Operation Hailstone - Carrier Raid on Truk Island 17–18th Feb 1944

H-Gram 026, Attachment 3 by Samuel J. Cox February 2019

Operation Hailstone - Carrier Raid on Truk Island 17–18th Feb 1944
1. Japanese shipping under air attack in Truk Lagoon, as seen from a USS Intrepid (CV-11) aircraft on the first day of raids, 17 February 1944. Dublon Island is at left, with Moen Island in the background. Four of these ships appear to have been hit by this time (80-G-215151). 2. Japanese ships being bombed during attack on Truk Caroline Island by USS Intrepid planes 17–18th Feb 1944 80-G-221244 3. Photo #: 80-G-217624 Truk Raid A Mark XIII aerial torpedo hits a Japanese cargo ship during the first day of U.S. Navy carrier air raids on Truk, 17 February 1944. Note the several torpedo wakes, including one very erratic one ending with the torpedo broaching (80-G-217624). 4. USS Baltimore (CA 68) rescued by a OS2U 3 Kingfisher is George M Blair (left) from Truk Lagoon 18th Feb 1944 80-G-216624 5. Vought OS2U 3 Kingfisher is recovered USS Baltimore (CA 68) after rescueing downed crew from Truk Lagoon 18th Feb 1944

Through the interwar years and into World War II, the Japanese Mandate island of Truk in the Central Caroline Islands had developed a forbidding reputation as an impregnable stronghold, the “Gibraltar of the Pacific,” which was somewhat exaggerated. The Japanese had been very secretive about what they were doing there after having acquired it from the Germans during World War I and kept it under a mandate from the League of Nations. The Japanese had in fact heavily fortified the island. Its strategic location made it the preferred base of the carriers and battleships of the Japanese Combined Fleet in the first two years of the war, and many an intelligence reports for impending battles began with the Japanese marshaling forces at Truk for their next offensive operation. Air and naval forces at Truk could quickly be shifted from there to counter U.S. actions from New Guinea to the Solomons to the Gilberts, Marshalls, Wake Island, and the Marianas. What the Japanese didn’t anticipate was three simultaneous U.S. advances in New Guinea, the Solomons and the Marshalls that resulted in their forces being severely jerked around, wasting a lot of scarce fuel and often being in the wrong place at the wrong time. U.S. submarines, once fixes had been implemented for faulty torpedoes, increasingly found the waters around Truk to be favorable hunting grounds.

The pre-war U.S. concept that carriers should be used in a “hit and run” mode was still deeply ingrained in the U.S. Navy even into 1944. Staying put and duking it out with a large land-based air force was still considered by many to be a really bad idea, not conducive to carrier longevity. However, by early 1944, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, had reached the conclusion that it was time to pierce the aura of Truk and that he had sufficient carrier forces to conduct a major multi-day attack against the Japanese stronghold. With an aggressive carrier task force commander like Rear Admiral Marc “Pete” Mitscher, Nimitz had the right man for the job. As it turned out, Nimitz’s counterpart, Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, made the same assessment at about the same time and decided it was time to get the Combined Fleet out of Truk.

The 7AF targeted Dublon Seaplane base and dropped incendiaries Truk Caroline Group Isls 16 17 Feb 1944
7AF Target Dublon Seaplane base is hit by incendiaries Truk Caroline Group Isls 16 17 Feb 1944 NA036036

POA - PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (7AF): B-24s from Tarawa Atoll and Abemama Island hit Ponape and Kusaie Islands, and Jaluit Atoll. P-40s strafe floatplanes off Emidj Island, as a USN Task Force begins a heavy attack on Truk Atoll.

Raid on Truk in the Carolines

The first carrier strike on Truk, designated Operation Hailstone, was scheduled for 17 to 18 February 1944, and timed to coincide with the U.S. landings on Eniwetok (Operation Catchpole) in the western Marshall Islands (see also H-Gram 026-2). Truk (now known as Chuuk, capital of the Federated States of Micronesia) is roughly equidistant from Eniwetok (669 nautical miles) and Rabaul (696 nautical miles) and ships and aircraft operating from Truk represented a significant threat to the Eniwetok operation. The Combined Fleet had deployed to Eniwetok in reaction to the U.S. carrier strikes on Wake Island in October 1943 (and had burned up a huge amount of scarce fuel doing so). Normally, however, due to fuel scarcity and U.S. submarines, the bulk of the Combined Fleet (including Admiral Koga’s flagship, the super-battleship Musashi) remained inside the Truk Lagoon. The lagoon was big enough that naval gunfire from outside the reef could not reach ships anchored inside the lagoon. In the middle of the lagoon, the island of Truk was fairly large, mountainous, and heavily wooded. It was defended by about 7,500 deeply entrenched Japanese troops, and another 3-4,000 Japanese sailors ashore in support functions at air strips, seaplane bases, and repair and logistics facilities. In addition to the considerable anti-aircraft fire that could be put up from the ships in the lagoon, the island was defended by over 40 major-caliber anti-aircraft guns, although the fire control radar intended for those guns had gone down on a transport ship sunk by a U.S. submarine. Of greatest concern to any attacking force was the 300 to 400 Japanese aircraft based at five airfields on the island at any given time. (The number fluctuated considerably as aircraft were shifted around).

In preparation for the strike, two U.S. Marine Corps B-24 Liberator bombers flying from Bougainville in the Solomons conducted a high-altitude, long-range photo-reconnaissance mission (the first) over Truk on 4 February 1944. Although the imagery was incomplete due to cloud cover, plenty of lucrative targets were identified, including one battleship, two aircraft carriers, and five or six heavy cruisers. The Japanese, however, detected the flight and wasted no time understanding its import. Admiral Koga gave the order to clear out. Within days, the majority of the Combined Fleet had shifted to the west to Palau, and the Musashi went all the way back to Japan.

The unlucky Japanese light cruiser Agano was delayed departing Truk due to previous damage. Agano had been hit by a torpedo from a U.S. Avenger during the strike on Rabaul on 11 Nov 1943 (see H-Gram 024) and while being towed to Truk for repairs was hit by a torpedo from Scamp (SS-277). (Agano’s escorts fought off an attack by Albacore, SS-218, the same day). Finally leaving Truk for Japan on 16 February, Agano was hit by two of four torpedoes from submarine Skate (SS-305) but remained afloat until the morning of the following day, during which the Japanese destroyer Oite rescued 523 of Agano’s 726-man crew. However, Oite was torpedoed and sunk during the U.S. airstrikes on Truk on 17 February, during which all but 22 of Oite’s crew and all of the survivors of Agano were lost. (Of note, Skate had put a torpedo into the super-battleship Yamato off Truk on Christmas Day 1943, sending the seriously damaged Yamato back to Japan for repairs.) By 17 February the only Japanese ships left in Truk were two light cruisers, eight destroyers, and about 50 other auxiliaries, cargo ships, merchant ships, and patrol and service craft.

The commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, personally assumed command of Task Force 50, shifting his flag from the heavy cruiser Indianapolis to the new battleship New Jersey. Spruance was selected for his fourth star just before the raid on Truk and was actually promoted just afterwards. The Fast Carrier Force (TF 58) was under the command of Rear Admiral Marc A. “Pete” Mitscher, who had relieved Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall after the Gilbert Islands operations, embarked on Yorktown. The U.S. Force consisted of four new Essex-class carriers––Yorktown, Essex Intrepid, and Bunker Hill––plus Enterprise and four light carriers Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens, along with more than 500 aircraft. In addition, six new fast battleships, ten cruisers and 28 destroyers rounded out the force. TG 58.4, under the command of Rear Admiral Samuel P. Ginder, with Saratoga, Princeton, Langley, and escorts was detached from TF 58 to cover the landings at Eniwetok (Operation Catchpole), where they commenced strikes on 16 February 1944.

On 12/13 February 1944, three fast carrier task groups departed Majuro Atoll (recently captured in the Marshall Islands) and topped off from five tankers before making a high-speed run toward Truk. These task groups included TG58.1, Commander Carrier Group 1, Rear Admiral John W. Reeves consisting of Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, three light cruisers, and one anti-aircraft cruiser; TG 58.2, Commander Carrier Group 2, Rear Admiral Alfred .E. Montgomery, consisting of Essex, Intrepid, Cabot, three heavy cruisers, and one anti-aircraft cruiser; and TG 58.3, Commander Carrier Group 3, Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, consisting of Bunker Hill, Monterey (future U.S. President Lieutenant Gerald Ford in crew), Cowpens, and battleships North Carolina (BB-55), Iowa (BB-61), New Jersey (BB-62, Vice Admiral Spruance embarked), Massachusetts (BB-59), South Dakota (BB-57), Alabama (BB-60), and two heavy cruisers.

TF 58 reached the launch point 90 nautical miles northeast of Truk on 17 February and commenced launching an hour and a half before dawn. The first strike was a 72-plane fighter sweep from the five U.S. fleet carriers, which caught the Japanese by surprise, the Japanese having just stood down after two weeks of high alert following the B-24 reconnaissance mission. The advance fighter sweep was a new technique devised by Rear Admiral Mitscher. About 45 Japanese fighters scrambled into the air only minutes before the U.S. fighters arrived overhead, and about another 45 were able to get airborne during the course of the fighter sweep. Over 30 Japanese fighters were shot down and 40 more destroyed on the ground by strafing––all for a loss of four U.S. fighters. The fighter sweep was followed immediately by 18 Avengers dropping incendiary and cluster fragmentation bombs (another innovation) on Japanese dispersal areas. By the afternoon, no Japanese fighters were challenging the U.S. air raid. Of about 365 Japanese aircraft at Truk when the raid began, only about 100 survived, the rest having been shot down or destroyed on the ground.

Commencing at 0443, the five light carriers began a staggered launch, resulting in a near continuous stream of strike aircraft (another innovation) arriving over Truk during the morning. During the course of the day there were 30 distinct U.S. airstrikes, delivering 369 1,000-pound bombs, 498 500-pound bombs, and 70 torpedoes. Many of the attacks went against Japanese shipping in the lagoon. The commander of Bombing Ten (VB-10), future Rear Admiral James D. Ramage, sank the merchant tanker Hoyo Maru. An Avenger from Intrepid’s Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6), flown by Lieutenant James E. Bridges, hit the ammunition ship Aikoku Maru, which blew up with such force it obliterated the ship and, unfortunately, Bridges’ aircraft and aircrew, too; all three were lost. The Japanese destroyer Fumizuki suffered a near miss, but the crew could not control the flooding and she sank the next day. The destroyer Tachikaze had run aground on 4 February and was still immobilized when she was hit by a torpedo and sunk. The destroyer Oite was hit and sunk as related above. The destroyer Shigure, survivor of numerous battles (and sole survivor of two) survived yet another, although she suffered serious damage with a bomb hit in her No. 2 turret, killing 21 and wounding 45.

Some Japanese ships tried to escape and were sunk by waiting submarines, while others were either blocked in the lagoon by U.S. air attack or set upon by U.S. surface ships as they attempted to flee. The light cruiser Naka was caught trying to flee 35 nautical miles west of Truk by several waves of Helldivers and Avengers from Bunker Hill and Cowpens and was hit by a bomb and a torpedo, breaking in two and sinking with the loss of 240 crewmen (210 were rescued).

As U.S. Navy aircraft were slaughtering Japanese auxiliaries and merchant ships inside the lagoon, Vice Admiral Spruance led an “around-the-atoll cruise” (TG 50.9) on 17 February to catch leakers, bombarding shore installations as it went. Consisting of the new battleships New Jersey and Iowa, the heavy cruisers Minneapolis (CA-36) and New Orleans (CA-32) (all survivors of the Tassafaronga debacle in November 1942), and four destroyers (covered by combat air patrol from the light carrier Cowpens), TG 50.9 caught the light cruiser Katori. That ship, the auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, two destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki), and a minesweeping trawler Shonan Maru No. 15 had left Truk before the attack but had not gotten far enough away. Aircraft from several carriers had already pounded the small group. The Akagi Maru was hit by three bombs, causing several large explosions, and she was abandoned. Despite her own damage, Katori took on a number of survivors from Akagi Maru, although all would be lost when Katori itself went down. All told, 788 crewmen and 512 passengers on Akagi Maru were lost.

Although aircraft could have finished off Katori, which had already been hit by one torpedo and as many as seven bombs, Spruance wanted a surface engagement, so Mitscher waved off further air attacks on the damaged light cruiser. Aviators, and some of Spruance’s own staff, viewed Spruance’s decision as reckless. (I can only imagine that from the bridge of an Iowa-class battleship, Spruance felt pretty invincible.) Spruance directed Minneapolis, New Orleans, and two destroyers to engage the Katori. The destroyers Bradford (DD-545) and Burns (DD-588) fired several salvos of torpedoes at Katori, all of which missed. Katori responded with a torpedo salvo of her own, which also missed. Eventually Iowa fired 46 16-inch and 124 5-inch shells at the Katori hitting her multiple times, yet she continued to fight valiantly until the end, her guns still firing as she rolled over and sank. Although there were survivors of Katori in the water, none were rescued by the U.S. or the Japanese. In the end, there were no survivors from her crew of about 300 nor were there any from those previously rescued from Akagi Maru.

As Katori met her end, the destroyer Maikaze valiantly stood by the Katori and got off a salvo of torpedoes at the Iowa and New Jersey that might have hit but for a timely warning from U.S. aircraft overhead. The New Jersey maneuvered and the torpedoes passed just ahead. VADM Spruance remarked, “That would have been embarrassing” (had the torpedoes hit). Like Katori, Maikaze absorbed tremendous punishment but kept firing until she was finally finished off by the U.S. cruisers, going down with all-hands. In the meantime, the little trawler Shonan Maru No. 15 put up a valiant fight against the destroyer Burns. The Japanese trawler continued to fire even as she went under, also with all hands.

The Nowaki, on the other hand, made good her escape and was able to open considerable distance during the melee with Katori and Maikaze. New Jersey and Iowa pursued, and opened fire at the extreme range of 34,000 to 39,000 yards, straddling Nowaki several times and hitting her with splinters. The last salvo, at a range of 22 miles, is believed to be the longest-range gun shot at an enemy ship. (Nowaki would be sunk by torpedoes from the destroyer Owen in the Philippines on 26 October 1944.) The surface engagement ended when Burns was directed to dispatch a Japanese submarine chaser, the CH-24, which opened fire on Burns with her single 3-inch gun. Despite her valiant but futile gesture, CH-24 didn’t last long. Burns attempted to rescue about 60 Japanese survivors in the water, who vigorously resisted being rescued. Whaleboats from Burns were able to haul about six unwilling Japanese out of the water. With the remainder refusing rescue, but close enough to Truk that they might be rescued by the Japanese, the Burns dropped three depth charges onto the survivors, ensuring they would not live to fight another day.

Like the little CH-24, the counter-attack by the Japanese was valiant but feeble. At 1900, six or seven Kate torpedo bombers, retrofitted with radar, attacked the U.S. carrier force. Intense U.S. anti-aircraft fire kept most of the Kates away. One made a concerted attack, and an attempt to intercept it with a night fighter guided by a radar-equipped Avenger failed. At 2211, the Kate put a torpedo into the starboard quarter of the Intrepid, jamming her rudder, killing 11 and wounding 17, and forcing her to withdraw for several months of repairs.

Between midnight and dawn, Mitscher pulled another innovation out of the hat, launching the first night carrier bombing attack against shipping in U.S. carrier history. Twelve specially-equipped TBF-1C Avengers from Enterprise’s VT-10, carrying four 500-pound bombs each, conducted a night strike on remaining shipping in Truk Lagoon. In 25 runs, the Avengers scored 13 direct hits and 7 near misses (plus two direct hits on islets mistaken for ships) which actually accounted for about one third of the hits on ships achieved by the entire force during two days of strikes. Despite the November 1943 loss of Navy ace and Medal of Honor awardee Butch O’Hare in the first attempt at night intercepts by U.S. carrier fighters, the Enterprise continued to be the leader in night battle tactics development; after the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, Enterprise would be designated as the night strike carrier, tasked with developing and executing tactics for night fighting.

Violating the “and run” part of long-standing “hit and run” carrier doctrine, at dawn on 18 February, aircraft from Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, and Bunker Hill attacked Truk again. Meeting no air opposition, the carrier planes bombed and strafed airfields, hangars, storage tanks (with 17,000 tons of fuel that went up in smoke), and ammo dumps with great effect. By the time the U.S. strikes ended, U.S. carriers had flown 1,250 combat sorties, dropping 400 tons of bombs and torpedoes on shipping and 94 tons on land targets. The Japanese had lost between 250 and 275 aircraft and 75 percent of their supplies on Truk. Japanese warship losses included two light cruisers, four destroyers, two submarine chasers, one auxiliary minesweeper, and a motor torpedo boat. Additional ships sunk included three auxiliary cruisers, 16 Navy transport ships, three Army transport ships, one freighter, two submarine tenders, and––probably most valuable––five tankers. Damaged ships included two destroyers, two submarines, a repair ship, a seaplane tender, a submarine chaser, and a target ship. One additional cargo ship was also damaged.

The cost to the United States of Operation Hailstone was one fleet carrier damaged, one battleship slightly damaged, 25 aircraft lost, and 40 dead. A number of U.S. aircrew were rescued by submarine. In one case, a Kingfisher float plane launched from the heavy cruiser Baltimore, flown by Lieutenant Junior Grade D. F. Baxter, flew right into the lagoon and rescued an Essex Hellcat pilot that had been shot down on the morning fighter sweep of 18 February, while nine other Hellcats held a Japanese destroyer at bay. The submarine Searaven (SS-196) also rescued the entire three-man crew of a Yorktown Avenger.

The Japanese never again used Truk as a major fleet anchorage, and the devastating carrier attack was a huge blow to Japanese morale (and a big boost to U.S. carrier pilots’ morale and confidence). At the time of the attack, Allied commanders had not yet decided whether Truk would need to be invaded or could be bypassed. On 12 Mar 1944, Admiral Nimitz made the decision to bypass it.

Of the Marshalls campaign and the raid on Truk, Navy historian and Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison would write, “Courage and determination the Navy had shown from the first, but in the Marshalls it demonstrated mastery of the art of amphibious warfare; of combining air, surface, submarine and ground forces to project fighting power irresistibly across the seas. The strike on Truk demonstrated a virtual revolution in naval warfare; the aircraft carrier emerged as the capital ship of the future, with unlimited potentialities.”

(Sources for this section include Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls. Also: The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy and King: The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea, by Walter R. Borneman, 2012; The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, by James Hornfischer, 2016. Additional sources include Naval History and Heritage Command Dictionary of American Fighting Ships [DANFS], for U.S. ship histories and combinedfleet.com for Japanese ship histories.)

https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-026/H-026-3.html

The Battle of Surigao Strait 25th October 1944
Last Battleship Versus Battleship Action

With warning from the U.S. airstrikes in the Sulu Sea, the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, had ample time to set up a blocking force at the northern exit from Surigao Strait to keep Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s “Southern” force from forcing its way into Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid assigned the task to Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, commander of Fire Support Unit South. Oldendorf then consolidated the battleships and most of the cruisers and destroyers of the Southern and Northern Fire Support Groups. (The light cruiser Nashville-CL-43-was held back from the battle because General Douglas MacArthur was still embarked. Although MacArthur was eager to ride her into battle, Kinkaid and Oldendorf thought better of it, and assigned her to cover the beachhead area).

Six pre-war battleships (West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania), four heavy cruisers (Oldendorf’s flagship Louisville-CA-28, Portland-CA-33, Minneapolis-CA-36, and HMAS Shropshire), and four light cruisers (Denver-CL-58, Columbia-CL-56, Phoenix-CL-46, and Boise-CL-47), plus 28 destroyers and 39 PT-boats were arrayed to meet the Japanese force. They were deployed in such a manner that Nishimura’s force would have to run a 50-mile gauntlet of PT boats, destroyers, and cruisers before it even reached the U.S. battle line.

Two of Oldendorf’s battleships, West Virginia and California, had been sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor, then raised and modernized. Maryland, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania had been damaged at Pearl Harbor, repaired and modernized. The cruisers Portland, Minneapolis, and Boise had all been severely damaged early in the war, but had survived and been repaired due to America’s enormous industrial might.

Many accounts inaccurately describe Nishimura as blundering in to an American trap, and he has been often characterized as inept or foolhardy, or deceived into thinking that no U.S. force was waiting for him. Actually, Nishimura knew full well what he was facing-his catapult-launched scout planes had actually served him well. He knew he was on a sacrificial mission (described in Japanese sources as “special attack,” the same terminology used for kamikaze aircraft). His mission was to draw the American forces to the southern side of Leyte Gulf, to clear a path for Kurita’s force to enter from the north. According to the original plan, Nishimura was to enter Leyte Gulf from the south, via Surigao Strait, at the same time as Kurita came in from the north (which might give him some chance of survival), but once he learned that Kurita had been delayed by U.S. Navy airstrikes in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October 1944, he knew there was no hope. However, he knew his duty was to proceed. In an irony of fate, Surigao Strait was where Nishimura’s only son had been killed in a plane crash early in the war.

As Nishimura approached the southern end of Surigao Strait after darkness fell, fully expecting to be ambushed by the Americans, he sent the heavy cruiser Mogami and three of his four destroyers ahead to scout a bay that was a likely place for U.S. ships to be waiting, while the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso trailed some distance behind. As it turned out, no U.S. ships were there, and waiting U.S. PT boats missed Mogami and destroyers as they went by in the darkness before then detecting trailing Yamashiro and Fuso at 2236. PT-131 commenced the first attack, but Japanese night tactics against PT boats and defensive fire were very effective, driving the initial attacks off. At roughly the same time, Mogami and the battleships linked back up, but in the darkness and confusion, one of Fuso’s secondary battery guns opened fire and hit Mogami with the first round. For the next three hours, the Japanese force fought off one wave of U.S. PT boats after another, damaging ten (one of which was run aground to prevent sinking, but later sank), but receiving no significant damage in return. Nishimura’s force entered the southern end of Surigao Strait at about 0200.

At 0300, Nishimura’s luck ran out. Captain Jesse B. Coward, commander of Destroyer Squadron 54, had deployed each of his two destroyer divisions on opposite sides of the strait, with flagship Remey (DD-688), McGowan (DD-678), and Melvin (DD-680) on the east side. McDermut (DD-677) and Monssen (DD-798) hugged the shoreline on the west side, both on a reciprocal course to the Japanese, which had first been detected by McGowan’s SG radar at 0238 at a range of 39,700 yards. Having learned the lessons of previous battles, the U.S. destroyers did not open fire with guns until after the torpedoes were well on their way. Coward’s eastern group of destroyers launched 27 torpedoes about 30 seconds after 0300. The Japanese opened fire on the eastern destroyers at 0301, straddling them and forcing them to turn away without firing their guns. The western two destroyers launched 20 torpedoes at about 0310, the two groups catching the Japanese in a crossfire. The result was devastating.

Two torpedoes from Melvin struck Fuso, inflicting serious damage to the old ship, and she fell out of line (in the ensuing confusion, Nishimura never knew Fuso was no longer following behind). At 0320, the torpedoes from McDermut and MONSSEN arrived. One torpedo from Monssen hit Yamashiro, with less damage than on Fuso, and Yamashiro plowed on with Mogami closing up behind her. At the same time, two torpedoes from McDermut hit the destroyer Yamagumo, which then blew up with all hands. Another McDermut torpedo hit the destroyer Asagumo, blowing off her bow and inflicting severe damage that would subsequently prove fatal, and knocking her out of action. At least one more McDermut torpedo hit the destroyer Michishio, which began to sink. Several torpedoes appeared to pass under Shigure (the luckiest ship in the Imperial Japanese Navy) without exploding. With his torpedo salvos, Captain Coward had hit both battleships and taken Fuso and three of the four Japanese destroyers out of the battle. (Coward would be awarded a Navy Cross-his second-and criticized by the Naval War College for taking a bad angle shot).

Then, Destroyer Squadron 24, under the command of Captain Kenmore M. McManes, commenced a torpedo attack at 0330 from the western flank in two sections. The first section was flagship Hutchins (DD-476), Daly (DD-519), and Bache (DD-470), and the second was led by HMAS Arunta, followed by Killen (DD-593) and Beale (DD-471). The explosion of Yamagumo from McDermut’s torpedo lit the scene. Shigure dodged four torpedoes from Arunta. One torpedo from Killen hit battleship Yamashiro (her second torpedo hit), causing Nishimura to issue a “general attack” order-i.e., all ships attack independently. More torpedoes hit the sinking Michishio, hastening her demise. Daly dodged torpedoes fired from either Mogami or one of the Japanese destroyers, and other destroyers in the group experienced near misses from Japanese return fire. McManes would also be awarded a Navy Cross.

Subsequently, Destroyer Squadron 56, commanded by Captain Roland M. Smoot, attacked in three sections. Section 1 was Albert W. Grant (DD-649), Richard P. Leary (DD-664), and flagship Newcomb (DD-586). Section 2 was Bryant (DD-665), Halford (DD-480), and Robinson (DD-562). Future CNO Lieutenant Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was the evaluator in the combat information center on Robinson and would be awarded a Bronze Star with Combat V. Section 3 was Bennion (DD-662), Leutze (DD-481), and Heywood L. Edwards (DD-663). Future CNO Lieutenant (j.g.) James L. Holloway III was the gunnery officer on Bennion (in his second week on board) and would also be awarded a Bronze Star with Combat V. By this time, Yamashiro had shaken off the second torpedo hit and resumed her forward advance with the so-far undamaged Mogami. Shigure doubled back to look for Fuso, but in the confusion reported Yamashiro as Fuso (they were sister ships), which served to completely confuse Nishimura. In the meantime, the torpedo hits on Fuso had proved fatal and she rolled over and sank at about 0325. A huge underwater explosion ignited a large pool of the highly volatile Borneo (Tarakan) fuel in which Fuso’s survivors were swimming. Only about 10 of her crew of 1,600 survived, many lost in the conflagration. Early accounts, including by Morison, indicated that Fuso blew up and for a time the two floating halves drew fire from U.S. ships. However, the research ship Petrel in 2017 confirmed more recent analysis that Fuso went down in one piece and that subsequent U.S. shellfire was directed a flaming pools of oil. Captain Smoot would be awarded his first of two Navy Crosses.

As Smoot’s destroyers launched their torpedoes, the U.S. cruisers opened fire at 0351, followed shortly after by the battleships. Two torpedoes from Bennion hit Mogami (other accounts indicate fire detonated four of Mogami’s own torpedoes), but either way she kept on coming. (By this point in the battle, it is very difficult to reconstruct exactly who shot who). As Smoot’s destroyers were withdrawing, they were mistaken for attacking Japanese. At about 0407, Albert W. Grant was hit 22 times by both Japanese and U.S. cruiser fire (more from the U.S ships) and suffered severe damage, with 39 killed and 104 wounded, but her crew was able to get her engines back on line and she retired from the battle area. The U.S. “machine-gun cruisers,” the light cruisers, pumped out prodigious amounts of 6-inch shellfire (Columbia fired 1,147 rounds in 18 minutes), several of which hit Albert W. Grant.

The U.S. battleships, having crossed the Japanese “T” (although there wasn’t much left of the Japanese “T”) opened fire at 0352. West Virginia hit Yamashiro with her first salvo. In the deluge of shellfire from the cruisers and battleships, some of the battleships could not find targets, particularly those with older radar. West Virginia, California, and Tennessee had new Mark-8 radar and got off 60–90 main battery rounds each. Of the ships with older radar, Pennsylvania never fired her main battery and Maryland used her older radar to fire at the splashes raised by West Virginia’s shells. Mississippi finally fired one salvo, which turned out to be the last U.S. battleship shells ever fired at another enemy ship.

In only a matter of a few minutes, Yamashiro and Mogami were hit repeatedly by battleship and cruiser shellfire, yet both continued returning fire and advancing despite receiving unbelievable punishment. At 0405, Mogami launched a spread of deadly “Long Lance” torpedoes, but because of the greatly reduced visibility in the smoke of the battle, her aim was off, and none of the U.S. battleships were hit. At some point, Yamashiro was hit by more torpedoes from U.S. destroyers, probably Newcomb and possibly Bennion (she probably absorbed at least four torpedoes, possibly five or six total). U.S. shellfire devastated the bridge of Mogami, killing all the senior officers, and at one point the ship was under the command of a chief petty officer signalman, who kept fighting. Finally, after an incredibly gallant but ineffective fight against overwhelming odds, Yamashiro turned away at 0410 and then suddenly rolled over and sank at about 0419-and, like Fuso, only about 10 of her crew of 1,600 would survive. Nishimura was lost with his flagship. Only when the flagship turned away did the battered Mogami follow and finally begin to retreat down Surigao Strait. On the U.S. side, the only casualties were on Albert W. Grant, most from “friendly fire.”

As the battle at the northern end of Surigao Strait reached its crescendo, Vice Admiral Shima’s force of two heavy cruisers (flagship Nachi and Ashigara) and four destroyers was steaming at high speed northerly into the battle area, the flashes of the battle plainly visible ahead. Shima’s force had entered the southern end of Surigao Strait at about 0245 and, due to rain and navigation error, had nearly run aground on an island, the force saved by a last-minute course change. This time, the U.S. PT boats had better luck. PT-137 fired a torpedo at a ship that was probably the severely damaged destroyer Asagumo limping back down the strait. The torpedo missed, but then hit Shima’s light cruiser, Abukuma, under the bridge, killing 30 sailors and severely reducing her speed (yet she continued toward the battle). Abukuma and the rest of Shima’s force were passing unseen on the far side of Asagumo when the torpedo came out of nowhere and hit. The Japanese destroyers had to take evasive action to avoid colliding with Abukuma.

Shima’s force passed burning and sinking Japanese ships, plowing into the battle area at very high speed in severely reduced visibility due to the smoke. The on-rushing Nachi, intent on conducting a torpedo attack on U.S. ships detected on radar, collided with the limping Mogami heading the opposite way at 0420. Last-minute evasive action by Nachi’s skipper kept the collision from being worse, but the damage to Nachi was bad enough to reduce her speed. The chief petty officer on the bridge of Mogami apologized via signal lamp for colliding with the reasonable excuse that all of Mogami’s senior officers were dead. At this point, the Japanese fired a swarm of Long Lance torpedoes in the direction of gun flashes of the U.S. ships, otherwise unseen in the heavy smoke, which luckily hit nothing. Disappointed in the lack of effect of his torpedoes and realizing that Nishimura’s force had been essentially wiped out, and the same was in store for him, Shima opted to live to fight another day, and his force reversed course.

Of Nishimura’s force, Asagumo finally sank, and the severely damaged Mogami would be hit ten more times by shells from U.S. cruisers that briefly pursued her down Surigao Strait. Mogami was then unsuccessfully attacked by U.S. PT boats. At 0902 the next morning, Mogami was hit by three bombs from TBM Avengers from Ommaney Bay (CVE-79) of Taffy 2 and she finally had to be scuttled; 192 of her crew were lost. Only the destroyer Shigure survived (the second time she was the sole survivor of a major battle). Her luck would run out on 24 January 1945, when she was sunk by submarine Blackfin (SS-322).

Of Shima’s force, the badly damaged Abukuma would be hit on 26 October by U.S. Army B-24 bombers (a rare case of high-altitude heavy bombers actually hitting a ship), detonating her torpedo bank, and causing her to sink with the loss of 250 of her crew. Nachi would be sunk by U.S. carrier aircraft off Manila on 5 November 1944, with a loss of 807 crewmen; Vice Admiral Shima was ashore and survived.

Web Ref: https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-038/h-038-2.html

Intrepid IV (CV-11)

The fourth Intrepid was launched 26 April 1943 by Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va.; sponsored by Mrs. John Howard Hoover; and commissioned 16 August, Captain Thomas L. Sprague in command.

After training in the Caribbean Intrepid departed Norfolk 3 December 1943 for San Francisco, then to Hawaii. She arrived Pearl Harbor 10 January and prepared for the invasion of the Marshall Islands, the next objective in the Navy's mighty island-hopping campaign. She sortied from Pearl Harbor with carriers Cabot and Essex 16 January to raid islands at the northeastern corner of Kwajalein Atoll 29 January 1944 and pressed the attack until the last opposition had vanished 2 February. The raids destroyed all of the 83 Japanese planes based on Roi and Namur before the first landings were made on adjacent islets 31 January. That morning Intrepid's planes strafed Ennuebing Island until 10 minutes before the first Marines reached the beaches. Half an hour later that islet, which protected Roi's southwestern flank and controlled the North Pass into Kwajalein Lagoon, was secured, enabling Marines to set up artillery to support their assault on Roi.

Her work in the capture of the Marshalls finished, Intrepid headed for Truk, the tough Japanese base in the center of Micronesia. Three fast carrier groups arrived undetected daybreak the 17th, sinking two destroyers and 200,000 tons of merchant shipping in 2 days of almost continuous attacks. Moreover, the carrier raid demonstrated Truk's vulnerability and thereby greatly curtailed its usefulness to the Japanese as a base.

The night of 17 February 1944 an aerial torpedo struck Intrepid's starboard quarter, 15 feet below her waterline, flooding several compartments and jamming her rudder hard to port. By racing her port screw and idling her starboard engine, Captain Sprague kept her on course until 2 days later strong winds swung her back and forth and tended to weathercock her with her bow pointed toward Tokyo. Sprague later confessed: "Right then I wasn't interested in going in that direction." At this point the crew fashioned a jury-rig sail of hatch covers and scrap canvas which swung Intrepid about and held her on course. Decorated by her crazy-quilt sail, Intrepid stood into Pearl Harbor 24 February 1944.

After temporary repairs, Intrepid sailed for the West Coast 16 March and arrived Hunter's Point, Calif., the 22d. She was back in fighting trim 9 June and departed for 2 months of operations out of Pearl Harbor, then to the Marshalls.

Intrepid's planes struck Japanese positions in the Palaus 6 and 7 September concentrating on airfields and artillery emplacements on Peleliu. The next day her fast carrier task force steamed west toward the southern Philippines to strike airfields on Mindanao 9 and 10 September. Then, after raids on bases in the Visayan Sea 12 through 14 September, she returned to the Palaus 17 September to support Marines in overcoming fanatical opposition from hillside caves and mangrove swamps on Peleliu.

When the struggle on that deadly island settled down to rooting Japanese defenders out of the ground on a man to man basis, Intrepid steamed back to the Philippines to prepare the way for liberation.

She struck throughout the Philippines, also pounding Okinawa and Formosa to neutralize Japanese air threats to Leyte.

As Intrepid's planes flew missions in support of the Leyte landings 20 October 1944, Japan's Navy, desperately striving to hold the Philippines, was converging on Leyte Gulf from three directions. Ships of the U.S. Navy parried thrusts in four major actions collectively known as the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

The morning of 24 October, an Intrepid plane spotted Admiral Kurita's flagship, Yamato. Two hours later, planes from Intrepid and Cabot braved intense antiaircraft fire to begin a day-long attack on Center Force. Wave after wave followed until by sunset American carrier-based planes had sunk mighty battleship Musashi with her mammoth 18-inch guns and had damaged her sister ship Yamato along with battleships Nagato and Haruna and heavy cruiser Myoko forcing the latter to withdraw.

That night Admiral Halsey's 3d Fleet raced north to intercept Japan's Northern Force which had been spotted off the northeastern tip of Luzon. At daybreak the tireless fliers went aloft to attack the Japanese ships then off Cape Engano. One of Intrepid's planes got a bomb into light carrier Zuiho to begin the harvest. Then American bombers sank her sister ship Chitosi, and a plane from either Intrepid or San Jacinto scored with a torpedo in large carrier Zuikaku knocking out her communications and hampering her steering. Destroyer Ayitsuki went to the bottom and at least 9 of Ozawa's 15 planes were shot down.

On through the day the attack continued and, after five more strikes, Japan had lost four carriers and a destroyer.

The still potent Center Force, after pushing through San Bernardino Strait, had steamed south along the coast of Samar where it was held at bay by a little escort carrier group of six "baby flattops", three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts until help arrived to send it fleeing in defeat back towards Japan.

As Intrepid's planes hit Clark Field 30 October a burning kamikaze crashed into one of the carrier's port gun tubs killing 10 men and wounding 6. Soon skillful damage control work enabled the flattop to resume flight operations.

Intrepid's planes continued to hit airfields and shipping in the Philippines.

Shortly after noon 25 November a heavy force of Japanese planes struck back at the carriers. Within 5 minutes 2 kamikazes crashed into the carrier killing 6 officers and 59 bluejackets. Intrepid never lost propulsion nor left her station in the task group; and, in less than 2 hours, had extinguished the last blaze. The next day, Intrepid headed for San Francisco, arriving 20 December for repairs.

Back in fighting trim in mid-February 1945, the carrier steamed for Ulithi, arriving 13 March. The next day she pushed on eastward for powerful strikes against airfields on Kyushu, Japan, 18 March. That morning a twin engine "Betty" broke through a curtain of defensive fire, turned toward Intrepid and exploded only 50 feet off Intrepid's forward boat crane. A shower of flaming gasoline and plane parts started fires on the hangar deck, out damage control experts quickly snuffed them out.

Intrepid's planes joined attacks on remnants of the Japanese fleet anchored at Kure damaging 16 enemy naval vessels including super battleship Yamato and carrier Amagi. Then the carriers turned to Okinawa as D-Day of the most ambitious amphibious assault of the Pacific war approached. Their planes lashed the Ryukyus 26 and 27 March, softening up enemy defensive works. Then, as the invasion began 1 April, they flew support missions against targets on Okinawa and made neutralizing raids against Japanese airfields in range of the embattled island.

During an air raid 16 April, a Japanese plane dove into Intrepid's flight deck forcing the engine and part of her fuselage right on through, killing 8 men and wounding 21. In less than an hour the flaming gasoline had been extinguished, and only 3 hours after the crash, planes were again landing on the carrier.

The following day, Intrepid retired homeward via Ulithi and Pearl Harbor arriving San Francisco 19 May for repairs.

Intrepid stood out of San Francisco 29 June and enlivened her westward voyage 6 August as her planes smashed Japanese on bypassed Wake Island. The next day she arrived Eniwetok where she received word 15 August to "cease offensive operations."

The veteran carrier got under way 21 August to support the occupation of Japan. She departed Yokosuka 2 December and arrived San Pedro, Calif., 15 December 1945.

Intrepid shifted to San Francisco Bay 4 February 1946. Her status was reduced to "in commission in reserve" 15 August before decommissioning 22 March 1947 and joining the Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Intrepid recommissioned at San Francisco 9 February 1952 and got underway 12 March for Norfolk. She decommissioned in the Norfolk Naval Shipyard 9 April 1952 for conversion to a modern attack aircraft carrier. Re-classified CVA-11 1 October, she recommissioned in reserve 18 June 1954. She became the first carrier in history to launch aircraft with American-built steam catapults 13 October 1954. Two days later she went into full commission as a unit of the Atlantic Fleet.

After shakedown out of Guantanamo Bay 1955, Intrepid departed Mayport, Fla., 28 May 1955 for the first of two deployments in the Mediterranean with the 6th Fleet, mainstay in preventing Communist aggression in Europe and the Middle East. She returned to Norfolk from the second of these cruises 5 September 1956. The carrier got under way 29 September for a 7-month modernization overhaul in the New York Navy Yard, followed by refresher training out of Guantanamo Bay.

Boasting a reinforced angle flight deck and a mirror landing system, Intrepid departed the United States in September 1957 for NATO's Operation "Strikeback", the largest peacetime naval exercise up to that time in history. Operating out of Norfolk in December she conducted Operation "Crosswind", a study of the effects of wind on carrier launches. Intrepid proved that carriers can safely conduct flight operations without turning into the wind and even launch planes while steaming downwind.

During the next 4 years Intrepid alternated Mediterranean deployments with operations along the Atlantic coast of the United States and exercises in the Caribbean. On 8 December 1961 she was reclassified to an antisubmarine warfare support carrier, CVS-11. She entered the Norfolk Navy Yard 10 March 1962 to be overhauled and refitted for her new antisubmarine warfare role. She left the shipyard 2 April carrying Air Antisubmarine Group 56.

After training exercises, Intrepid was selected as the principal ship in the recovery team for Astronaut Scott Carpenter and his Project Mercury space capsule. Shortly before noon of 24 May 1962, Carpenter splashed down in Aurora 7 several hundred miles from Intrepid. Minutes after he was located by land-based search aircraft, two helicopters from Intrepid, carrying NASA officials, medical experts, Navy frogmen, and photographers, were airborne and headed to the rescue. One of the choppers picked him up over an hour later and flew him to the carrier which safely returned him to the United States.

After training midshipmen at sea in the summer and a thorough overhaul at Norfolk in the fall, the carrier departed Hampton Roads 23 January 1963 for warfare exercises in the Caribbean. Late in February she interrupted these operations to join a sea hunt for Venezuelan freighter, Anzoategui whose mutinous second mate had led a group of pro-Castro terrorists in hijacking the vessel. After the Communist pirates had surrendered at Rio de Janeiro, the carrier returned to Norfolk 23 March 1963.

Intrepid operated along the Atlantic Coast for the next year from Nova Scotia to the Caribbean perfecting her antisubmarine techniques. She departed Norfolk 11 June 1964 carrying midshipmen to the Mediterranean for a hunter-killer at sea training with the 6th Fleet. While in the Mediterranean, Intrepid aided in the surveillance of a Soviet task group. En route home her crew learned that she had won the coveted Battle Efficiency "E" for antisubmarine warfare during the previous fiscal year.

Intrepid operated along the East Coast during the fall. Early in September she entertained 22 NATO statesmen as part of their tour of U.S. military installations. She was at Yorktown 18 to 19 October 1964 for ceremonies commemorating Lord Cornwallis's surrender 183 years before.

During a brief deployment off North Carolina, swift and efficient rescue procedures on the night of 21 November 1964 saved the life of an airman who had plunged overboard while driving an aircraft towing tractor.

Early the next year Intrepid began preparations for a vital role in NASA's first manned Gemini flight. On 23 March 1965 Lt. Comdr. John W. Young and Maj. Virgil I. Grissom in Molly Brown splashed down some 50 miles from Intrepid after history's first controlled re-entry into the earth's atmosphere ended the pair's nearly perfect three-orbit flight. A Navy helicopter lifted the astronauts from the spacecraft and flew them to Intrepid for medical examination and debriefing. Later Intrepid retrieved Molly Brown and returned the spaceship and astronauts to Cape Kennedy.

After this mission Intrepid entered the Brooklyn Navy Yard in April for a major overhaul to bring her back to peak combat readiness.

This was the final Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) job performed by the New York Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, N.Y., slated to close after more than a century and a half of service to the nation. In September, Intrepid, with her work approximately 75 percent completed, eased down the East River to moor at the Naval Supply Depot at Bayonne, N.J., for the completion of her multi-million dollar overhaul. After builder's sea trials and fitting out at Norfolk she sailed to Guantanamo on shakedown.

Mid-1966 found Intrepid with the Pacific Fleet off Vietnam. Here her gallant pilots delivered powerful blows for freedom and scored what is believed to be one of the fastest aircraft launching times recorded by an American carrier. Nine A-4 Skyhawks and six A-l Skyraiders, loaded with bombs and rockets, were catapulted in 7 minutes, with only a 28-second interval between launches. A few days later planes were launched at 26-second Intervals. After 7 months of outstanding service with the 7th Fleet off Vietnam, Intrepid returned to Norfolk having earned her Commanding Officer, Captain John W. Fair, the Legion of Merit for combat operations in Southeast Asia.

In June 1967, Intrepid returned to the Western Pacific by way of the Suez Canal just prior to its closing during the Israeli-Arab crisis. There she began another tour with the 7th Fleet to safeguard the peace and freedom of the world, for, as Daniel Webster said in 1834, "God grants liberty only to those who love it, and are always ready to guard and defend it."

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/i/intrepid-iv.html Published: Wed Aug 21 12:01:20 EDT 2024