United States Navy aircraft carrier USS Langley (CVL-27)

 USS Langley (CVL-27)

Builder: New York Shipbuilding Corporation
Laid down: 11 April 1942
Launched: 22 May 1943
Commissioned: 31 August 1943
Decommissioned: 11 February 1947
Fate: Transferred to French Navy 8 January 1951

 French Navy - La Fayette

Name: La Fayette
Acquired: 8 January 1951
Commissioned: 1951
Decommissioned: 1963
Identification: R96
Fate: Sold for scrapping 1963

General characteristics (as built)

Class and type: Independence-class aircraft carrier
Displacement: 11,000 tons
Length: 622.5 ft (189.7 m)
Beam: 71.5 ft (21.8 m) (waterline), 109 ft 2 in (33.27 m) (overall)
Draft: 26 ft (7.9 m)
Speed: 31 knots (57 km/h; 36 mph)
Complement: 1,569 officers and enlisted
Armament: 26 × 40 mm guns
Aircraft carried: 45 aircraft

 

USS Langley (CVL-27) was an Independence-class light aircraft carrier that served the United States Navy from 1943 to 1947, and French Navy as La Fayette from 1951 to 1963.

Description and construction

Langley was named for Samuel Pierpont Langley, American scientist and aviation pioneer. She carried on the name and tradition of USS Langley (CV-1), the first U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, which had been sunk on 27 February 1942. The ship was originally ordered as a Cleveland-class light cruiser and named Fargo (CL‑85). She was laid down as USS Crown Point (CV‑27) by New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, New Jersey United States on 11 April 1942 and renamed Langley on 13 November 1942.

The USS Langley (CVL-27) was an Independence-class light aircraft carrier named in honor of the pioneering aviator Samuel Pierpont Langley. Built during World War II, it was the third U.S. Navy vessel to carry the name and served with distinction during pivotal operations in the Pacific theater. Below is a comprehensive exploration of its features, capabilities, and enhancements across key operational categories.

Flight deck arrangements

The flight deck of the USS Langley was designed to maximize its ability to support air operations despite its smaller size compared to fleet carriers. It measured 622.5 feet (189.7 meters) in length and 109 feet 2 inches (33.27 meters) at its widest point. This deck accommodated up to 45 aircraft, including a mix of fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo bombers like the F6F Hellcat and TBM Avenger.

The ship’s flight deck featured advanced operational systems for its time, including arrestor wires and crash barriers to enable safe landings. A single catapult was installed to assist in launching heavily loaded aircraft. Two elevators efficiently transported aircraft between the flight deck and the enclosed hangar deck, which provided space for maintenance and storage. As wartime requirements evolved, improvements to deck lighting and navigation aids allowed for increased capability in night operations. These upgrades were particularly crucial during late-war operations when the ship played a role in extended carrier strikes.

Propulsion

The USS Langley was powered by a high-performance propulsion system that consisted of four Babcock & Wilcox boilers feeding steam to four General Electric turbines. These turbines drove four screw propellers, generating a combined output of 100,000 shaft horsepower.

This setup allowed the carrier to reach a maximum speed of 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph), providing the agility to evade threats and reposition effectively during combat operations. The ship’s range was approximately 13,000 nautical miles (24,000 kilometers) at a cruising speed of 15 knots (28 km/h), which enabled it to remain deployed for extended missions in the vast Pacific theater. Its propulsion system was robust and reliable, ensuring high availability even under combat conditions.

Armament

The USS Langley was heavily armed for a light aircraft carrier, reflecting the need to defend against aerial and surface threats. It was initially equipped with 26 Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and a suite of Oerlikon 20 mm cannons for close-range defense. These weapons were strategically placed around the flight deck and hull to provide 360-degree coverage.

During its service, the armament was upgraded to adapt to the increasing prevalence of kamikaze attacks. The number of anti-aircraft guns was increased, and additional fire control systems were integrated to enhance accuracy against fast-moving targets. This reinforced the ship’s ability to protect itself and its complement of aircraft during intense engagements.

Fire control and electronics

The USS Langley featured advanced fire control and electronic systems, which were continuously upgraded throughout its operational life. Air search radar systems provided early detection of incoming threats, allowing the carrier to prepare its defensive measures in advance. Surface search radars enhanced situational awareness by identifying nearby vessels and hazards, even under poor visibility conditions.

For fire control, the ship relied on radar-guided targeting systems linked to its anti-aircraft weapons. These systems dramatically improved the accuracy and effectiveness of the ship’s defensive fire, particularly during high-speed engagements with enemy aircraft. Communication and navigation technologies on board were state-of-the-art, ensuring seamless coordination with task forces and facilitating precise execution of air operations.

Armor

As with other ships of its class, the USS Langley was lightly armored to preserve speed and maneuverability. The belt armor ranged from 1.5 to 5 inches in thickness, protecting critical components like the propulsion system and ammunition magazines. The main deck featured 3 inches of armor, while the conning tower and other vital areas were shielded by thinner plates of approximately 0.38 inches.

This limited armor provided a degree of protection against shrapnel, strafing, and near-miss explosions but left the ship vulnerable to direct hits from heavy ordnance. As a result, the Langley relied on its speed, anti-aircraft defenses, and fleet escorts for protection during operations.

The USS Langley played a vital role in numerous campaigns during World War II, including operations in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. It demonstrated the effectiveness of light carriers in providing close air support and flexibility in fleet operations. The combination of its efficient flight deck arrangements, powerful propulsion system, and strong defensive capabilities made it a valuable asset to the U.S. Navy during its service.

Service history - World War II

1943

Langley was launched on 22 May 1943 and commissioned on 31 August 1943, Captain W.M. Dillon in command. After shakedown in the Caribbean Sea, Langley departed Philadelphia on 6 December 1943 for Pearl Harbor, where she participated in training operations.

1944

On 19 January 1944, she sailed with Task Force 58 (TF 58) for the attack on the Marshall Islands. From 29 January to 6 February, Langley's Carrier Air Group 32 (CVG-32) conducted raids on Wotje and Taroa Island to support the landings at Kwajalein, and from 10 through 28 February at Eniwetok. After a brief respite at Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, Langley's aircraft hit Japanese positions on Palau, Yap, and Woleai, Caroline Islands, from 30 March to 1 April. She next proceeded to New Guinea to take part in the capture of Hollandia on 25 April. A mere 4 days later, the carrier engaged in the 2‑day strike against the Japanese bastion Truk. During the raid, Langley and her aircraft accounted for some 35 enemy planes destroyed or damaged, while losing only one aircraft herself.

Langley next departed Majuro on 7 June 1944 for the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign. On 11 June, TF 58 launched a strike of 208 fighters and eight torpedo bombers against enemy bases and airfields on Saipan and Tinian. From 11 June to 8 August, Langley operated with TF 58 and also took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19 to 20 June 1944.

Langley leads Task Group 38.3 into Ulithi anchorage, 12th December 1944.

The carrier departed Eniwetok on 29 August and sortied with TF 38, under the command of Adm. William F. Halsey for air assaults on Peleliu and airfields in the Philippines as the preliminary steps in the invasion of the Palaus from 15 to 20 September 1944. During October, she operated off Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Later in the month, TF 38 supported the landings on Leyte. The Japanese efforts to stop the U.S. advance included the counterattack by most available major fleet units ('Operation Sho-Go'). On 24 October, Langley's planes took part in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Aircraft of TF 38 attacked the Japanese Center Force, as it steamed toward the San Bernardino Strait and the American beachhead at Tacloban. The Japanese units temporarily retired. The following day, upon word of Japanese aircraft carriers north of Leyte, TF 38 raced to intercept. In the ensuing Battle off Cape Engaño, the Japanese lost four carriers, two battleships, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and five destroyers. Langley's aircraft assisted in the destruction of the carriers Zuihō and Zuikaku, the latter being the only remaining carrier of the six that had participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.

Langley rolling heavily to starboard during Typhoon Cobra, 18 December 1944. Taken from USS Essex.

During November 1944, Langley supported the Philippine landings and strikes the Manila Bay area. Aircraft of Langley's CVG-44 attacked Japanese reinforcement convoys, and airfields on Luzon and in the Cape Engaño area. On 1 December, the carrier withdrew to Ulithi for reprovisioning.

Following quick repairs, she operated with the task force off Leyte supporting the occupation of Mindoro 14 to 16 December 1944. She rode out Typhoon Cobra and made a special search for survivors afterward. With TG 38.3, she participated in the Lingayen Gulf operations, launched strikes against Formosa, Sakishima, Okinawa, and Luzon. Entering the South China Sea in search of enemy surface forces, the task force pounded shipping and conducted strikes on Formosa, the China coast, Hainan, and Hong Kong. Essex withstood the onslaught of the third typhoon in four months on 20 and 21 January 1945 before striking again at Formosa, Miyako-jima, and Okinawa on 26 and 27 January.

Typhoon Cobra

14th to 19th December 1944

USS Langley (CVL 27) rolling sharply as she rides out Typhoon Cobra from USS Essex (CV-9) 13th Jan 1945
USS Langley (CVL 27) rolling sharply as she rides out Typhoon Cobra from USS Essex (CV-9) 13th Jan 1945

During Typhoon Cobra in 14th to 19th December 1944, a total of nine U.S. Navy ships sustained significant damage due to the severe storm conditions. The typhoon, which struck the Third Fleet in the Philippine Sea, caused extreme waves and winds that battered many vessels in the fleet, in addition to sinking three destroyers: USS Hull (DD-350); USS Monaghan (DD-354); USS Spence (DD-512) and caused the death of 790 sailors.

USS Hull (DD-350) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944
USS Hull (DD-350) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944

USS Monaghan (DD-354) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944
USS Hull (DD-350) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944.

USS Spence (DD-512) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944

USS Spence (DD-512) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944.

USS Hull (DD-350) - USS Monaghan (DD-354) - USS Spence (DD-512)

These destroyers capsized and sank due to the intense conditions, and 790 sailors lost their lives in the disaster.

Other ships damaged during Typhoon Cobra

Aircraft Carriers: The storm caused substantial damage to several carriers, including the USS Monterey (CVL-26), which suffered a severe onboard fire that was difficult to control. Future U.S. President Gerald Ford, serving as a young officer, helped to contain the blaze. Other carriers, such as USS Cowpens (CVL-25), USS San Jacinto (CVL-30), and USS Altamaha (CVE-18), were also damaged.

USS Massachusetts (BB-59) was damaged by Typhoon Cobra December 1944
The battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), among others, sustained structural damage from the waves and heavy rolling conditions.

Battleships: The battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), among others, sustained structural damage from the waves and heavy rolling.

Cruisers and Destroyers: Several cruisers and destroyers suffered structural damage, fuel loss, and equipment failures. Some destroyers reported near-capsize events, with USS Dewey (DD-349) and USS Aylwin (DD-355) narrowly avoiding the same fate as the three lost destroyers.

In total, over 100 aircraft were lost on various carriers, washed overboard or damaged beyond repair due to the severe weather. The disaster led to significant changes in Navy weather forecasting, safety protocols, and training to prevent similar incidents in the future.

On 18 December 1944, elements of Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet plowed into a powerful Pacific Typhoon east of the Philippines. By the time the tropical cyclone passed, three U.S. destroyers had been sunk, Spence (DD-512), Hull (DD-350) and Monaghan (DD-354) with 775 of their crewmen lost and only 91 rescued. The light carrier Monterey (CVL-26) suffered a serious fire during the storm, losing three crewmen and 18 aircraft. Total casualties across the entire force, including the three destroyers, included 790 killed and 146 planes smashed, washed overboard, or jettisoned. Twenty-seven ships were damaged, eleven requiring major repairs, including Monterey.

Following the Battle of Leyte Gulf on 24–25 October, the Third Fleet Fast Carrier Task Force (TF-38) was essentially tied down providing air cover to Leyte as the U.S. Army Air Force was unable to get onto airfields on Leyte and provide their own air-cover to troops ashore, primarily due to abysmal whether that rendered all but the airfield at Tacloban unusable due to mud. (Tacloban had very limited capacity even under ordinary circumstances.) As a result, rather than roaming the Western Pacific, Halsey’s carriers were subject to increasing Japanese kamikaze attacks while tied down off the eastern Philippines. (Actually, more U.S. ships would by sunk, put out of action, or damaged, and with more casualties in the two months it took the Army to secure Leyte, than during the Battle of Leyte Gulf itself, which will be the subject of the next H-gram.) Nevertheless, TF-38 stood in there and kept pounding Japanese airfields with airstrikes and fighter sweeps throughout the Philippines but especially on the main island of Luzon, which MacArthur had originally slated for invasion in mid-December. Halsey’s carriers were conducting operations in support of this planned invasion (which would be postponed until January 1945, but that was not known yet) when the weather began seriously to deteriorate on 16 December, gravely impacting at-sea refueling operations. Many of Halsey’s ships were low on fuel due to the continuous high-tempo combat operations

As of 17 December 1944, TF-38 consisted of seven Essex-class fleet carriers, six Independence-class light carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, eleven light cruisers and about 50 destroyers. TF-38 was joining with the Third Fleet refueling group that consisted of twelve fleet oilers, three fleet tugs, five destroyers, ten destroyer escorts, and five escort carriers with replacement planes.

With the technology of the time, there was little capability to track typhoons, and avoiding them depended greatly on the “Seaman’s Weather Eye.” The problem with this typhoon was that although it was very powerful, it was very compact and not very big, so warning signs were not apparent until the typhoon was very close, much closer than expected. Initially, as the weather rapidly deteriorated on 17 December, there were no signs that a typhoon was approaching, and the weather forecasters on the Third Fleet staff and on the carriers repeatedly misdiagnosed the situation. As seas built on the morning of the 17th, refueling became increasingly hazardous, with cases of parted hoses and lines and several near-collisions.

At 1251, Halsey gave orders to belay fueling. Halsey also gave orders for ships that had not been able to refuel to ballast down with salt water. However, several ships delayed too long in doing so in hopes that they would be able to take fuel as soon as the seas subsided. Vice Admiral John McCain, Commander of CTF-38, followed Halsey’s order, except for those orders pertaining to the destroyers Spence, Hickox (DD-673) and Maddox (DD-731) which were so low on fuel (10–15%) that they might not make it 24 hours. The Spence and Hickox were ordered to remain with the oilers and grab fuel if the seas allowed. As a result, the three destroyers delayed ballasting down, in the case of Spence too long, which would prove fatal.

Several attempts by Halsey to maneuver the fleet to areas more conducive to refueling put parts of the fleet directly in the path of the storm, unfortunately. For a time, the fleet was on the same course as the storm but slightly ahead and faster, which gave a misleading impression that conditions were slowly improving. It wasn’t until about 0400 on the 18th that it became apparent that the fleet had stumbled into a very serious weather condition. It wasn’t until about 1000 that the barometer started falling precipitously in a manner indicative of an approaching typhoon and not just a bad weather front. By 1400 the wind reached hurricane strength, and several of the carriers were so close that they could see the eye of the typhoon on radar.

In the end, a number of ships ultimately wound up in the most dangerous quadrant, with some passing right through the eye on 18 December. Halsey’s biggest mistake was waiting too long to give individual ships the okay to break out of formation to ride out the storm independently, giving the order only at 1149 (although some commanding officers were already doing so on their own initiative). Others who tried too long to stay in formation caused their ships to take an even worse beating than necessary. At 1314, Halsey issued a typhoon warning, the first official traffic referencing a typhoon. By this time, three of Halsey’s destroyers had already gone down, and others were fighting to survive.

The poor sea-keeping qualities of the Independence-class light carriers (which had been hastily designed and built on light cruiser hulls) became readily apparent by 0900 on 18 December. All were rolling severely. Langley (CVL-27) rolled 70-degrees at one point. Seven planes on Cowpens (CVL-25) were washed overboard and one plane that broke loose started a fire that was quickly extinguished. On San Jacinto (CVL-30), a fighter plane broke loose on the hangar deck and smashed seven other aircraft. By contrast, the escort carriers, with their hull design based on merchant ships, actually fared better than the light carriers, suffering less damage, although about 90 of the replacement aircraft were lost.

The light carrier Monterey (CVL-26) fared the worst, as a plane broke free on the hangar deck and smashed into a bulkhead at 0911, starting a serious fire, that was put out only after three sailors were killed and many more injured, with 18 planes destroyed by fire or washed overboard and another 16 planes seriously damaged as they careened about the hangar bay during severe rolls, exacerbated by the fact that Monterey also lost steerageway when the boiler rooms were evacuated shortly after the fire started. Of note, future President Lieutenant Gerald R. Ford was serving as the General Quarters Officer of the Deck. With Captain Stuart H. Ingersoll on the bridge, Ford was ordered to go down to the hangar deck and report on the fire, noting later that he was nearly washed overboard while planes were smashing into each other. Fortunately, the crew got the fire and the planes under control along with steerage, and Monterey weathered the typhoon, although she required repairs at Bremerton until April 1945.

Spence (DD-512) was a new Fletcher-class destroyer, much more stable than the older Farragut-class, but she was in trouble even before the typhoon hit, with her fuel state down to 15%, which meant she had less than 24 hours’ steaming time at eight knots. After unsuccessfully attempting to refuel from battleship New Jersey (BB-62) on the 17th, she was then ordered to accompany the oiler group to refuel at the first chance, which never came. Her skipper began water-ballasting too late and she began rolling heavily to port. Water entered through the ventilators and short-circuited the distribution board. Then the rudder jammed hard right. At 1110, Spence took a deep roll to port, recovered, and then took another one from which she did not recover, going down with 317 of her crew (23 survived), the first destroyer to sink in the typhoon.

By 1100 the destroyer Hull (DD-350), commanded by Lieutenant Commander J.A. Marks, was in serious trouble. Marks was responsible for screening a group of four oilers and maintained station for too long. Hull was at 70% fuel state and had not taken on saltwater ballast in the tanks. (The Court of Inquiry determined that standard procedures at the time did not require re-ballasting with that much fuel on board, but the failure to do so nonetheless contributed to her loss. Although regulations didn’t require it, re-ballasting was a lesson from an earlier typhoon that had not been learned.) In addition, as an older Farragut-class destroyer, Hull had over 500 tons of extra weapons and equipment added, making her top heavy. By 1100 the wind had reached 100 knots, and Hull was rolling 50 degrees, which just before noon reached 70 degrees. She survived several such rolls before a gust of wind estimated at 110 knots pinned her on her beam ends, and water poured down her funnels and into the pilothouse and she capsized and sank a few minutes after noon with 202 of her crew (62 survived.)

The Farragut-class destroyer Dewey (DD-349) almost met the same fate as Hull, but was saved by the prompt jettisoning of topside weights, re-ballasting with salt water, and the loss of her funnel, which reduced sail area, along with a lot of bailing and pumping. Farragut-class Aylwin (DD-355) also barely survived as she passed very close to the eye wall. By 1100, Aylwin had lost her engines and steering control, rolled 70 degrees to port and stayed there for 20 minutes. Regaining steering control intermittently, Lieutenant Commander W. K. Rogers, through some incredible ship handling was able to hold her up, but temperatures in the engine rooms reached 180 degrees as the blowers failed and the engine rooms had to be evacuated. The ship’s engineering officer, Lieutenant E. R. Rendahl and Machinist’s Mate T. Sarenski remained at their posts despite the intense heat in order to protect the electrical circuits. When they too finally evacuated, they had to take off their life jackets to fit through the escape hatch to the deck, where they collapsed due to the temperature change and were washed overboard. Somehow, Aylwin managed to survive despite serious flooding.

Farragut-class destroyer Monaghan (DD-354) was not so lucky as Dewey and Aylwin. Her fuel tanks were 76 percent full, and although she attempted to ballast down, with great difficulty as valves stuck, it was too late. At 1130, Monaghan lost electric power and the steering engine failed. After several very heavy rolls she foundered just before noon along with 256 of her crew (only six survived). Monaghan had 12 battle stars, having sunk a Japanese midget submarine inside Pearl Harbor during the air attack, served at Midway, performed valiantly in the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, drove the Japanese submarine I-7 onto the rocks in the Aleutians and fought in other battles, but she was defeated by a storm.

By the time the typhoon moved through, numerous ships had been damaged. Those that required major repair included Anzio (CVE-57), Cape Esperance (CVE-88), Baltimore (CA-68), Miami (CL-89), Dewey (DD-349), Aylwin (DD-355), Buchanan (DD-484), Dyson (DD-572), Hickox (DD-673), Benham (DD-796), Donaldson (DE-44), and Melvin R. Nawman (DE-416.) Other ships damaged included four light carriers, three escort carriers, one battleship, one destroyer, two destroyer escorts, and an oiler.

A hero of the Typhoon was the destroyer escort Tabberer (DE-418), which had her foremast and radio antennas washed away, and was taking 60 degree rolls. As evening approached on the 18th, Tabberer encountered and rescued a survivor of Hull. At that point her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Henry L. Plage, commenced a box search, despite her own serious state. Over the next 51 hours, Plage didn’t receive (or ignored) repeated orders from Admiral Halsey for all ships to regroup at Ulithi. (Halsey did not learn that any of his ships had been sunk until 0225 on 19 December.) During this period, Tabberer rescued 55 survivors (41 from Hull and 14 from Spence) before being relieved by two destroyer escorts. Tabberer rescued ten of the Hull survivors at night. Many were rescued by Hull swimmers, who went over overboard with lines tied, in order to bring the survivors to nets and life rings on Tabberer’s side, while other crewmen used rifle fire to drive away sharks. Lieutenant Commander Plage was awarded a Legion of Merit and Tabberer a Navy Unit Commendation (the first ever awarded, although others were awarded retroactively for earlier actions). The destroyer Brown (DD-546) rescued the six survivors from Monaghan and 13 survivors of Hull. All told, 93 crewmen who had been washed overboard or survived the sinking of their ships were rescued.

A Court of Inquiry subsequently convened at Ulithi on 26 December 1944 aboard the destroyer tender Cascade (AD-16), with Admiral Chester A. Nimitz in attendance and presided by Vice Admiral John Hoover. The Court of Inquiry placed responsibility for losses and storm damage on Admiral Halsey but ascribed no negligence, stating that Halsey’s mistakes “were errors in judgment committed under stress of war operations and stemming from a commendable desire to meet military requirements.” In retrospect, Halsey should not have attempted any refueling operations on the morning of 18 December, but that would have required him to know where the center of the typhoon was before he did. The Court of Inquiry also determined that the commanding officers of Hull, Monaghan, and Spence maneuvered too long in an attempt to keep station, which “prevented them from concentrating early enough on saving their ships.” In the opinion of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, it was “too much to expect of junior destroyer skippers-classes of 1937 and 1938, Naval Academy-to have pitted their brief experience against the lack of typhoon warnings and their own want of fuel.”

However, in the words of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, “The time for taking all measures for a ship’s safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.”

Sources are: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 13: The Liberation of the Philippines, by Samuel Eliot Morison; and the Dictionary of American Fighting Ships (DANFS).

1945

During January 1945, Langley participated in the South China Sea raid supporting Invasion of Lingayen Gulf. Raids were made against Formosa, French Indochina, and the China coast from 30 December 1944 to 25 January 1945. Langley's task group was attacked by two dive bombers on 21 January. One 50 kg (110 lb) bomb struck the center of Langley's flight deck forward and penetrated to the gallery deck to explode among the officers' staterooms just aft of the forecastle. The fire was quickly extinguished, and the flight deck repaired to continue flight operations. The second bomber inflicted greater damage on USS Ticonderoga.^[1]

Langley next joined in the sweeps against Tokyo and Nansei Shoto in support of the landings on Iwo Jima between 10 February and 18 March 1945. She next raided airfields on the Japanese homeland, and arrived off Okinawa on 23 March. Until 11 May, the ship operated either off Okinawa or took part in strikes on Kyushu, Japan, in an effort to destroy kamikaze bases in southern Japan which were launching desperate and deadly suicide attacks.

After touching Ulithi and Pearl Harbor, she steamed to San Francisco, arriving on 3 June for repairs and modernization at the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. She departed 1 August and reached Pearl Harbor on 8 August 1945. While there, word arrived that hostilities had ended. She completed two 'Magic Carpet' voyages to the Pacific, transporting soldiers back to the United States, and got underway on 1 October for Philadelphia.

1946

She departed from that port 15 November for the first of two trips to Europe transporting U.S. Army troops returning home from that theater. She returned to Philadelphia on 6 January 1946 and was assigned to the Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Philadelphia Group, on 31 May 1946. Langley was decommissioned on 11 February 1947.

 Transfer to France - French aircraft carrier La Fayette (R96)

Langley was taken out of 'mothballs', refurbished and transferred to France under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program on 8 January 1951. After more than a decade of French Navy service as La Fayette, she was returned to the United States on 20 March 1963 and sold to the Boston Metals Co., Baltimore, Maryland, for scrapping.^[2]

French aircraft carrier La Fayette formerly USS Langley CVL 27) in Indo China waters 1953