Fighter bombing and strafing, and subsequent bomber runs over emplacements, are effectively coordinated.

 SATURDAY, 12 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): A detachment of the 344FS, 343FG based at Ft Glenn, Alaska begins operating from Attu Island with P-40's.

 MONDAY, 21 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands a fighters strip is completed at Shemya Island.

All missions are cancelled due to weather for the tenth straight day.

 TUESDAY, 22 JUNE 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a P-40 sights a submarine 5 mi (8 km) E of Zeto Point. A B-24 then searches the area but makes no contact.

 FRIDAY, 25 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 photo and weather reconnaissance missions by 2 B-24's and 6 attack missions by 25 B-25's, 12 B-24's, and 2 P-38's hit Kiska Island. Targets include gun revetments at Gertrude Cove and AA batteries.

The 344FS, 343FG transfers with P-40's from Ft Glenn, Alaska to Shemya Island. The squadron also has detachments operating from Amchitka and Attu Islands.

 SATURDAY, 26 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 16 bombers and 28 fighters fly 7 attack, weather reconnaissance and photo missions to Kiska and Little Kiska Islands, starting fires. Intense machinegun fire damages 4 P-38's.

 SUNDAY, 27 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Kiska Island in the Aleutian Islands, 8 B-24's make a radar run but return with their bombs due to weather. Later, 5 B-24's and 7 B-25's bomb the Main Camp area and vicinity N of Salmon Lagoon. 14 B-25's bomb Gertrude Cove, camp areas, and North Head, while 7 others abort due to weather. 2 P-40's fly reconnaissance over Segula Island but overcast prevents observations.

 MONDAY, 28 JUNE 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 6 B-25's bomb Gertrude Cove, Little Kiska Island and the southern Main Camp area through holes in the overcast. The mission is partly ineffective because of faulty bomb-release mechanisms.

JULY 1943

 THURSDAY, 1 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the month of July: The 21BS(H), 30BG(H) based on Umnak Island ceases operating from Amchitka Island, and The detachment of the 344FS, 343FG that has been operating from Amchitka Island with P-40's since May 43 returns to it's base on Shemya Island, and The 632 and 633BSs (Dive), 407BG (Dive) based at Drew Field, Tampa, Florida begin operating from Amchitka Island with A-36's.

 FRIDAY, 2 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 bombers and 4 P-38's fly 4 reconnaissance missions over Kiska and Segula Islands. 17 B-24's and 16 B-25's then attack Kiska Island in 5 missions, 2 of them radar-guided. Fires are started at several of the targets, which include Gertrude Cove, the harbor, and buildings in the Main Camp area. Intense AA fire damages 3 aircraft. 2 B-25's on a submarine attack hit the Kiska seaplane ramp after making no contact with the target. 2 P-40's cover troops which make an unopposed landing on Rat Island.

 SATURDAY, 3 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24's bomb Main Camp on Kiska Island and take photos of Segula Island.

 TUESDAY, 6 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-24's and 2 P-40's on 3 weather reconnaissance missions report Kiska Island overcast, and take photos of Segula Island. 6 B-24's bomb Main Camp on Kiska. 8 B-25's abort a radar run over Kiska Island when 1has engine trouble and the others fail to locate a PV Pathfinder. They sight a submarine which crash-dives immediately.

 WEDNESDAY, 7 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-25's fly a special Mission to Attu Island in the Aleutian Islands.

 FRIDAY, 9 JULY 1943

 SATURDAY, 10 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 11AF attacks the Japanese Home Islands for the first time as 8 B-25's raid Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands, scoring hits on the S part of Shimushu Island, Paramushiru Island, Kurile Strait, and northern Paramushiru Island, in dead reckoning runs when solid cloud cover prevents a maximum altitude attack. No AA fire is encountered and no enemy aircraft are sighted. The B-25's stage through Attu Island on returning to Adak Island. 6 B-24's, originally slated to accompany the B-25's to Paramushiru Island and 5 other B-25's are on short notice dispatched to attack a convoy off Attu Island. They claim 2 medium freighters sunk in deck-level strikes.

 SUNDAY, 11 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 5 B-24's take off to attack Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands and fly a shipping search but are turned back by bad weather. A shipping search by 5 B-25's finds nothing. 6 B-25's and 6 B-24's in 3 missions (one by radar) attack North Head and Main Camp on Kiska Island sighting new excavations near Sredni Point, strafe a tent near Haycock Rock, and also fly over Segula Island.

 THURSDAY, 15 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 and 2 P-39's fly reconnaissance over Kiska and Segula Islands. 9 B-24's and 14 B-25's bomb Kiska Island targets including AA batteries at North Head, Jeff Cove and Gertrude Cove. Fires are started. 1bomber turns back with 3 engines and jettisons bombs, another crashes on return. AA fire damages a B-25.

 SUNDAY, 18 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-24's and 6 B-25's bomb Gertrude Cove and Main Camp on Kiska Island. 6 B-24's bomb shipping targets between Paramushiru Island and Shimushu Island in the Kurile Islands and completed runway at Murakami Bay on Paramushiru Island, which is also photographed. They observe fires among buildings S and E of this runway. Some of the observed aircraft take to the air and vainly pursue the attackers.

 MONDAY, 19 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 633d, 634th and 635BSs (Dive), 407BG (Dive), based at Drew Field, Tampa, Florida begin operating from Amchitka Island in the Aleutian Islands with A-24's. The squadron will fly combat mission s 4-13 Aug.

 WEDNESDAY, 21 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 9 B-24's bomb Kiska Island targets, including the runway, North Head, and Main Camp area where fires are observed.

Poor weather cancels other scheduled missions.

 THURSDAY, 22 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 26 B-25's, 17 B-24's, 13 P-40's, and 20 P-38's hit North Head, Main Camp, and the submarine base at Kiska Island, as well as coastal defenses and AA guns at both Kiska and Little Kiska Islands, starting numerous fires. Intense and heavy AA fire downs one B-25 (crew saved) and damages 18 aircraft of which another B-25 crashes at base. 1 B-25 photographs the S and W Kiska Island shores. 1 B-24 flies radar reconnaissance over Kiska Island. The 77BS(M), 28th Composite Group, based on Adak Island begins operating from Attu Island with B-25's.

 SATURDAY, 24 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 62 P-40's fly 9 missions to Kiska Island [2 of them with Royal Canadian AF (RCAF) pilots] bombing the runway and scoring many hits. An AA battery takes a direct hit and explodes. AA guns are strafed on North Head and Little Kiska Island. Intense AA fire downs 1 P-40.

 SUNDAY, 25 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 40 P-40's fly 7 attack missions [2 by (RCAF) pilots] against Kiska Island, bombing and strafing North Head AA batteries, the runway, Main Camp, and Little Kiska Island.

HQ 343FG transfers from Adak Island to Amchitka Island.

The 406BS(M), 41BG(M), based at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, Territory of Alaska begins operating from Adak Island with B-25's.

 MONDAY, 26 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 3 bombers and 5 fighters fly 5 armored reconnaissance missions to Kiska Island. 32 B-24's, 38 P-4O's, and 24 P-38's fly 13 attack raids, bombing and scoring hits on numerous Kiska Island and Little Kiska Island targets, including North Head, Main Camp, the runway, Gertrude Cove, AA batteries, and on a suspected submarine in Kiska Island harbor. A submarine is sighted near Rat Island. AA fire claims 1 P-40 (pilot rescued), and damages 3 others. 1 B-25 and 15 P-38's fly 2 air cover missions to Kiska Island for the USN. Over 1O4 tons of bombs are dropped on Kiska Island this day, highest one-day bomb load so far dropped by the 11AF.

 TUESDAY, 27 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 12 bombers and 20 fighters take off on 5 attack missions to Kiska Island. Several of the fighters jettison bombs. The other aircraft hit Main Camp, North Head and Little Kiska Island.

The 21BS(H), 30BG(H) transfers from Umnak Island to Shemya, Island. The air echelon is operating from Amchitka Island.

 THURSDAY, 29 JULY 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-17 scouts Kiska Island and bombs the Main Camp area.

AUGUST 1943

 SUNDAY, 1 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-24's bomb the Main Camp area on Kiska Island through the overcast.

 MONDAY, 2 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 8 B-24's, 9 B-25's, and 8 P-38's hit Kiska Island in 2 waves, bombing and strafing North Head, and coast guns on Little Kiska Island, scoring several hits. 1or 2 enemy aircraft over Attu Island cannot be intercepted due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 3 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 6 attack missions, 2 of which abort, are flown to Kiska Island by B-24's, B-25's, P-38's, and P-40's; numerous targets hit and strafed include installations at North Head and South Head.

 WEDNESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, between 0855 and 1846 hours, 153 tons of bombs are dropped on Kiska Island, a new one-day record; 6 armored weather, photo and reconnaissance missions, flown by 3 B-24's, 2 P-40's, and 2 F-5A's bomb through clouds, take photos and observe fires in Main Camp and on Little Kiska Island; later 48 B-25's, 22 B-24's, 16 A-24's, 8 P-40's, and 40 P-38's fly 17 bombing and strafing attacks to Kiska Island; targets hit include buildings near the radio station, and the gun battery area on North Head. Little Kiska Island and Segula Island are also strafed.

The 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, which has been operating from Adak Island with B-24's since Jun 43, returns to it's base on Amchitka Island.

 MONDAY, 9 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies photo reconnaissance over various Kiska Island sites.

 TUESDAY, 10 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, P-38's, P-40's, A-24's, B-24's and B-25's bomb and strafe various targets on Kiska Island; direct hits are scored on revetments W of the Wheat Grove and on gun emplacements, as well as on buildings on Little Kiska Island.

HQ 11AF transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Adak Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 11 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, B-24's, B-25's, A-24's, and P-38's pound Kiska Island targets in 11attack missions; later, 10 reconnaissance, strafing and photo missions to Kiska are flown by 3 P-38's, 26 P-40's, 4 F-5A's and 1 B-24. 9 B-24's from Attu Island drop bombs and incendiaries on Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands, including Kashiwabara Airfield and Shimushu Island where the Kataoka naval base and staging area are hit. 40 enemy aircraft challenge the attackers, which score 4 confirmed kills, 1probable, and 4 possibles.

 THURSDAY, 12 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutians Islands, B-24's and B-25's fly 26 bombing, strafing, and radar and photo reconnaissance sorties over Kiska Island targets from Adak Island. From Amchitka Island P-40's, P-38's, B-24's, B-25's, and A-24's fly 70 bombing sorties over the island and are joined by B-24's, P-40's, and F-5A's flying 6 reconnaissance and photo sorties. Targets include the runway, harbor and shipping installations, army barracks, and the Rose Hill area.

 FRIDAY, 13 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 7 B-25's from Adak Island bomb targets at Main Camp and North Head on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. A B-24 flies a special reconnaissance mission. From Amchitka Island B-24's, B-25's, A-24's, and P-38's fly 8 more bombing missions against Kiska Island pounding the Camp area, gun emplacements, buildings, shipping, and airstrip revetments.

The 406BS(M), 41BG(M), ceases operating from Adak Island with B-25's and returns to it's base at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage.

During the latter part of Aug 43, the 515th and 516FBS, 407FBG, cease operating from Amchitka Island with A-24's and return to their base at Drew Field, Tampa, Florida.

 SATURDAY, 14 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-24's fly a special radar ferret and reconnaissance mission; 1 B-25, 8 B-24's, and 10 P-38's then fly 2 attack missions to Kiska Island, bombing with unobserved results.

 SUNDAY, 15 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, US and Canadian troops invade Kiska Island and discover that the Japanese, under the cover of fog, evacuated their garrison. A P-38 bombs and strafes Sniper Hill.

The 635BS (Dive), 407FBG, based at Drew Field, Tampa, Florida but operating from Amchitka Island, is disbanded and it's A-24's are transferred to other units.

 MONDAY, 16 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a B-24 reconnaissance flight reconnoiters North Head, Main Camp, and northern Kiska Island, and observes friendly forces' unopposed advance into Main Camp.

 TUESDAY, 17 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 flies over Kiska Island watching friendly forces land on the shore of E Kiska Lake.

 SATURDAY, 21 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the Aleutian Campaign, 3 Jun 42 to 21 Aug 43, the 11AF destroyed 69 aircraft, sank 21 and damaged 29 ships, and lost 29 of its own aircraft.

 THURSDAY, 26 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, the 11AF's striking power shrinks rapidly as the the following squadrons are ordered to prepare for departure to the Zone of Interior (ZI): 21BS(H), 30BG(H), on Umnak Island with B-24's, 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, on Amchitka Island with B-24's, 73BS(H), 28th Composite Group, on Amchitka Island with B-25's, and 406BS(M), 41BG(M), at Elmendorf Field, Anchorage, with B-25's.

 MONDAY, 30 AUGUST 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 73BS(H), 28th Composite Group, based on Amchitka Island with B-25's, begins a movement back to the US.

SEPTEMBER 1943

 WEDNESDAY, 1 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 P-40's attempting to intercept Japanese aircraft reported near Attu Island in the Aleutian Islands abort because of weather.

ASW OPERATIONS (1AF): During Sep 43, the 5th and 13(Anti-sub)S(H), 25(Anti-sub)W, cease flying ASW patrols from Westover Field, Massachusetts and Grenier Field, New Hampshire respectively with B-24's. The 5th is redesignated the 827BS(H) on 1Oct 43 and will arrive in Italy in Apr 44 with B-24's; the 13th is redesignated 863BS(H) and will arrive in England in Jan 44 with B-17's.

 SATURDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): HQ XI BC transfers from Amchitka Island to Adak Island in the Aleutian Island.s

 THURSDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): At Umnak Island, (RCAF) No 14 (Fighter) Squadron prepares to depart for British Columbia, Canada.

 FRIDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24's fly from Adak Island to Attu Island in the Aleutian Islands in preparation for a mission to Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands tomorrow.

 SATURDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 12 B-25's and 8 B-24's attack Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands for the third and last time this year. 6 B-24's bomb the Kashiwabara staging area; shipping is bombed and strafed in Kashiwabara harbor and Paramushiru Straits; 1freighter and 1 large transport are sunk while 1transport and 2 cargo ships are damaged; 2 other cargo vessels sustain possible hits; targets hit on land include 2 buildings and an AA battery on Shimushu Island. Of 40 fighters giving battle, 13 are shot down and 3 more are probables. 2 B-24's force-land in the USSR, one with mechanical defect, the other after being hit; 1 B-24 is downed by AA fire; losses are 7 B-25's and 2 B-24's in this most disastrous day for the 11AF. It will be another 5 months before it is able to strike at the Kurils again.

The 77BS(M), 28th Composite Group, transfers from Adak Island to Amchitka Island with B-25's.

 SUNDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): HQ XI Fighter Command transfers from Elmendorf Field, Anchorage to Adak Island.

 MONDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1943

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR (11AF): Major General Davenport Johnson succeeds Major General William O Butler as Commanding General of the 11AF.

The 36BS(H), 28th Composite Group, begins a movement from Amchitka Island to McChord Field, Washington with B-24's. The squadron will transfer to England in Nov 43.

 SUNDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 21BS(H), 30BG(H), begins a movement from Shemya Island with B-24's to Smoky Hill AAFld, Kansas where it will be inactivated on 1Nov 43.

 THURSDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Admiral Thomas C Kinkaid issues Operations Plan (Op Plan) 9-43 which reorganizes the Alaskan Army and Navy air strength. The Commanding General 11AF becomes Commander of Task Force 90 (TF 90), composed of Task Group 90.1(TG 90.1), designated the Air Striking Unit (comprising 16 medium bombers, 12 heavy bombers, 100 fighters) and of TG 90.2, designated the Air Search Group, a Navy air arm.

For operations, the 11AF is now under the jurisdiction of Commander Northern Pacific (COMNORPAC) Forces. There is no administrative change.

OCTOBER 1943

 SATURDAY, 9 OCTOBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 12 Kuril-based Japanese bombers attack Attu Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 11 P-40's unsuccessfully intercept 8 Japanese medium bombers attacking Massacre Bay and the nearby airfield on Attu Island in the Aleutian Islands.

 MONDAY, 18 OCTOBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 406BS(M), 4AF, departs Elmendorf Field, Anchorage for the US. The squadron will transition from B-25's to B-24's and arrive in England on 2 Nov 43.

NOVEMBER 1943

DECEMBER 1943

 WEDNESDAY, 1 DECEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands during the month of Dec 43, the detachment of the 344FS, 343FG, operating from Attu Island with P-40's, returns to it's base at Shemya Island.

 SATURDAY, 4 DECEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 bombers return early from an armed seasearch, due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 8 DECEMBER 1943

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24's fly armed reconnaissance. During the night of 8/9 Dec, another B-24 off on a photographic Mission over Kasatochi Island in the Aleutian Islands, turns back because of mechanical trouble.

JANUARY 1944

 SATURDAY, 22 JANUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): HQ 343FG transfers from Amchitka Island, Aleutian Islands to Alexai Point, Alaska.

 MONDAY, 31 JANUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 5 bombers fly a negative sea-search mission.

FEBURARY 1944

 SATURDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 6 B-24s and 16 P-38s join USN aircraft to fly air cover in several relays during retirement of US light cruisers and destroyers following bombardment of installations in the Kurabu Cape-Musashi Bay areas; shortly afterwards, the aircraft also photograph and attack installations at Paramushiru and Shimushu.

 FRIDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 77BS(M), 28BG (Composite), moves from Amchitka Island to Attu Island with B-25s.

 THURSDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s from Shemya Island search for enemy shipping; 1 B-24 crashes during takeoff, the others find nothing.

 FRIDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s from Shemya Island are over Matsuwa Island shortly after midnight 24/25 Feb on a photographic reconnaissance and bomb run; the mission is not completed due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 26 FEBRUARY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): XI BC (Air Striking Group Task Group 90.1) is directed to conduct armed photographic reconnaissance missions in the Kurile Islands, day or night, as weather permits.

HQ 28BG (Composite) moves from Adak Island to Shemya Island.

 MONDAY, 28 FEBRUARY

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s from Shemya Island search for enemy shipping; 1 B-24 crashes during takeoff, the others find nothing.

MARCH 1944

 WEDNESDAY, 1 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, XI Strategic Air Force (Provisional) is activated at Shemya Island. It includes all units of the XI BC and XI Fighter Command stationed at Near Island, and is only a tactical operating agency without administrative functions.

 THURSDAY, 2 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 B-24s fly a futile shipping search over the Kurile Islands; turned back by a weather front, they either jettison or bring back their bombs.

 FRIDAY, 3 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 9 B-24s take off from Shemya Island to search for enemy shipping, but return due to heavy icing and squalls; 6 P-40s fly a search mission between Shemya and halfway to Attu Island; and HQ XI BC moves from Adak Island to Shemya Island.

 TUESDAY, 7 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, B-24s and B-25s fly a negative search mission for an enemy submarine.

 WEDNESDAY, 8 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, bombers fly negative search and patrol missions for an enemy submarine; B-24s fly cover for a convoy en route from Adak to Shemya Islands.

 THURSDAY, 16 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s take off from Shemya Island shortly before midnight 15/16 Mar to fly armed reconnaissance over Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands, but turn back prematurely. Some of the bombers jettison their bombloads over the target area.

 FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944 - ST PATRICK'S DAY

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Onnekotan Island, Kurile Islands, before dawn releasing bombs through the overcast.

 THURSDAY, 23 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A detachment of the 11FS, 343FG, begins operating from Amchitka Island with P-40s and P-38s; the squadron is based on Adak Island.

 FRIDAY, 24 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly a photographic Mission over Onnekotan Island.

 SATURDAY, 25 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 Shemya Island-based B-24s bomb Kurabu Cape and the N coast of Onnekotan Island.

 TUESDAY, 28 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 18FS, 343FG, moves from Amchitka Island to Attu Island, Aleutian Islands with P-38s.

 FRIDAY, 31 MARCH 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): HQ XI BC and HQ XI Fighter Command are disbanded. Their headquarters personnel are absorbed by the 28BG (Composite) and the 343FG, respectively.

APRIL 1944

 FRIDAY, 7 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-24s dispatched to destroy a convoy, believed SE of Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands, turn back due to engine, navigation and weather difficulties. A flight of F-7As of the 2d Photographic Charting Squadron, 1Photographic Charting Group, 311(Photo)Wing (Mapping and Charting), arrives in the Aleutian Islands; its Mission is mapping of the Kurile Islands. The squadron is based at Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, Colorado and sends detachments to various parts of the world to photo map.

 SUNDAY, 9 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather sortie over Matsuwa Island is negative due to low clouds and fog.

 MONDAY, 10 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Matsuwa and Onnekotan Islands.

 TUESDAY, 11 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 3 B-24s attempting to fly a photographic and bombing run over Matsuwa Island installations, 2 must turn back; the third bombs the runway area.

 THURSDAY, 13 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance and bombing runs over the airfield on Matsuwa Island and installations on Onnekotan Island.

 FRIDAY, 14 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly armed photo reconnaissance mission during early the morning over Matsuwa, Onnekotan, and Paramushiru Islands, Kurile Islands. Photographs taken are negative due to cloud cover.

 SATURDAY, 15 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the night of 14/15 Apr 3 B-24s on armed reconnaissance mission over Matsuwa and Onnekotan Islands hit several targets including Matsuwa Airfield; reconnaissance over Paramushiru Island fails due to overcast.

 TUESDAY, 18 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Matsuwa, Onnekotan, and Paramushiru Islands; cloud cover and lack of moonlight permit only bombing of Kashiwabara Airfield and the Banjo Cape area.

 THURSDAY, 20 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 aborts a weather mission to Shasukotan Island, Kurile Islands

 SATURDAY, 22 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather sortie is aborted soon after take off due to weather.

 SUNDAY, 23 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly weather and photographic reconnaissance within 100 mi (160 km) of the Kurile Islands and photograph Matsuwa Island.

 MONDAY, 24 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, a B-24 flies a photo and bombing run over Matsuwa Island; later another B-24 flies weather and bombing runs over Shasukotan, Yekaruma, Kharimkotan, and Onnekotan Islands.

 TUESDAY, 25 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s photograph and bomb installations on Matsuwa Island.

 THURSDAY, 27 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-25 bombs a submarine without success.

 SATURDAY, 29 APRIL 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s abort an armed photographic Mission due to weather.

MAY 1944

 MONDAY, 1 May 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A single weather sortie is flown.

 WEDNESDAY, 10 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The Eleventh directs its components to place more emphasis on photographing and bombing of specific targets instead of general reconnaissance.

 FRIDAY, 12 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 reconnoiters and bombs installations on Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands, concentrating on the airfield on Tagan Cape.

 SATURDAY, 13 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-25 flies a shipping strike and strafes 2 fishing vessels.

 THURSDAY, 18 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Over the Kurile Islands, a B-24 on weather reconnaissance attacks a Japanese aircraft and 2 B-25s sink an auxiliary vessel; another is sunk shortly before 2400 hours by 2 other B-25s.

 FRIDAY, 19 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies armed reconnaissance over Shimushu and Ketoi Islands, Kurile Islands.

 MONDAY, 22 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 Attu Island, Aleutian Island-based B-25s on a shipping strike near Paramushiru bomb and strafe a picket boat, which is left sinking.

 WEDNESDAY, 24 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 bombers fly weather and photo reconnaissance over Shimushu Island and bomb the Matsuwa Island area.

 THURSDAY, 25 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1Shemya Island, Aleutian Islands-based B-24 flies reconnaissance and bombing Mission in the C Kurile Islands; another B-24 aborts due to equipment failure.

 FRIDAY, 26 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s off on an armed photo mission over Shimushu Island turn back due to mechanical troubles.

 SATURDAY, 27 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 bombers fly weather and armed photo reconnaissance and bomb Ushishiru Island, Kurile Islands.

 SUNDAY, 28 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly reconnaissance and drop bombs on Shimushu and Matsuwa Islands. 1 B-25 and P-38s fly a guardship coverage mission, 2 other B-25s fly a negative anti-shipping sweep.

 MONDAY, 29 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): At dawn 2 B-25s photograph and bomb Shimushu and Matsuwa Islands (secondary). During the early afternoon 2 B-25s escorted by 4 P-38s strafe, bomb and sink a patrol boat in the Kurile Islands. Later 4 other B-25s unsuccessfully attack 2 vessels off Shimushu.

 TUESDAY, 30 MAY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-25 and 2 P-38s fly guardship cover.

 WEDNESDAY, 31 May 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the morning 2 B-25s and 4 P-38s fly guardship cover. A bomber flies a weather mission while another reconnoiters and hits Buroton Bay, Kurile Islands.

JUNE 1944

 THURSDAY, 1 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s from Shemya Island, Aleutian Islands photograph and bomb installations at Buroton Bay, Kurile Islands, including a suspected seaplane base and the harbor area. Of 2 B-25s and 4 P-38s taking off for a guardship cover mission, 3 aircraft abort with engine trouble; 2 other B-25s fly a negative antishipping sweep.

 FRIDAY, 2 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s, finding Shimushiru Island overcast, bomb and photograph Matsuwa Island (the secondary) during dawn.

 SATURDAY, 3 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-25s and 2 P-38s fly guardship cover; 2 other B-25s fly a negative shipping search.

 SUNDAY, 4 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly an uneventful reconnaissance over Shimushiru Island; fuel shortage and equipment failure prevent flying to Matsuwa Island (the secondary). Later, a B-25 and 2 P-38s fly a guardship cover mission.

 TUESDAY, 13 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the night of 12/13 Jun 6 B-24s dispatched to fly an offensive sweep and provide air cover for a naval task force abort the mission s due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 14 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s fly extensive photo reconnaissance over the C and N Kurile Islands; they are attacked by about 20 fighters of which 3 are damaged.

 THURSDAY, 15 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly armed photo reconnaissance over Shimushiru Island.

 SATURDAY, 17 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 12 B-25s fly 3 air missions for a Naval Task Force on withdrawal, following the shelling of Kurabu Cape installations on Paramushiru Island, Kurile Islands.

 MONDAY, 19 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly armored photo reconnaissance over Paramushiru Island and bomb the Suribachi area with unobserved results.

 FRIDAY, 23 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-25s fly a negative shipping sweep.

 SATURDAY, 24 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s at dawn bomb the area N of the airfield at Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru Island; later 2 B-25s fly a negative shipping search.

 SUNDAY, 25 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Two B-24s bomb the airfield at Kurabu Cape, Paramushiru Island.

 MONDAY, 26 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 12 B-25s fly three 4-plane air cover missions for a Naval task force on withdrawal following shelling of Kurabu Cape installations on Paramushiru Island.

 THURSDAY, 29 JUNE 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-25s fly a negative shipping sweep.

JULY 1944

 SATURDAY, 1 JULY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): At dawn in the Kurile Islands, 4 B-24s radarbomb southern Shimushu Island and Kurabu Cape Airfield, Paramushiru Island through overcast.

 SATURDAY, 22 JULY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-25s flying a negative shipping search encounter a bomber which evades contact.

 MONDAY, 24 JULY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 2 B-25s fly a negative shipping search.

 SATURDAY, 29 JULY 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly bombing and reconnaissance runs over Shimushu Island and Paramushiru Island sites including Kurabu Cape installations.

AUGUST 1944

 FRIDAY, 4 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 P-38s accompanied by 1 B-25 fly top cover for a naval force near Massacre Bay, Attu Island, Aleutian Islands; 4 B-25s fly an uneventful shipping sweep.

 SATURDAY, 5 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather mission is followed by a shipping sweep flown by 2 B-25s which is aborted early due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 10 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s on a shipping sweep spot 2 patrol boats 75 miles (121km) ESE of Shimushu Island, Kurile Islands; one is sunk, the other is damaged.

 SATURDAY, 12 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-24s and 2 F-7As over Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands hit targets which include shipping in Higashi Banjo Strait and buildings and runway on Suribachi; enemy fighters give battle; the B-24s score 3 kills and 13 probables and damaged; 6 more B-25s fly an uneventful shipping sweep and take photos over Shimushiru Island.

 SUNDAY, 13 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, of 3 B-24s departing Shemya Island, Aleutian Islands during the night of 12/13 Aug, 1aborts while the other 2 bomb the Kashiwabara staging area on Paramushiru Island; later 6 B-25s fly a shipping sweep E of the N Kurils during which a fighter is downed.

 SATURDAY, 19 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, a weather sortie and a 4-plane shipping sweep are flown with negative results.

 SUNDAY, 20 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Aleutian Islands, 4 B-25s fly a negative shipping sweep.

 FRIDAY, 25 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 1 B-24 flies reconnaissance over Shasukotan, Onnekotan, and Harumukotan Islands but drops no bombs due to accurate AA fire.

 SATURDAY, 26 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 3 B-24s hit the Kashiwabara staging area on Paramushiru Island during the early morning, starting several fires; later 6 B-25s strafe and bomb the E coast of the N Kurile Islands, sinking a patrol boat; 1 out of 4 interceptors and one of the B-25s are hit; 7 more B-24s bomb targets on Kashiwabara and on Otomari Cape, including docks, piers, boats, and a fuel dump. 6 P-38s unsuccessfully attempt to intercept 4 unidentified aircraft W of Attu Island.

 SUNDAY, 27 AUGUST 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s bomb and photograph Kashiwabara, Parmushiru Island in 2 raids; and 4 B-25s on a shipping sweep E of the N Kurile Islands bomb and strafe picket boats damaging 1 and leaving another sinking.

SEPTEMBER 1944

 FRIDAY, 1 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 bombs Kashiwabara on Paramushiru Island, Kurile Islands during the night of 31Aug/1Sep; a B-25 bombs a shack on the SW coast of Paramushiru Island and sinks a nearby ship; and 5 other B-25s on this Mission turn back due to overcast.

 MONDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-25s fly an antishipping sweep close to Paramushiru Island and draw shore-based AA fire; 8 fighters intercept but there are no losses on either side.

 THURSDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 6 B-25s on a shipping sweep attack a small fishing fleet between Paramushiru and Onnekotan Islands.

 SATURDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-25s hunt shipping off Paramushiru Island; 4 return to Attu Island, Aleutian Islands with bombs, finding no targets; one hits the mast of a vessel and ditches in the water; the other lands on one engine in Petropavlovsk, USSR; 3 B-24s make an uneventful raid during the night of 9/10 Sep on Kashiwabara, Paramushiru Island; later 2 photo planes escorting 2 bombers over the Kurile Islands on a mapping project are attacked by fighters which inflict no damage.

 SUNDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-25s fly shipping sweep off Suribachi, Kurile Islands.

 MONDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s on a shipping search sink a small craft off Shimushu Island, Kurile Islands; 2 other B-25s fly a search mission for a B-25 (which force-landed in USSR on 9 Sep but is still reported as missing).

 TUESDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 6 bombers fly a negative shipping sweep over Shimushu Island; 3 more attack Suribachi Airfield and offshore shipping targets; 1 B-24 flies negative reconnaissance.

 THURSDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): During the night of 13/14 Sep 3 B-24s strike Kurabu Cape shipping and airfield on Paramushiru Island.

 SATURDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s bomb Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island; 4 B-25s abort a shipping sweep due to weather and mechanical difficulties.

 SUNDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s abort a mission to Suribachi due to weather. 4 B-25s fly an unsuccessful shipping sweep.

 TUESDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-25s fly a shipping sweep over Tomari Cape; and 4 B-24s off to strike Kurabu Cape turn back due to weather and mechanical failures.

 SUNDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-24s striking Kurabu Cape Airfield on Paramushiru Island are challenged by 12 Japanese fighters and 1 of 2 damaged B-24s forcelands in the USSR; one fighter is downed; and 4 B-25s fly a negative shipping search.

 MONDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-25s fly a negative shipping sweep.

 TUESDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies weather reconnaissance; later 4 B-24s radar-bomb Suribachi Airfield in the Kurile Islands.

 FRIDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s bomb Katooka naval base and Kokutan Cape.

OCTOBER 1944

 MONDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, photo reconnaissance missions, by 4 B-25s to Paramushiru Island and by 2 B-24s to Onnekotan Island, abort due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s flying offshore reconnaissance over Onnekotan, Harumukotan, and Shasukotan Islands also strafe several small vessels.

 WEDNESDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, a B-24 weatheraborts a photo run off Matsuwa Island; 4 B-25s bomb a freighter and a barge off Shimushu Island; 15-17 fighters intercept and the B-25s score 1 victory.

 THURSDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): At dawn on Paramushiru Island, 2 B-24s bomb Kashiwabara and Kurabu Cape.

 SUNDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Photo missions to Paramushiru, Matsuwa, Onnekotan and Shasukotan Islands turn back due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s abort a strike at Kashiwabara, Paramushiru Island due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-25s over Shimushiru and Paramushiru Islands blow up 3 buildings and damage 2 others at Cape Namikawa.

 THURSDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): B-24s hit the airfield and shipping targets in the Matsuwa Island-Onnekotan Island area.

 FRIDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Paramushiru Island, 4 B-25s bomb Kurabu Airfield and bomb and strafe buildings on Tomari Cape, scoring hits on canneries, warehouses, and barracks; later, 4 B-24s photograph and bomb targets at Kashiwabara.

 SATURDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s bomb and strafe buildings at Otomae Bay, Kurile Islands.

 SUNDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s on armed reconnaissance over Paramushiru Island turn back when the flight drifts off course; 1 B-24 strafes a freighter off Shimushiru Island.

 MONDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-24s fly cover sorties for a naval task force.

 TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-24s fly cover sorties for a naval task force.

 WEDNESDAY, 18 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s bomb Kurabu Cape Airfield on Paramushiru Island and Suribachi; 8-12 interceptors attack the B-25s, which claim 2 victories.

 THURSDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 bombs Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru Island.

 MONDAY, 23 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 3 B-24s hit Kashiwabara targets on Paramushiru Island; 3 more B-24s bomb Otomari and fly a photo mission over Onnekotan Island; and 5 B-25s bomb the Asahi Bay area.

 TUESDAY, 24 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands, 3 B-24s bomb Kashiwabara and Kurabu Cape; 4 B-25s weather-abort a photo mission to the island; 2 others on a shipping sweep off Kurabu hit a freighter, which is observed listing and smoking, and strafe 2 subchasers.

 THURSDAY, 26 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 6 B-24s which abort a naval task force cover

 FRIDAY, 27 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-24s weather-abort an attempt to fly cover for a naval task force.

 SATURDAY, 28 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-25s fly cover for a naval task force.

 SUNDAY, 29 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Paramushiru Island, 4 B-25s on reconnaissance hit Tomari Cape buildings and a freighter which is left listing.

 MONDAY, 30 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Matsuwa and Onnekotan Islands.

 TUESDAY, 31 OCTOBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s score direct hits on a cannery at Tomari Cape on Paramushiru Island and leave nearby buildings burning; 1 of 2 B-25s hit by AA heads for and safely lands in the USSR.

NOVEMBER 1944

 WEDNESDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, a B-24 on an armed weather mission bombs Otomari Cape.

 THURSDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-24s bomb Suribachi on Paramushiru Island and Onnekotan Island; 4 B-25s on a photo and offensive sweep bomb targets at Torishima Island and Hayakegawa setting fire to 15 buildings, including a cannery.

 SATURDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s strike the airfield, buildings, and offshore shipping at Suribachi and Kurabu on Paramushiru Island.

 SUNDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s abort an offensive sweep off Suribachi on Paramushiru Island due to intense shore fire; 4 more B-25s fly armed reconnaissance over Shimushu Island and at decklevel bomb Torishima Island targets; of 4 fighters intercepting the B-25s, 1 is downed; 4 B-24s bomb Onnekotan and Matsuwa Islands; 3 more B-24s bomb Katalka naval base on Shimushu Island, starting fires; 7 fighters intercept and the B-24s down 1.

 MONDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-25s bomb Torishima Island, score a hit on a large building, sink two nearby barges, and probably hit other shipping targets; about 20 fighters intercept, downing 1 B-25; the B-25s claim 3 victories.

 WEDNESDAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): An 8-aircraft shipping sweep is cancelled due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): An 8-plane armed reconnaissance sweep and a 4-plane bombing Mission are cancelled due to weather.

 SUNDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Onnekotan and Matsuwa Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 1944 1.

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-25s weather-abort an armed photo reconnaissance over Paramushiru Island.

 FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s bomb Suribachi Airfield on Paramushiru Island; 2 fighters intercept and damage 1 B-24 which force-lands on Kamchatka, USSR.

 SATURDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Paramushiru Island, 4 B-24s strike Suribachi shore batteries, including one on Takikawa Cape. A shipping sweep by 6 B-25s is cancelled due to weather.

 MONDAY, 20 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly an air cover Mission for the US Navy.

 TUESDAY, 21 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Advance HQ 11AF is established on Shemya Island, Aleutian Islands with Brigadier General Harry A Johnson as Deputy Commander. 5 B-24s fly air coverage for naval units; another fleet coverage mission by 10 B-25s is cancelled due to weather; before clearance can be obtained from the Soviets through diplomatic channels, a B-24 airdrops provisions to a marooned crew of a B-24 which forcelanded on Kamchatka Island on 17 Nov 44.

 WEDNESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s abort an air coverage mission due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 aborts an armed photo mission over Matsuwa Island due to weather and instead radarbombs Kurabu Airfield on Paramushiru Island; B-25s cancel a shipping sweep due to weather.

 SUNDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A shipping sweep by 4 B-25s is called off due to weather.

 TUESDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 photographs and bombs the Matsuwa Island shore area in the Kurile Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s bomb Kashiwabara on Paramushiru Island. B-25s call off a shipping sweep due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather sortie is the only mission.

DECEMBER 1944

 MONDAY, 4 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather aircraft aborts shortly after takeoff.

 TUESDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s off for a strike on Kakumabetsu in the Kurile Islands abort due to weather and B-25s cancel a shipping sweep.

 WEDNESDAY, 6 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s bomb Suribachi Airfield on Paramushiru Island, scoring hits on the runway, and blast batteries; on the return flight, 1 is hit by AA fire. 1 B-25 flies a negative shipping search. A B-24 weather airplane force-lands in the USSR.

 THURSDAY, 7 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 9 bombers fly 2 negative shipping searches.

 MONDAY, 11 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s fly a negative enemy shipping search.

 TUESDAY, 12 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The weather aircraft aborts the mission due to the weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 13 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s weatherabort a shipping search.

 WEDNESDAY, 20 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies armed reconnaissance over the Kurile Islands; another B-24 strikes Onnekotan Island installations, while 2 more flying armed photo mission over Kashiwabara, Paramushiru Island, and Katoaka, Shimushu Island also strafe buildings on Onnekotan Island and bomb Nemo Bay. 4 B-25s abort a fighter-decoy Mission due to weather.

 SATURDAY, 23 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The weather mission finds squall conditions and is aborted.

 FRIDAY, 29 DECEMBER 1944

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-25s on a fighter decoy Mission abort due to weather; 2 of them are missing on the return flight. A B-24 bombs Katoaka on Shimushu Island in the Kurile Islands.

JANUARY 1945

 MONDAY, 1 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s fly coverage for a naval force upon aborting a bomb Mission to the Kurile Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 3 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): B-25s fly coverage for a naval force over the Kurile Islands.

 FRIDAY, 5 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-24s fly an air coverage mission for a naval task force on its approach to Suribachi on Paramushiru Island.

 SATURDAY, 6 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Paramushiru Island, 2 B-24s bomb Suribachi Bay Airfield, also hitting buildings and pier areas. 10 B-25s fly single air coverage sorties for a naval task force.

 TUESDAY, 9 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): For the first time the Eleventh radar-bomBSwith H2X equipment as 4 B-24s hit Suribachi Bay Airfield on Paramushiru Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 10 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s on an armed photo mission bomb and photograph Kurabu Airfield on Paramushiru Island, scoring hits on the runway.

 THURSDAY, 11 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 3 B-24s on an armed reconnaissance to Suribachi on Paramushiru Island, bomb NW of Taro Lake; 5 B-25s hit Kotani Shima.

CBI - THEATER OF OPERATIONS - CHINA (14AF): In Burma, 5 B-25s damage a bridge at Wan Mai-Lo; 12 fighter-bombers hit targets of opportunity NE of Wanling, 7 drop napalm on targets of opportunity NE of Muse, and 11attack targets of opportunity SE of Wanting, China and in the E end of the Wanting River valley.

 THURSDAY, 18 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly an unsuccessful reconnaissance mission to Kurabu Airfield on Paramushiru Island; one of the B-24s forcelands in the USSR on the return trip.

 FRIDAY, 19 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies a radar ferret mission over Shimushu and Onnekotan Islands in the Kurile Islands; 2 other B-24s hit Matsuwa and Onnekotan Islands.

 SATURDAY, 20 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-24s bomb the Kataoka area on Shimushu Island, Kurile Islands.

 TUESDAY, 23 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 1 B-24 flies a reconnaissance sortie along Onnekotan Island-Matsuwa Island E coasts; 4 B-24s strike the Kakumabetsu cannery and targets on Paramushiru Island; 8 to 10 fighters intercept and the B-24s claim 2 victories; 1 B-24 is lost.

 WEDNESDAY, 24 JANUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-25s on a lowlevel attack on Torishima Island abort due to mechanical trouble; 4 more B-25s bomb buildings on Torishima; AA fire damages 2 B-25s. In the Aleutian Islands, 6 fighters take off after radar reports an unidentified target SE of Attu Island; they spot a balloon which they shoot down with tracers.

FEBRUARY 1945

 MONDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s bomb Kataoka on Shimushu Island in the Kurile Islands through solid overcast; a shipping sweep by B-25s is cancelled due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s off to Kataoka, Shimushu Island abort the mission when all aircraft accidentally drop bombs prior to the bombing run. 4 B-25s weather abort.

 THURSDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-25s abort a mission to the Masugawa River when unable to identify the target.

 SUNDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 7 B-24s off on an air cover

Mission for a naval task force, only 3 reach the target.

 MONDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): B-25s cancel a cover

Mission for a naval force because of weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 14 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s bomb and photograph Suribachi Airfield on Paramushiru Island, Kurile Islands (the secondary target).

 SATURDAY, 17 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s provide air coverage for a naval task force en route to Paramushiru Island.

 SUNDAY, 18 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-24s fly cover sorties for a naval force during its approach to Kurabu Cape, Paramushiru Island.

 MONDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 6 B-24s fly photo reconnaissance over Shimushu Island and bomb Kurabu Cape Airfield on Paramushiru Island; 6 Japanese fighters intercept; the B-24s claim 4 damaged. 4 B-25s weather-abort a mission to hit targets along the Hayakegawa River.

 SATURDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s on a shipping sweep attack the Hayakegawa River in the Kurile Islands; returning, the B-25s sight and photograph a Japanese bomb-carrying balloon.

MARCH 1945

 TUESDAY, 6 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A mission to the Kurile Islands is cancelled due to inclement weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 7 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands; 8 B-25s, dispatched to strike a reported convoy, abort due to weather; so do 8 B-24s after departing on a shipping sweep and a strike on Kataoka, Shimushu Island.

 FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 3 B-24s fly a negative shipping search.

 SATURDAY, 10 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 5 B-24s radar-bomb targets at Kataoka on Shimushu Island, and Suribachi and Kakumabetsu on Paramushiru Island with unobserved results; 1 fighter is sighted but no attack is made; 2 other B-24s on this mission abort due to weather and mechanical trouble. B-25 missions to the Hayakegawa River and Paramushiru are also cancelled due to weather.

 WEDNESDAY, 14 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Of 12 B-25s taking off to cover a naval task force on its way to Matsuwa Island in the Kurile Islands, 6 abort due to weather and failure to locate the task force; the others fly coverage sorties throughout the day.

 THURSDAY, 15 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies air coverage for a naval task force; 7 others weather-abort.

 FRIDAY, 16 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Because of a navigational error, 2 B-24s on a photo mission to Matsuwa Island reach 130 miles (209 km) S of the island, the deepest penetration of the Japanese Home Islands to date; the B-24s turn N, photograph Matsuwa Island and bomb Shimushiru Island with unobserved results.

 SATURDAY, 17 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s fly bombing and photo missions over Matsuwa Island, concentrating on the airfield, and on returning photograph Shasukotan, Harumukotan, and Onnekotan Islands.

 SUNDAY, 18 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A weather sortie is flown.

 MONDAY, 19 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 5 B-24s bomb and photograph the Kashiwabara naval base on Paramushiru Island. 8 B-25s bomb canneries along the Masugawa and Asahigawa Rivers.

 FRIDAY, 23 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): An 8-bomber strike is called off due to weather.

 MONDAY, 26 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 missions, each by 4 B-25s, attempt to bomb canneries on the Masugawa and the Hayakegawa Rivers; fighters drive off the Masugawa mission and the other mision cannot find the target due to weather. 4 B-24s bomb the Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island.

 THURSDAY, 29 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s bomb Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island; 8 B-25s weatherabort a mission to Tomari Cape and 1 B-24 flies a radar-ferret mission along the Paramushiru Island coast.

 FRIDAY, 30 MARCH 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-25s cancel a shipping strike because of weather.

APRIL 1945

 MONDAY, 2 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 on weather reconnaissance returns early due to mechanical trouble; another B-24 investigates radar jamming on Kresta Point in the Aleutian Islands.

 FRIDAY, 6 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 8 B-24s attack and photograph Kurabu on Paramushiru Island, especially the airfield, while 8 B-25s hit radar installations in an all-out attack on Hayakegawa, Kotani Island, and Minami Cape, dropping napalm-filled incendiaries for the first time; buildings and shipping in N part of Hayakegawa are hit especially hard; another B-25 flies weather reconnaissance.

 SATURDAY, 7 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies a radar-ferret mission along the coasts of Paramushiru and Harumukotan Islands in the Kurile Islands.

 TUESDAY, 10 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In coordinated operations with USN (USN): aircraft, 7 B-24s napalm-bomb Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island, Kurile Islands; 4 B-25s attempt to hit radar installations on Minami Cape on Paramushiru Island, the primary air warning station in the Kurils, but fail to release bombs due to an approach error; 3 other B-25s decklevel bomb a Masugawa River cannery; and a B-24 investigates ice floes along the Kurile Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 11 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): P-38s together with USN aircraft pick up bombfilled paper balloons over Attu and E of Adak Islands in the Aleutian Islands; one balloon over Attu is shot down and portions of the gondola are recovered in Massacre Bay.

 THURSDAY, 12 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): P-38s shoot down paper bomb-balloons over Attu Island.

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR: The Commander-In-Chief, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, dies in Warm Springs, Georgia and Harry S Truman is sworn in as the new President.

 FRIDAY, 13 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): At Attu Island, 27 P-38s and P-40s scramble following radar reports of unidentified plots; later, they shoot down 9 of 11 Japanese paper bomb-balloons sighted over the W Aleutians.

 SUNDAY, 15 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A B-24 flies a weather reconnaissance mission.

 MONDAY, 16 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, B-25s abort a mission to bomb Hayakegawa because of weather front; 6 B-24s radarbomb the Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island; another B-24 flies a radar-ferret sortie.

 THURSDAY, 19 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-25s off to bomb Kurile Island targets abort due to weather.

 FRIDAY, 27 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Shimushu Island, 6 B-24s drop fragmentation bombs on the Kataoka naval base, 1 B-24 hits Minami Cape, and another flies a radar-ferret mission.

 SUNDAY, 29 APRIL 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 12 B-25s attempting to bomb targets in the Kurile Islands abort due to a weather front. 6 B-24s radar-bomb Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island.

MAY 1945

 TUESDAY, 1 May 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies a weather reconnaissance mission over the Kurile Islands.

 FRIDAY, 4 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Brigadier General Isaiah Davies replaces Major General Davenport Johnson as Commanding General 11AF on an interim basis.

 SATURDAY, 5 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 1 B-24 flies weather mission over the Kurile Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 9 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, radar discloses considerable shipping between Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands; thus, 12 B-24s take off and radar-bomb through overcast; another B-24 flies a radarferreting sortie over Paramushiru and Shimushu.

 THURSDAY, 10 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): The 11AF and the USN's Fleet Air Wing Four execute the heaviest and most successful joint Mission to date in the Kurile Islands; 12 B-24s bomb shipping targets in the Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island, and fly photo reconnaissance over E and W Paramushiru Island on the return trip; next, 16 Attu Island, Aleutian Island-based B-25s take off; 1 aborts while the others hit shipping between Kashiwabara on Paramushiru Island and Kataoka; heavy AA fire claims 1 B-25; a B-24 and a B-25 forcelands in the USSR.

 TUESDAY, 15 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 13 B-24s bomb the Kashiwabara, Paramushiru Island-Kataoka, Shimushu Island area, claiming one ship destroyed, and a direct hit on another, and investigate radar activities. Low fog limits observation of other results; AA fire damages 2 B-24s, 1 of which forcelands in the USSR.

 FRIDAY, 18 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-24s bomb naval, harbor, and airfield targets at Kataoka on Shimushu Island; another B-24 searches for enemy radar along the Kurile Islands.

 SATURDAY, 19 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-25s try to bomb Minami Cape radar installation and cannery on the Naka River on Shimushu Island; only one gets near the targets and bombs and strafes the area, while intense AA fire and enemy fighters drive off the rest and down 1 B-25; another B-25 is missing and a third reaches Petropavlovsk, USSR.

 WEDNESDAY, 23 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 7 B-24s radar-bomb the Kataoka naval base area on Shimushu Island while another flies a radar-ferret Mission in the same area.

 FRIDAY, 25 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s fly a radar ferret Mission over Matsuwa Island and bomb the Tagan Cape area; another B-24 flies armed weather reconnaissance.

ZI - ZONE OF INTERIOR: The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approve the directive for Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, scheduled for 1Nov 45.

 TUESDAY, 29 MAY 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s weather abort a shipping sweep along the E coasts of Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands.

JUNE 1945

 FRIDAY, 1 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): A 4-plane shipping strike is called off due to weather.

 SUNDAY, 3 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): On Shimushu Island in the Kurile Islands, 1 B-24 flying a radar ferret Mission to Kataoka is followed by 8 others, radar bombing and photographing scattered targets in the naval base area; 7 B-25s take off for an attack but 4 are turned back by weather and the others low level bomb a Masugawa River Cannery.

 MONDAY, 4 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 8 B-25s abort a shipping strike at Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru Island due to weather; 11 B-24s, however, get through and radar-bomb Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island.

 SATURDAY, 9 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In coordination with USN surface and AFs attacking in the Kurile Islands, 6 B-24s and 8 B-25s fly extensive armed weather reconnaissance and anti-shipping sweeps over Kurabu and Otomari Capes, Ichinowatashi, and Asahigawa on Paramushiru Island; the B-24s score no results, half of them jettisoning their bombs; the B-25s then fly a diversionary bombing Mission over Araido Island where they are attacked by 8 Japanese fighters; to evade them, the B-25s fly over Kamchatka where Soviet AA fire shoots down one, killing its crew; another damaged B-25 crash-lands in Petropavlovsk. This is the first time Soviet AA hits a US aircraft.

 SUNDAY, 10 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly with the USN's Fleet Air Wing Four bombers on a shipping attack and sink NICHIEI MARU #5 off the SW coast of Paramushiru Island, Kurile Islands.

 MONDAY, 11 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 8 B-24s on a shipping sweep over the Kurile Islands do not find targets because of overcast and instead radar-bomb installations on Kurabu Cape, Paramushiru Island and in the Kataoka areas of Shimushu Island.

 TUESDAY, 12 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s strafe shipping off Paramushiru Island, near Arahata Cape, damaging 4 freighters and 2 barges; one of the B-25s is shot down.

 SATURDAY, 16 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-24s bomb and strafe shipping off Suribachi Bay, Paramushiru Island and a radar site on Minami Cape, Shimushu Island; one of the B-24s crashes into the water; 4 B-25s on a shipping strike score near misses on a freighter in Asahi Bay and bomb targets along the Torishima Chain; mechanical failures force 2 of the B-25s to fly to Petropavlovsk, USSR.

 SUNDAY, 17 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 4 B-25s bomb shipping near Kataoka, Shimushu Island; one ship (KONGO MARU) is observed exploding, another burns after a strafing run; 4 other B-25s fly a shipping sweep from Shimushu to Kurabu Cape, Paramushiru Island; a number of vessels are sighted but cannot be attacked because of land-based AA.

 MONDAY, 18 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 6 B-24s join USN aircraft in attacking Kataoka, Shimushu Island and Tomari Cape, Paramushiru Island; cloud cover prevents observation of effects; 1 B-24 flies a radar-ferret Mission over the Kurile Islands.

 TUESDAY, 19 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In a coordinated shipping search, a B-24 flies the theater's longest mission, a 2,700-mile (4,345 km) roundtrip lasting 15.5 hours and flying as far as Uruppu Island, Japan; turning N the B-24 bombs a small convoy 25 miles (40 km) SW of Shimushu Bay, Shimushu Island, Kurile Islands, sinks a vessel, heavily damages another, and sets 2 more afire; another B-24 bombs and photographs Matsuwa Island; 4 B-25s break off a shipping sweep due to the presence of Japanese fighters.

 FRIDAY, 22 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): Major General John B Brooks relieves Brigadier General Isaiah Davies as Commanding General, 11AF.

 SATURDAY, 23 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): In the Kurile Islands, 2 B-24s on a shipping sweep between Matsuwa and Paramushiru Islands sink 1freighter, damage 2 more, and hit a whale boat; 1Japanese fighter is claimed destroyed; 6 more B-24s bomb Kataoka on Shimushu Island.

 SUNDAY, 24 JUNE 1945

ATO - ALASKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS (11AF): 2 B-24s on a shipping sweep instead radarbomb Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru Island, because of overcast and turbulence; another planned shipping strike by 6 B-25s is also cancelled due to weather.

JULY 1945

 WEDNESDAY, 4 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): To celebrate the 4th of July, 8 B-24s radar-bomb the Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island with napalm.

 TUESDAY, 10 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 4 B-24s fly a search down the W coasts of Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands and then radar-bomb Minami Zaki on Shimushu Island. 1 B-24 flies a radar-ferret Mission over the N Kurile Islands.

 WEDNESDAY, 11 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 5 B-24s radar-bomb Kataoka on Shimushu Island and 4 B-25s fly a shipping sweep and bomb a Otomae Wan fishery, scoring hits among the buildings.

 THURSDAY, 12 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 4 B-25s on a shipping sweep bomb and strafe a freighter; 1 B-25 is lost killing the crew.

 MONDAY, 16 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 2 B-24s fly a negative shipping search mission to Shimushiru Island. 4 B-25s on an enemy shipping sweep deck-level bomb and strafe an enemy freighter; 3 of the bombers then bomb and strafe Torishima Retto, the secondary target.

 TUESDAY, 17 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): The 77BS(M), 28BG (Composite), flies it's last Mission of the war when 4 B-25s make an unsuccessful shipping sweep between Kurabu Zaki and Tomari Zaki; 2 of the B-25s land in the USSR and 11 of the 12 airmen become the last American aircrew interned in the USSR during the war (one airman is KIA). An unsuccessful shipping sweep is flown by 2 B-24s over Shimushiru Island.

 WEDNESDAY, 18 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 2 routine search and weather sorties are flown.

 FRIDAY, 20 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 8 B-24s fly the heaviest and most successful Mission of the month, bombing hangars and revetments at Matsuwa Airfield on Matsuwa Island. The detachment of the 11FS, 343FG, operating from Amchitka Island with P-38s and P-40s since Mar 44, returns to base on Adak Island.

 MONDAY, 23 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 2 B-24s radar-bomb Kurabu Cape Airfield on Paramushiru Island.

 THURSDAY, 26 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 7 B-24s successfully hit the Kataoka Naval Base on Shimushu Island with incendiaries, leaving smoke columns 5,000 ft (1,524 m) high in their wake; there is no airborne opposition and AA fire is moderate and inaccurate. Another B-24 flies a radar-ferret Mission over the N Kurile Islands.

 MONDAY, 30 JULY 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 8 B-24s on way to the Kurile islands are soon recalled because of weather disturbances.

AUGUST 1945

 THURSDAY, 2 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): On Shimushu Island in the Kurile Islands, 5 B-24s visually bomb Kataoka Naval Base and 1radar-bombs Kokutan Zaki and returns to base (600 miles or 966 km) on 3 engines.

 TUESDAY, 7 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 5 B-24s bomb Kataoka Airfield on Shimushu Island; AA fire damages 2 B-24s.

 SATURDAY, 11 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): The 11FS, 343FG moves from Adak to Shemya Islands with P-38s.

 SUNDAY, 12 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 4 B-24s make a combined visual and radar bomb run over Kataoka on Shimushu Island; 3 more bomb Suribachi Airfield on Paramushiru Island, hitting runways and buildings; 1 B-24 flies a radar-ferret mission.

 MONDAY, 13 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): The 11AF dispatches its last combat mission when 6 B-24s radar-bomb the Kashiwahara Staging Area on Paramushiru Island with incendiaries, leaving huge columns of smoke.

 TUESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 2 B-24s are prevented by cloud cover from taking photos of the Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands; 4 others abort a photo mission to Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands due to weather.

 THURSDAY, 23 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): 4 B-24s fly a photo mission over Paramushiru and Shimushu Islands, Kurile Islands.

 FRIDAY, 24 AUGUST 1945

ATO - ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (11AF): B-24s try to photograph the Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands but are impeded by clouds.

SEPTEMBER 1945

 SUNDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 1945

FINI!

Hostilities with Japan end officially with the signing of the instrument of surrender aboard the USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay.

This chronology is dedicated to all the men and women who served in the US Army AFs in World War II and especially the 40,061 USAAF airmen who died in combat in Overseas Theaters. Requiescat in pace.