The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II
United States Navy aircraft carrier USS Yorktown CV-5
USS Yorktown (CV-5)
Name: USS Yorktown (CV-5)
Namesake: The Battle of Yorktown
Ordered: 3 August 1933
Builder: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.
Laid down: 21 May 1934
Launched: 4 April 1936
Commissioned: 30 September 1937
Struck: 2 October 1942
Honors and awards: 3 × battle stars
Fate: Crippled by Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu, later finished off by submarine I-168, Battle of Midway, 5-7th June 1942
Wreck discovered, 19 May 1998General characteristics (as built)
Class and type: Yorktown-class aircraft carrier
Displacement: As built: 19,800 long tons (20,100 t) light 25,500 long tons (25,900 t) full load
Length: As built: 770 ft (230 m) (waterline @ design draft) 824 ft 9 in (251.38 m) overall
Beam: As built: 83 ft 3 in (25.37 m) (waterline) 109 ft 6 in (33.38 m) (overall)
Draft: 25 ft 11.5 in (7.912 m) (as built)
Propulsion: 9 × Babcock & Wilcox boilers, 4 × Parsons geared turbines, 120,000 shp (89 MW) 4 × screws
Speed: 32.5 knots (37.4 mph; 60.2 km/h)
Range: 12,500 nautical miles (23,200 km; 14,400 mi) at 15 knots (17 mph; 28 km/h)
Complement: 2,217 officers and men (1941)
Sensors and processing systems: CXAM RADAR from 1940[1]
Armament 1937: As built: 8 × single 5 in/38 cal guns 4 × quad 1.1 in/75 cal guns 24 × .50 caliber machine guns
Armament from February 1942: 8 × 5 in/38 cal 4 × Quad 1.1 in/75 cal 24 20mm Oerlikon guns 24 × .50 caliber machine guns
Armor: As built: 2.5-4 inch belt 60 lb protective decks 4 inch bulkheads 4 inch side and 3 inch top round conning tower 4 inch side over steering gear
Aircraft carried: As built: 90 aircraft 3 × elevators 2 × flight deck hydraulic catapults 1 × hangar deck hydraulic catapults
USS Yorktown (CV-5) was an aircraft carrier that served in the United States Navy during World War II. Named after the Battle of Yorktown in 1781, she was commissioned in 1937. Yorktown was the lead ship of the Yorktown class, which was designed on the basis of lessons learned from operations with the converted battlecruisers of the Lexington class and the smaller purpose-built USS Ranger.
Yorktown was at port in Norfolk during the attack on Pearl Harbor, having just completed a patrol of the Atlantic Ocean. She then sailed to San Diego in late December 1941 and was incorporated as the flagship of Task Force 17. Together with the carrier Lexington, she successfully attacked Japanese shipping off the east coast of New Guinea in early March 1942. Her aircraft sank or damaged several warships supporting the invasion of Tulagi in early May. Yorktown rendezvoused with Lexington in the Coral Sea and attempted to stop the invasion of Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. They sank the light aircraft carrier Shōhō on 7 May during the Battle of the Coral Sea, but did not encounter the main Japanese force of the carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku until the next day. Aircraft from Lexington and Yorktown badly damaged Shōkaku, but the Japanese aircraft critically damaged Lexington, which was later scuttled, and severely damaged Yorktown.
Despite the damage suffered, Yorktown was able to return to Hawaii. Although estimates were that the damage would take two weeks to repair, Yorktown put to sea only 72 hours after entering drydock at Pearl Harbor, which meant that she was available for the next confrontation with the Japanese. Yorktown played an important part in the Battle of Midway in early June. Yorktown's aircraft played crucial roles in crippling two Japanese fleet carriers. Yorktown also absorbed both Japanese aerial counterattacks at Midway which otherwise would have been directed at the carriers USS Enterprise and Hornet.[2]
On 4 June, during the battle, Japanese aircraft from the aircraft carrier Hiryu crippled Yorktown after two attacks.[3] She lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port. Salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo. On 6 June, the Japanese submarine I-168 fired a salvo of torpedoes, two of which struck Yorktown, and a third sinking the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. With further salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the remaining repair crews were evacuated from Yorktown, which sank on 7 June.[4] The wreck of Yorktown was located by oceanographer Robert Ballard in 1998.
USS Yorktown (CV-5) insignia or emblem adopted during the later 1930s
Insignia Bombing Squadron Five (VB-5); Insignia Fighting Squadron Five (VF-5); Insignia Fighting Squadron Forty Two (VF-42)
Description and construction
Christened by Eleanor Roosevelt christens Yorktown (4 April 1936)
Christened by Eleanor Roosevelt christens Yorktown (4 April 1936)
Yorktown was laid down on 21 May 1934 at Newport News, Virginia, by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.; launched on 4 April 1936; sponsored by Eleanor Roosevelt; and commissioned at the Naval Station Norfolk (NS Norfolk), Norfolk, Virginia, on 30 September 1937, Captain Ernest D. McWhorter in command.
After fitting out, the aircraft carrier trained in Hampton Roads, Virginia and in the southern drill grounds off the Virginia capes into January 1938, conducting carrier qualifications for her newly embarked air group.
Fighting Squadron Five (VF 5) USS Yorktown (CV-5) off California 1939
Grumman F3F 3 biplane fighters from Fighting Squadron Five (VF 5) USS Yorktown (CV-5) off California 1939
Landing accidents aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) 1940
Douglas TBD-1 Devastator Torpedo Plane BulNo 0614 (VT-5) landing accident on USS Yorktown (CV-5) 1940
Flight deck arrangements
Yorktown's flight deck was designed to support a variety of aircraft operations, with a layout maximizing her flight efficiency and operational flexibility. Her flight deck was straight and unarmored, made primarily of wood over a steel frame to save weight. This design allowed for rapid reconfiguration and repairs, should the deck sustain damage. The ship had a hangar deck beneath the flight deck, where her aircraft could be stored, serviced, and prepared for launch. Aircraft were brought to the flight deck using two elevators-one forward and one aft, positioned near the deck edges to avoid obstructing flight operations. The deck also featured arresting gear to catch incoming planes upon landing, as well as a pair of hydraulically operated catapults for launching aircraft. These systems enabled Yorktown to launch and recover a substantial number of aircraft in rapid succession, essential for sustaining her operational tempo during combat.
Propulsion
Yorktown was powered by an innovative propulsion system that included four geared steam turbines, each driving a separate propeller shaft. Her engines could produce a total of 120,000 shaft horsepower, allowing her to reach speeds up to 32.5 knots. She had eight Babcock & Wilcox boilers, operating at high pressure and allowing for greater fuel efficiency and range. This was a significant advantage for a carrier of her time, as it enabled Yorktown to undertake extended missions without the need for frequent refueling. Her range was approximately 12,000 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 15 knots, giving her excellent operational flexibility for both offensive and defensive operations across vast distances.
USS Yorktown (CV-5) 5 inch caliber dual purpose gun mounts
USS Yorktown (CV-5) 5 inch caliber dual purpose gun mounted on the starboard gun platform July 1937
Armament
USS Yorktown was well-armed for an aircraft carrier, as her primary function was to deploy aircraft. Initially, she was equipped with eight 5-inch (127 mm) dual-purpose guns in single mounts along her port and starboard sides. These guns were capable of engaging both surface targets and aircraft. Additionally, Yorktown carried twelve quadruple 1.1-inch anti-aircraft cannons, also known as "Chicago Pianos," which were intended to provide close-in defense against incoming aircraft. Later, as anti-aircraft needs grew, her armament was supplemented with 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannons, offering an additional layer of close-range defense against enemy planes. Despite this extensive armament, Yorktown relied heavily on her aircraft and their capability to strike at enemy vessels, especially submarines, from a safe distance.
USS Yorktown Fire control and sinking, 7 June 1942
USS Yorktown (CV-5) firefighters at work after the ship was hit by three Japanese bombs 4th June 1942
Fire control and electronics
Yorktown was fitted with advanced fire-control systems and electronic equipment for her time, which allowed her to track and engage targets effectively. The ship used the Mk 33 Gun Fire Control System for her main 5-inch guns, which included optical rangefinders and directors to assist in target acquisition and accuracy. Her anti-aircraft defenses were controlled by multiple gun directors, enabling coordinated fire against incoming aircraft. In addition to her gunnery systems, Yorktown was among the first American carriers to be equipped with radar. Her air-search radar could detect incoming aircraft at a distance, which was revolutionary for the era, enhancing the crew's ability to prepare for and repel aerial attacks. This radar system provided an early warning capability that was instrumental in her defensive operations during battles like the Battle of Midway.
Repairing bomb damage on board USS Yorktown (CV-5)
Repairing bomb damage on board USS Yorktown (CV-5) Battle of Midway 4th Jun 1942
Armor
Yorktown's armor was relatively modest, as she was designed to rely on her speed and the protection offered by her aircraft to avoid heavy engagements with enemy surface ships. Her belt armor was 2.5 inches thick, covering key machinery spaces and providing limited protection against smaller projectiles or near misses. The flight deck was not armored, in contrast to later carrier designs, prioritizing aircraft capacity and operational flexibility over direct protection. However, her fuel tanks and magazines were placed below the waterline and well protected to minimize the risk of catastrophic explosions in case of enemy hits.
Structural changes
Throughout her service, Yorktown underwent a series of structural adjustments based on combat experience and operational needs. The carrier was modified to improve her anti-aircraft defenses, with additional 20 mm and 1.1-inch mounts added as the war progressed. Her superstructure was also slightly altered to improve radar and communication equipment positioning, as new systems were introduced to enhance her operational effectiveness. These upgrades allowed her to adapt to the evolving nature of naval warfare, making her more resilient in the face of increased aerial threats. However, her basic design and structure remained largely unchanged, as her time in service was short before her loss at the Battle of Midway.
Yorktown’s combination of speed, armament, and radar capabilities made her one of the most formidable carriers of her time, and her adaptations throughout her service helped set a precedent for future American carrier design.
Early Carrier Aircraft
Yorktown sailed for the Caribbean on 8 January 1938 and arrived at Culebra, Puerto Rico, on 13 January. Over the ensuing month, the carrier conducted her shakedown, touching at Charlotte Amalie, St Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands; Gonaïves, Haiti; Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and Cristóbal, Panama Canal Zone. Departing Colón Bay, Cristóbal, on 1 March, Yorktown sailed for Hampton Roads, arrived on 6 March, and put into the Norfolk Navy Yard the next day for post-shakedown availability.
After undergoing repairs through the early autumn of 1938, Yorktown moved station from the navy yard to NS Norfolk on 17 October 1938 and soon headed for the Southern Drill Grounds for training.
Yorktown operated off the eastern seaboard, ranging from Chesapeake Bay to Guantanamo Bay, into 1939. As flagship for Carrier Division 2, she participated in her first war game-Fleet Problem XX-along with her sister-ship Enterprise in February 1939. The scenario for the exercise called for one fleet to control the sea lanes in the Caribbean against the incursion of a foreign European power while maintaining sufficient naval strength to protect vital American interests in the Pacific. The maneuvers were witnessed, in part, by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, embarked in the heavy cruiser Houston.
The critique of the operation revealed that carrier operations-a part of the scenarios for the annual exercises since the entry of Langley into the war games in 1925-had achieved a new peak of efficiency. Despite the inexperience of Yorktown and Enterprise-comparative newcomers to the Fleet-both carriers made significant contributions to the success of the problem. The planners had studied the employment of carriers and their embarked air groups in connection with convoy escort, antisubmarine defense, and various attack measures against surface ships and shore installations. In short, they worked to develop the tactics that would be used when war actually came.[5]
Pacific Fleet
Following Fleet Problem XX, Yorktown returned briefly to Hampton Roads before sailing for the Pacific on 20 April 1939. Transiting the Panama Canal a week later, Yorktown soon commenced a regular routine of operations with the Pacific Fleet. The Second World War started on 1 September 1939, but the USA was not yet involved. Operating out of San Diego into 1940, the carrier participated in Fleet Problem XXI that April. Yorktown was one of six ships to receive the new RCA CXAM radar in 1940.[1] At the same time her signal bridge atop the tripod foremast was enclosed, and several 50 caliber machine guns were fitted in galleries along the edges of the flight deck.
Fleet Problem XXI-a two-part exercise-included some of the operations that would characterize future warfare in the Pacific. The first part of the exercise was devoted to training in making plans and estimates; in screening and scouting; in coordination of combatant units; and in employing fleet and standard dispositions. The second phase included training in convoy protection, the seizure of advanced bases, and, ultimately, the decisive engagement between the opposing fleets. The last pre-war exercise of its type, Fleet Problem XXI contained two exercises (comparatively minor at the time) where air operations played a major role. Fleet Joint Air Exercise 114A prophetically pointed out the need to coordinate Army and Navy defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, and Fleet Exercise 114 proved that aircraft could be used for high altitude tracking of surface forces-a significant role for planes that would be fully realized in the war to come.
With the retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters after the conclusion of Fleet Problem XXI, Yorktown operated in the Pacific off the west coast of the United States and in Hawaiian waters until the following spring, when the success of German U-boats preying upon British shipping in the Atlantic required a shift of American naval strength. Thus, to reinforce the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Navy transferred a substantial force from the Pacific including Yorktown, Battleship Division Three (the New Mexico-class battleships), three light cruisers, and 12 accompanying destroyers.[5]
Neutrality patrol
Yorktown departed Pearl Harbor on 20 April 1941 in company with destroyers Warrington, Somers, and Jouett; headed southeast, transited the Panama Canal on the night of 6–7 May, and arrived at Bermuda on 12 May. From that time until the United States entered the war, Yorktown conducted four patrols in the Atlantic, ranging from Newfoundland to Bermuda and logging 17,642 miles (28,392 km) steamed while enforcing American neutrality.
USS Brazos (AO 4) refueling the USS Yorktown (CV-5) mid Pacific July 1940
USS Brazos (AO 4) refueling the USS Yorktown (CV-5) mid Pacific July 1940
Although Adolf Hitler had forbidden his submarines to attack American ships, the men who manned the American naval vessels were not aware of this policy and operated on a wartime footing in the Atlantic.
On 28 October, while Yorktown, the battleship New Mexico, and other American warships were screening a convoy, a destroyer picked up a submarine contact and dropped depth charges while the convoy itself made an emergency starboard turn, the first of the convoy's three emergency changes of course. Late that afternoon, engine repairs to one of the ships in the convoy, Empire Pintail, reduced the convoy's speed to 11 knots (13 mph; 20 km/h).
During the night, the American ships intercepted strong German radio signals, indicating submarines probably in the vicinity reporting the group. Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, commanding the escort force, sent a destroyer to sweep astern of the convoy to destroy the U-boat or at least to drive him under.
The next day, while cruiser scout planes patrolled overhead, Yorktown and the cruiser Savannah fueled their escorting destroyers, finishing the task as dusk fell. On 30 October, Yorktown was preparing to fuel three destroyers when other escorts made sound contacts. The convoy subsequently made 10 emergency turns while the destroyers Morris and Anderson dropped depth charges, with Hughes assisted in developing the contact. Anderson later made two more depth charge attacks, noticing 'considerable oil with slick spreading but no wreckage'.
The short-of-war period was becoming more like the real thing as each day went on. Elsewhere on 30 October, U-552 torpedoed the destroyer Reuben James, sinking her with a heavy loss of life, the first loss of an American warship in World War II. After another Neutrality Patrol stint in November, Yorktown put into Norfolk on 2 December.[5]
Pearl Harbor the trigger point for America to enter into WWII
On the early morning of 7 December 1941, Japanese warplanes attacked the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor without warning, damaging or sinking 16 U.S. warships. With the battle line crippled, the undamaged American carriers assumed great importance. There were, on 7 December, only three in the Pacific: Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga. Yorktown, Ranger, Wasp, and the recently commissioned Hornet were in the Atlantic. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in massive outrage across the United States and led to the country's formal entry into World War II the next day. Yorktown departed Norfolk on 16 December for the Pacific, her secondary gun galleries studded with new Oerlikon 20 mm guns. (The ship's Gunnery Officer retained the Browning M2 .50 caliber machine guns the Oerlikons replaced, and acquired a supply of M1919A4 .30 caliber machine guns as well. The crew discovered the pintle mounts of the .30 calibers fitted neatly into cut swab handles, and the swab handles themselves fitted neatly into the hollow pipes used for the ship's safety lines. Dozens of sailors went into the unofficial antiaircraft gun business, and according to one report, 'Yorktown bristled with more guns than a Mexican revolution movie.'[6]) She reached San Diego 30 December 1941 and soon became flagship for Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher's newly formed Task Force 17 (TF 17).
The carrier's first mission in her new theater was to escort a convoy carrying Marine reinforcements to American Samoa. Departing San Diego on 6 January 1942, Yorktown and her consorts covered the movement of Marines to Pago Pago in Tutuila to augment the garrison already there.
Having safely covered that troop movement, Yorktown, in company with sister ship Enterprise, departed Samoan waters on 25 January. Six days later, Task Force 8 (built around Enterprise), and TF 17 (around Yorktown) parted company. The former headed for the Marshall Islands, the latter for the Gilberts, each to take part in some of the first American offensives of the war, the Marshalls-Gilberts raids.
Yorktown was being screened by two cruisers, Louisville and St. Louis and four destroyers. At 05:17, Yorktown launched 11 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators and 17 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntlesses, under the command of Commander Curtis W. Smiley. Those planes hit what Japanese shore installations and shipping they could find at Jaluit, but severe thunderstorms hampered the mission, and seven planes were lost. Other Yorktown planes attacked Japanese installations and ships at Makin and Mili Atolls.
The attack on the Gilberts by Task Force 17 had apparently been a surprise since the American force encountered no enemy surface ships. A single Japanese Kawanishi H6K 'Mavis' flying boat attempted to attack American destroyers sent astern in hope of recovering the crews of planes overdue from the Jaluit mission. Antiaircraft fire from the destroyers drove off the intruder before it could cause any damage.
Later, another Mavis, or possibly the same one, came out of low clouds 15,000 yards (14,000 m) distant from Yorktown. The carrier withheld her antiaircraft fire in order not to interfere with the combat air patrol (CAP) fighters. Presently, the Mavis, pursued by two Grumman F4F Wildcats, disappeared behind a cloud. Within five minutes, the enemy patrol plane fell out of the clouds and crashed in the water.
Although TF 17 was slated to make a second attack on Jaluit, it was canceled because of heavy rainstorms and the approach of darkness. Therefore, the Yorktown force retired from the area.
Admiral Chester Nimitz later called the Marshalls-Gilberts raids 'well conceived, well planned, and brilliantly executed.' The results obtained by Task Forces 8 and 17 were noteworthy, Nimitz continued in his subsequent report, because the task forces had been obliged to make their attacks somewhat blindly, due to lack of hard intelligence data on the Japanese-held islands.
Yorktown subsequently put in at Pearl Harbor for replenishment before she put to sea on 14 February, bound for the Coral Sea. On 6 March, she rendezvoused with TF 11 which had been formed around Lexington and under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown. Together they headed towards Rabaul and Gasmata to attack Japanese shipping there in an effort to check the Japanese advance and to cover the landing of Allied troops at Nouméa, New Caledonia. The two carriers were screened by eight heavy cruisers (including the Australian warships HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra) and 14 destroyers. As they steamed toward New Guinea, the Japanese continued their advance toward Australia with a landing on 7 March at the Huon Gulf, in the Salamaua-Lae area on the eastern end of New Guinea.
Word of the Japanese operation prompted Admiral Brown to change the objective of TF 11's strike from Rabaul to the Salamaua-Lae sector. On the morning of 10 March 1942, American carriers launched aircraft from the Gulf of Papua. Lexington flew off her air group commencing at 07:49 and, 21 minutes later, Yorktown followed suit. The choice of the gulf as the launch point for the strike meant the planes would have to fly some 125 miles (200 km) across the Owen Stanley mountains, which provided security for the task force and ensured surprise, at the cost of poor flying conditions.
In the attacks that followed, Lexington's Douglas SBD Dauntlesses from Scouting Squadron 2 (VS-2) dive-bombed Japanese ships at Lae at 09:22. The carrier's torpedo and bomber squadrons (VT-2 and VB-2) attacked shipping at Salamaua at 09:38. Her fighters (VF-2) split up into four-plane attack groups: one strafed Lae and the other, Salamaua. Yorktown's planes followed on the heels of those from Lexington. VB-5 and VT-5 attacked Japanese ships in the Salamaua area at 09:50, while VS-5 went after auxiliaries moored close in shore at Lae. The fighters of VF-42 flew CAP over Salamaua until they determined there was no air opposition, then strafed surface objectives and small boats in the harbor.
After carrying out their missions, the American planes returned to their carriers and 103 planes of the 104 launched were back safely on board by noon. One SBD-2 Dauntless had been downed by Japanese antiaircraft fire. The raid on Salamaua and Lae was the first attack by many pilots, and, if accuracy was below that achieved in later actions, the fliers gained invaluable experience which helped in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.
Task Force 11 retired at 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) on a southeasterly course until dark, when the ships steered eastward at 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph) and made rendezvous with Task Group 11.7 (TG11.7), three heavy cruisers (USS Chicago, HMAS Australia, and HMAS Canberra) and four destroyers under the Royal Australian Navy Rear Admiral John Crace, which provided cover for the carriers on their approach to New Guinea.
Yorktown resumed her patrols in the Coral Sea area, remaining at sea into April, out of reach of Japanese land-based aircraft and ready to carry out offensive operations whenever the opportunity presented itself. After the Lae-Salamaua raid, the situation in the South Pacific seemed temporarily stabilized, and Yorktown and her consorts in TF 17 put into the undeveloped harbor at Tongatabu, in the Tonga Islands, for needed upkeep, having been at sea continuously since departing from Pearl Harbor on 14 February.
However, the enemy was soon on the move. To Admiral Nimitz, there seemed to be 'excellent indications that the Japanese intended to make a seaborne attack on Port Moresby the first week in May'. Yorktown accordingly departed Tongatapu on 27 April, bound once more for the Coral Sea. TF 11-now commanded by Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, who had relieved Brown in Lexington-departed Pearl Harbor to join Fletcher's TF 17 and arrived in the vicinity of Yorktown's group, southwest of the New Hebrides Islands, on 1 May.[5]
USS Yorktown (CV-5) - Battle of the Coral Sea
At 15:17 the next afternoon, two SBD Dauntlesses from VS-5 sighted a Japanese submarine running on the surface. Three TBD Devastators from Yorktown succeeded only in driving the submarine under.
On the morning of 3 May, TF 11 and TF 17 were some 100 miles (161 km) apart, engaged in fueling operations. Shortly before midnight, Fletcher received word from Australian-based aircraft that Japanese transports were disembarking troops and equipment at Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Arriving soon after the Australians had evacuated the place, the Japanese landed to commence construction of a seaplane base there to support their southward thrust.
Yorktown accordingly set course northward at 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph). By daybreak on 4 May, she was within striking distance of the newly established Japanese beachhead and launched her first strike at 07:01―18 F4F-3 Wildcats of VF-42, 12 TBD Devastators of VT-5, and 28 SBD Dauntlesses from VS and VB-5. Yorktown's air group made three consecutive attacks on enemy ships and shore installations at Tulagi and Gavutu on the south coast of Florida Island in the Solomons. Expending 22 torpedoes and 76 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs in the three attacks, Yorktown's planes sank the destroyer Kikuzuki, three minesweepers and four barges. In addition, Air Group 5 destroyed five enemy seaplanes but lost two F4F Wildcats (the pilots were recovered) and one TBD Devastator (whose crew was lost).
Meanwhile, that same day, TF 44, a cruiser-destroyer force under Rear Admiral Crace (RN), joined Lexington's TF 11, thus completing the composition of the Allied force on the eve of the crucial Battle of the Coral Sea.
Elsewhere, to the northward, eleven troop-laden transports-escorted by destroyers and covered by the light carrier Shōhō, four heavy cruisers, and a destroyer-steamed toward Port Moresby. In addition, another Japanese task force-formed around the two Pearl Harbor veterans, carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, and screened by two heavy cruisers and six destroyers-provided additional air cover.
On the morning of 6 May, Fletcher gathered all Allied forces under his tactical command as TF 17. At daybreak on 7 May, he dispatched Crace, with the cruisers and destroyers under his command, toward the Louisiade archipelago to intercept any enemy attempt to move toward Port Moresby.
While Fletcher moved north with his two flattops and their screens in search of the enemy, Japanese search planes located the oil tanker Neosho and her escorting destroyer, Sims and misidentified the former as a carrier. Two waves of Japanese planes-first high-level bombers and then dive bombers-attacked the two ships. Sims, her antiaircraft battery crippled by gun failures, took three direct hits and sank quickly with a heavy loss of life. Neosho was more fortunate in that, even after seven direct hits and eight near-misses, she remained afloat until, on 11 May, her survivors were picked up by Henley and her hulk sunk by the rescuing destroyer.
USS Yorktown (CV-5) in drydock at Pearl Harbor on 29 May 1942
Yorktown in drydock at Pearl Harbor on 29 May 1942, shortly before departing for Midway
Neosho and Sims had performed a valuable service, drawing off the planes that might otherwise have hit Fletcher's carriers. Meanwhile, Yorktown and Lexington's planes found Shōhō and sank her. One of Lexington's pilots reported this victory with the radio message, 'Scratch one flattop'.
That afternoon, Shōkaku and Zuikaku, still not located by Fletcher's forces, launched 27 bombers and torpedo planes to search for the American ships. Their flight proved uneventful until they ran into fighters from Yorktown and Lexington, which proceeded to down nine enemy planes in the ensuing dogfight.
Near twilight, three Japanese planes incredibly mistook Yorktown for their own carrier and attempted to land. The ship's gunfire, though, drove them off, and the enemy planes crossed Yorktown's bow and turned away out of range. Twenty minutes later, when three more enemy pilots made the mistake of trying to get into Yorktown's landing circle, the carrier's gunners splashed one of the trio.
However, the battle was far from over. The next morning, 8 May, a Lexington search plane spotted Admiral Takeo Takagi's carrier striking force-including Zuikaku and Shōkaku. Yorktown planes scored two bomb hits on Shōkaku, damaging her flight deck and preventing her from launching aircraft. In addition, the bombs set off explosions in gasoline storage tanks and destroyed an engine repair workshop. Lexington's Dauntlesses added another hit. Between the two American air groups, the hits killed 108 Japanese sailors and wounded 40 more.
While the American aircraft were attacking the Japanese flattops, Yorktown and Lexington had been alerted by an intercepted message that indicated that the Japanese knew of their whereabouts and prepared to fight off a retaliatory strike, which came shortly after 11:00.
American Combat Air Patrol F4F Wildcats downed 17 aircraft, although some still got through the defenses. Nakajima B5N 'Kates' launched torpedoes from both sides of Lexington's bow, achieving two hits on the port side while Aichi D3A 'Val' dive bombers managed three bomb hits. Lexington began to list from three partially flooded engineering spaces. Several fires raged below decks, and the carrier's elevators were put out of commission.
Meanwhile, Yorktown was having problems of her own. Skillfully maneuvered by her commander, Captain Elliott Buckmaster, the carrier dodged eight torpedoes. Attacked by 'Val' dive-bombers, the ship managed to evade all but one bomb. At 11:27, Yorktown was hit in the center of her flight deck by a single 250 kg (550 lb), semi-armor-piercing bomb which penetrated four decks before exploding, causing severe structural damage to an aviation storage room and killing or seriously wounding 66 men, as well as damaging the superheater boilers which rendered them inoperable. Up to 12 near misses damaged Yorktown's hull below the waterline.
Lexington's damage control parties brought the fires under control, and the ship was still able to continue flight operations despite the damage. The air battle itself ended shortly before noon on the 8th; within an hour, the carrier was on an even keel, although slightly down by the bow. However, an explosion caused by the ignition of gasoline vapors later caused a fire and tore apart her interior. Lexington was abandoned at 17:07, and later sunk by the destroyer Phelps.
The Japanese had won a tactical victory, inflicting comparatively heavier losses on the Allied force, but the Allies, in stemming the tide of Japan's conquests in the South and Southwest Pacific, had achieved a strategic victory. Yorktown had not achieved her part in the victory without cost, and had suffered enough damage to cause experts to estimate that at least three months in a yard would be required to put her back in fighting trim. However, there was little time for repairs, because U.S. naval intelligence had gained enough information from decoded Japanese naval messages to estimate that the Japanese were on the threshold of a major operation aimed at the northwestern tip of the Hawaiian chain. These were two islets in a low coral atoll known as Midway Island.[5]
USS Yorktown (CV-5) - and the Battle of Midway
Armed with this intelligence, Admiral Nimitz began methodically planning Midway's defense, rushing all possible reinforcement in the way of men, planes and guns to Midway. In addition, he began gathering his comparatively meager naval forces to meet the enemy at sea. As part of those preparations, he recalled TF 16, Enterprise and Hornet to Pearl Harbor for a quick replenishment.
Yorktown, too, received orders to return to Hawaii; she arrived at Pearl Harbor on 27 May, entering dry dock the following day. The damage the ship had sustained after Coral Sea was considerable, and led to the Navy Yard inspectors estimating that she would need at least two weeks of repairs. However, Admiral Nimitz ordered that she be made ready to sail alongside TF 16. Further inspections showed that Yorktown's flight elevators had not been damaged, and the damage to her flight deck and hull could be patched easily. Yard workers at Pearl Harbor, laboring around the clock, made enough repairs to enable the ship to put to sea again in 48 hours.[7] The repairs were made in such a short time that the Japanese Naval Air Commanders would mistake Yorktown for another carrier as they thought she had been sunk during the previous battle. However, one critical repair to her power plant was not made: her damaged superheater boilers were not touched, limiting her top speed.[6] Her air group was augmented by planes and crews from Saratoga which was then headed for Pearl Harbor after her refit on the West Coast. Yorktown sailed as the core of TF 17 on 30 May.
Northeast of Midway, Yorktown, flying Vice Admiral Fletcher's flag, rendezvoused with TF 16 under Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and maintained a position 10 miles (16 km) to the northward of him.
Patrols, both from Midway and the carriers, were flown during early June. At dawn on 4th June Yorktown launched a 10 plane group of Dauntlesses from VB-5 which searched a northern semicircle for a distance of 100 miles (160 km) out but found nothing.
Douglas SBD 3 Dauntless scout bomber warming up on USS Yorktown
Douglas SBD 3 Dauntless scout bomber warming up on USS Yorktown in the late morning of 4th June 1942
Meanwhile, PBYs flying from Midway had sighted the approaching Japanese and broadcast the alarm for the American forces defending the key atoll. Admiral Fletcher, in tactical command, ordered Admiral Spruance's TF16 to locate and strike the enemy carrier force.
Yorktown's search group returned at 08:30, landing soon after the last of the six-plane CAP had left the deck. When the last of the Dauntlesses were recovered, the deck was hastily respotted for the launch of the ship's attack group: 17 Dauntlesses from VB-3, 12 Devastators from VT-3, and six Wildcats from 'Fighting Three'. Enterprise and Hornet, meanwhile, launched their attack groups.
USS Yorktown TBD-1 Devastator VT 3 enroute to attack the Japanese carrier force 4th June 1942
Torpedo Squadron Three (VT-3) seen here in Hawaii before battle of Midway May 1942
Squadron pilots, photographed Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, Hawaii, in late May 1942, just before the Battle of Midway. Most of these men lost their lives in that action. Those present include Ensign Carl A. Osberg, USNR; Machinist John R. Baker, USN; Ensign Oswald A. Powers, USNR; Ensign David J. Roche, USNR; Ensign Donald E. Weissenborn, USNR; Radio Electrician Werner I. Weis, USN; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Richard W. Suesens, USNR; Lieutenant Patrick H. Hart, USN, Executive Officer; Lieutenant Commander Lance E. Massey, USN, Commanding Officer; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Curtis W. Howard, USN; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) John N. Myers, USN; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Fred C. Herriman, USNR. Machinist Harry L. Corl, USN; Ensign Wesley F. Osmus, USNR; Ensign Otho W. Schneider, USNR; Ensign John M. Armitage, USNR; Ensign Gerald R. Stablein, USNR; Ensign Leonard L. Smith, USNR; Chief Machinist's Mate John W. Haas, USN; Chief Aviation Pilot Wilhelm G. Esders, USN.
The torpedo planes from the three American carriers located the Japanese striking force, but met disaster. Of the 41 planes from VT-8, VT-6, and VT-3, only six returned to Enterprise and Yorktown; none made it back to Hornet.
As a reaction to the torpedo attack the Japanese CAP had broken off their high-altitude cover for their carriers and had concentrated on the Devastators, flying 'on the deck', allowing Dauntlesses from Yorktown and Enterprise to arrive unopposed.[5]
Virtually unopposed, Yorktown's dive-bombers attacked Sōryū, making three lethal hits with 1,000 pounds (450 kg) bombs and setting her on fire.[8] Enterprise's planes, meanwhile, hit Akagi and Kaga, effectively destroying them. The bombs from the Dauntlesses caught all of the Japanese carriers in the midst of refueling and rearming operations, causing devastating fires and explosions.
Three of the four Japanese carriers had been left burning wrecks. The fourth, Hiryū, separated from her sisters, launched a striking force of 18 'Vals' and soon located Yorktown.
Smoke pours from Yorktown after being hit by Japanese dive bombers at Midway
Smoke pours from Yorktown after being hit in the boilers by Japanese dive bombers at Midway
As soon as the attackers had been picked up on Yorktown's radar at about 13:29, she discontinued fueling her CAP fighters on deck and swiftly cleared for action. Her returning dive bombers were moved from the landing circle to open the area for antiaircraft fire. The Dauntlesses were ordered aloft to form a CAP. An auxiliary 800-US-gallon (3,000 L) gasoline tank was pushed over the carrier's fantail, eliminating one fire hazard. The crew drained fuel lines and closed and secured all compartments.[5]
All of Yorktown's fighters were vectored out to intercept the oncoming Japanese aircraft at a distance of 15 to 20 miles (24 to 32 km) out. The Wildcats attacked vigorously, breaking up what appeared to be an organized attack by some 18 'Vals' and 6 'Zeroes'.[9] 'Planes were flying in every direction', wrote Captain Buckmaster after the action, 'and many were falling in flames.'[5] The leader of the 'Vals', Lieutenant Michio Kobayashi, was probably shot down by the VF-3's commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander John S. Thach. Lieutenant William W. Barnes also pressed home the first attack, possibly taking out the lead bomber and damaging at least two others.[10]
Despite an intensive barrage and evasive maneuvering, three 'Vals' scored hits. Two of them were shot down soon after releasing their bomb loads; the third went out of control just as his bomb left the rack. It tumbled in flight and hit just abaft the number two elevator on the starboard side, exploding on contact and blasting a hole about 10 feet (3 m) square in the flight deck. Splinters from the exploding bomb killed most of the crews of the two 1.1-inch (28 mm) gun mounts aft of the island and on the flight deck below. Fragments piercing the flight deck hit three planes on the hangar deck, starting fires. One of the aircraft, a Yorktown Dauntless, was fully fueled and carrying a 1,000 pounds (450 kg) bomb. Prompt action by LT A. C. Emerson, the hangar deck officer, prevented a serious fire by activating the sprinkler system and quickly extinguishing the fire.
The second bomb to hit the ship came from the port side, pierced the flight deck, and exploded in the lower part of the funnel, in effect a classic 'down the stack shot.' It ruptured the uptakes for three boilers, disabled two boilers, and extinguished the fires in five boilers. Smoke and gases began filling the firerooms of six boilers. The men at Number One boiler remained at their post and kept it alight, maintaining enough steam pressure to allow the auxiliary steam systems to function.
A third bomb hit the carrier from the starboard side, pierced the side of number one elevator and exploded on the fourth deck, starting a persistent fire in the rag storage space, adjacent to the forward gasoline stowage and the magazines. The prior precaution of smothering the gasoline system with carbon dioxide undoubtedly prevented the gasoline from igniting.
While the ship recovered from the damage inflicted by the dive-bombing attack, her speed dropped to 6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph); and then at 14:40, about 20 minutes after the bomb hit that had shut down most of the boilers, Yorktown slowed to a stop, dead in the water.
At about 15:40, Yorktown prepared to get underway; and, at 15:50, thanks to the black gang in No. 1 Fireroom having kept the auxiliaries operating to clear the stack gas from the other firerooms and bleeding steam from No. 1 to the other boilers to jump-start them, Chief Engineer Delaney reported to Captain Buckmaster that the ship's engineers were ready to make 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) or better. Yorktown yanked down her yellow breakdown flag and up went a new hoist-'My speed 5.'[11] Captain Buckmaster had his signalmen hoist a huge new (10 feet wide and 15 feet long) American flag from the foremast. Sailors, including Ensign John d'Arc Lorenz called it an incalculable inspiration: 'For the first time I realized what the flag meant: all of us - a million faces - all our effort - a whisper of encouragement.'[11] Damage control parties were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour, giving her a speed of 19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph) and enabling her to resume air operations.
Simultaneously, with the fires controlled sufficiently to warrant the resumption of fueling, Yorktown began refueling the fighters then on deck; just then the ship's radar picked up an incoming air group at a distance of 33 miles (53 km). While the ship prepared for battle, again smothering gasoline systems and stopping the fueling of the planes on her flight deck, she vectored four of the six fighters of the CAP in the air to intercept the raiders. Of the 10 fighters on board, eight had as little as 23 US gallons (87 L) of fuel in their tanks. They were launched as the remaining pair of fighters of the CAP headed out to intercept the Japanese planes.
USS Yorktown is hit on the port side amidships 4th June 1942
Yorktown is hit on the port side, amidships, by a Type 91 aerial torpedo during the mid-afternoon attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu.
At 16:00, maneuvering Yorktown churned forward, making 20 knots. The fighters she had launched and vectored out to intercept had meanwhile made contact with the enemy. Yorktown received reports that the planes were 'Kates'. The Wildcats shot down at least three, but the rest began their approach while the carrier and her escorts mounted a heavy antiaircraft barrage.
Yorktown maneuvered radically, avoiding at least two torpedoes before another two struck the port side within minutes of each other, the first at 16:20. The carrier had been mortally wounded; she lost power and went dead in the water with a jammed rudder and an increasing list to port.
As the ship's list progressed, Commander Clarence E. Aldrich, the damage control officer, reported from central station that, without power, controlling the flooding looked impossible. The Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Commander John F. Delaney, soon reported that all boiler fires were out, all power was lost, and that it was impossible to correct the list. Buckmaster ordered Aldrich, Delaney, and their men to secure the fire and engine rooms and lay up to the weather decks to put on life jackets.
The list, meanwhile, continued to increase. When it reached 26 degrees, Buckmaster and Aldrich agreed that capsizing was imminent. 'In order to save as many of the ship's company as possible', the captain wrote later, he 'ordered the ship to be abandoned'.
Over the next few minutes the crew lowered the wounded into life rafts and struck out for the nearby destroyers and cruisers to be picked up by their boats, abandoning ship in good order. After the evacuation of all wounded, the executive officer, Commander Dixie Kiefer left the ship down a line on the starboard side. Buckmaster, meanwhile, toured the ship one last time, to see if any men remained. After finding no 'live personnel', Buckmaster lowered himself into the water by means of a line over the stern, by which time water was lapping the port side of the hangar deck.[5]
Rescuing crew members and salvaging equipment before her sinking on 7th June 1942
After being picked up by the destroyer USS Hammann, Buckmaster transferred to the cruiser Astoria and reported to Vice Admiral Fletcher, who had shifted his flag to the heavy cruiser after the first dive-bombing attack. The two men agreed that a salvage party should attempt to save the ship since she had stubbornly remained afloat despite the heavy list and imminent danger of capsizing.
While efforts to save Yorktown had been proceeding apace, her planes were still in action, joining those from Enterprise in striking the last Japanese carrier-Hiryū-late that afternoon. Taking four direct hits, the Japanese carrier was soon helpless. She was abandoned by her crew and left to drift out of control.
Yorktown, as it turned out, floated throughout the night. Two men were still alive on board her; one attracted attention by firing a machine gun, heard by the sole attending destroyer, Hughes. The escort picked up the men, one of whom later died. Buckmaster selected Executive Officer Dixie Kiefer commander of the salvage crew which also included 29 officers and 141 men to return to the ship in an attempt to save her. Five destroyers formed an antisubmarine screen while the salvage party boarded the listing carrier on the morning of 6 June. The fleet tug USS Vireo, summoned from Pearl and Hermes Reef, commenced towing the ship, although progress was painfully slow.
Yorktown's repair party went on board with a carefully predetermined plan of action to be carried out by men from each department-damage control, gunnery air engineering, navigation, communication, supply and medical. To assist in the work, Lieutenant Commander Arnold E. True brought Hammann alongside to starboard, aft, furnishing pumps and electric power.
USS Hammann (DD 412) sinking with stern high after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I 168 6th Jun 1942 80 G 32320
By mid-afternoon, the process of reducing topside weight was proceeding well; one 5-inch (127 mm) gun had been dropped over the side and a second was ready to be cast loose, planes had been pushed over the side, and a large quantity of water had been pumped out of engineering spaces. These efforts reduced the list by about two degrees.
Unknown to Yorktown and the six nearby destroyers, however, Japanese submarine I-168 had discovered the disabled carrier and achieved a favorable firing position. The I-boat eluded detection-possibly due to the large amount of debris and wreckage in the water-until 15:36, when lookouts spotted a salvo of four torpedoes approaching the ship from the starboard beam.
Hammann went to general quarters, with a 20-millimeter gun going into action in an attempt to explode the torpedoes in the water as she tried to get underway. One torpedo hit Hammann directly amidships and broke her back. The destroyer jackknifed and went down rapidly. Two torpedoes struck Yorktown at the turn of the bilge at the after end of the island structure. The fourth torpedo passed astern of the carrier.
About a minute after Hammann sank there was an underwater explosion, possibly caused by the destroyer's depth charges going off. The concussion killed many of Hammann's and a few of Yorktown's men who had been thrown into the water, battered the damaged carrier's hull, dislodged Yorktown's auxiliary generator and numerous fixtures from the hangar deck, sheared rivets in the starboard leg of the foremast, and injured several onboard crew members.[12] The remaining destroyers initiated a search for the enemy submarine (which escaped), and commenced rescue operations for Hammann survivors and the Yorktown salvage crew. Vireo cut the tow and doubled back to assist in rescue efforts.
USS Yorktown capsizing to port and sinking, 7th June 1942
Yorktown capsizing to port and sinking, 7th June 1942
Throughout the night of 6 June and into the morning of 7th June, Yorktown remained afloat; but by 05:30 on 7th June, observers noted that her list was rapidly increasing to port. Shortly afterwards, the ship turned over onto her port side, and lay afloat for several minutes, revealing the torpedo hole in her starboard bilge- the result of the submarine attack. Captain Buckmaster's American flag was still flying.[13] All ships half-masted their colors in salute; all hands who were topside with heads uncovered came to attention, with tears in their eyes. Two patrolling PBYs appeared overhead and dipped their wings in a final salute.[13] At 07:01, the ship rolled upside-down, and slowly sank, stern first, in 3,000 fathoms (5,500 m) of water with her battle flags flying.[5] To most who witnessed the sinking, the Yorktown went quietly and with enormous dignity- 'like the great lady she was,' as one of them put it.[13] In all, Yorktown's sinking on 7 June 1942 claimed the lives of 141 of her officers and crewmen.[14]
Wreck location
On 19 May 1998, the wreck of Yorktown was found and photographed by oceanographer Dr. Robert Ballard, discoverer of the wrecks of the RMS Titanic and the German battleship Bismarck. The wreck of Yorktown, 3 miles (5 km) deep, was sitting upright in excellent condition. Despite spending 56 years on the deep-sea floor, much of her paint and equipment were still visible.[15] A more extensive survey of the wreck was conducted by EV Nautilus in September 2023.[16]
Honors and legacy
Yorktown (CV-5) earned three battle stars for her World War II service, two of them for the significant part she had played in stopping Japanese expansion and turning the tide of the war at Coral Sea and at Midway.[5] CV-10, the second vessel of the Essex-class of aircraft carriers, was renamed from USS Bonhomme Richard to Yorktown in honor of her loss at Midway, and was preserved after decommissioning in 1970 to become a museum ship in 1975.
Awards and decorations
Awards and decorations American Defense Service Medal with 'A' Device
American Campaign Medal Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with 3 stars World War II Victory Medal
Japanese submarine I-168
Assigned to support Operation MI, the planned Japanese invasion of Midway Atoll in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, I-168 was one of 13 submarines that formed the Advance Expeditionary Force. With her repairs completed, she departed Kure, Japan, under Tanabe′s command on 23 May 1942 and headed for Kure Atoll, 48 nautical miles (89 km; 55 mi) west-northwest of Midway, which she reconnoitered on 31 May 1942. On either 1 or 2 June 1942, according to different sources, she arrived off the northwest coast of Midway itself and spent three days observing Midway on the southern horizon through her periscope by day and through binoculars at a range of five nautical miles (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) at night, reporting "unusually frequent patrol aircraft launches," an indication the forces on the atoll had been alerted to the impending Japanese attack. She made her first periscope reconnaissance of Midway′s Sand Island on 2 June, and on 3 and 4 June she circumnavigated Midway, providing weather reports to Combined Fleet headquarters.
The American aircraft carriers deploying to oppose the Japanese invasion had passed through the area of the Japanese submarine patrol line before the submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force arrived on their patrol stations, and - other than I-168, with her vantage point off Midway - none of them made contact with American forces before the Battle of Midway began on 4 June 1942, when aircraft from the Japanese aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū attacked Midway. I-168 observed the Japanese airstrike from her patrol station off the atoll. Later in the morning, U.S. Navy carrier aircraft inflicted fatal damage on Akagi, Kaga, and Sōryū, but Hiryū avoided damage and launched a strike which badly damaged the American aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5). U.S. carrier aircraft subsequently inflicted fatal damage on Hiryū as well. Yamamoto ordered I-168 to bombard the airfield on Midway's Eastern Island until the heavy cruisers Mogami, Mikuma, Kumano, and Suzuya could take over the bombardment from her at 01:00 on 5 June 1942, and then to remain off Eastern Island and report U.S. air activity at Midway subsequent to the bombardment. I-168 surfaced 4,500 yards (4,100 m) off the eastern tip of Eastern Island at around 21:54 on 4 June and proceeded on the surface to Sand Island. At 01:24 on 5 June 1942, she opened fire from a point 1,100 yards (1,000 m) southwest of Midway. She fired six rounds from her 100-millimeter (3.9 in) deck gun, inflicting no damage, before United States Marine Corps searchlights and coastal artillery fire forced her to submerge. The Japanese cancelled the heavy cruiser bombardment that was to have followed.
On the morning of 5 June 1942, Japanese floatplanes from the heavy cruiser Chikuma sighted the crippled Yorktown 150 nautical miles (280 km; 170 mi) north-northeast of Midway. Sources disagree on the subsequent sequence of events: One claims that a U.S. Navy PBY Catalina flying boat attacked I-168 while she was on the surface that day, forcing her to submerge, and that she received orders to intercept and sink Yorktown after resurfacing, but another claims that she already was on her way to intercept Yorktown when the PBY attacked her. Either way, she avoided damage during the aircraft's attack and proceeded toward Yorktown′s reported position.
I-168′s lookouts sighted Yorktown at a distance of 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) at 04:10 on 6 June 1942. She closed the range from a distance of 11 nautical miles (20 km; 13 mi) at 6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph), and at 05:30 sighted the destroyer USS Hammann (DD-412) tied up along Yorktown′s starboard side to provide firefighting and salvage assistance to the carrier, which was under tow by the fleet tug USS Vireo. I-168 sighted destroyers circling 1 nautical mile (1.9 km; 1.2 mi) away at 06:00 and submerged, slowing to 3 knots (5.6 km/h; 3.5 mph) for the final approach through Yorktown's destroyer screen. I-168 remained undetected, but overly cautious use of her periscope resulted in I-168 getting too close to Yorktown on the initial approach, so the submarine circled to starboard to increase the range and then fired a salvo of four torpedoes - two followed three seconds later by two more - either at 13:30 from a range of 1,200 yards (1,100 m) or at 13:31 from range of 1,900 yards (1,700 m), according to different sources. The first torpedo struck Hammann, which sank four minutes later, 81 members of her crew of 241 dying as they struggled in the water when her depth charges exploded after she sank. At 13:32 the second and third torpedoes struck Yorktown on her starboard side below her bridge, and the fourth torpedo missed astern.
After observing the torpedo hits, I-168 descended to 200 feet (61 m) and slowed to 3 knots (5.6 km/h; 3.5 mph) directly under Yorktown. American destroyers began a counterattack at 13:36, when a destroyer passed directly over I-168 and dropped two depth charges. The destroyers USS Gwin (DD-433), USS Hughes (DD-410), and USS Monaghan (DD-354) dropped what I-168′s crew believed to be 60 depth charges before damaging I-168 at 15:30. A depth charge exploding near the bow put out the lights, causing I-168′s emergency lighting to come on; sprung both the outer and inner hatches of No. 1 torpedo tube, causing flooding in the forward torpedo room and maneuvering room; damaged the forward battery room; and reduced I-168′s depth to 60 feet (18 m). Extensive damage to I-168′s battery cells prompted her crew to put on gas masks because of the danger of chlorine gas poisoning, and all unoccupied crewmen grabbed sacks of rice from forward storage and moved them astern to trim the submarine because of the flooding forward.
With her batteries nearly exhausted, I-168 surfaced at 16:40, an hour before sunset, intending to fight it out on the surface if necessary. She sighted Gwin, Hughes, and Monaghan about 5 nautical miles (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) away but they did not detect her, so she ran west on the surface at 14 knots (26 km/h; 16 mph), the best speed she could make, to charge batteries and ventilate her interior spaces. Tanabe transmitted a report to Combined Fleet headquarters claiming to have sunk Yorktown. According to one source, two American destroyers spotted I-168 at a range of 11,000 yards (10,000 m), and commenced firing at her from a range of 6,500 yards (5,900 m) about 30 minutes after sighting her; another source states that a single destroyer engaged her, closing to a range of 5,470 yards (5,000 m) and firing at her intermittently. After her crew completed emergency repairs to one of her electric motors, I-168 submerged and evaded the approaching destroyers. She surfaced again at 20:00, having survived attacks with 40 depth charges over the course of 13 hours.
After conducting emergency repairs, I-168 limped back to Japan using only two engines, a journey of twelve days. Almost out of fuel, she arrived at Yokosuka, Japan, on 19 June 1942. After refueling, she proceeded to Kure, Japan, which she reached the same day. At Kure, a large crowd greeted her, music was played, and dignitaries made speeches. I-168 moved from Kure to Sasebo on 25 or 26 June 1942, according to different sources, and began repairs there.
I-168′s 6 June report of having sunk Yorktown was premature, but Yorktown eventually rolled over and sank in 16,650 feet (5,075 m) of water on the morning of 7 June 1942. One of only two Japanese submarines to make contact with enemy forces during the Battle of Midway and the only one to inflict damage, I-168 sank the only two ships the U.S. Navy lost during the battle, and at the time Yorktown was the largest ship sunk by a submarine during the Pacific campaign of World War II.
USS Lexington (CV-2) - and the attempted raid on Rabaul February 20, 1942
The heavy cruiser San Francisco and two destroyers reinforced the task force on 10 February and Brown rendezvoused with the ANZAC Squadron six days later. Even after emptying Neosho of her oil there was not enough fuel for the ANZAC Squadron to join Brown's proposed raid on Rabaul and they were forced to remain behind. Brown was reinforced by the heavy cruiser Pensacola and two destroyers on 17 February and tasked these ships to bombard Rabaul in addition to the attack by Lexington's aircraft. While still some 453 nautical miles (839 km; 521 mi) northeast of Rabaul, the task force was spotted by a Kawanishi H6K 'Mavis' flying boat on the morning of 20 February 1942. The snooper was detected by Lexington's radar and was shot down by Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Thach and his wingman, but not before it radioed its spot report. Another H6K was vectored in to confirm the first aircraft's report, but it was detected and shot down before it could radio its report. Brown's plan had depended on the element of surprise and he canceled the raid, although he decided to proceed toward Rabaul to lure Japanese aircraft into attacking him.[49]
Defending the Lexington was air group VF-3
The Lexington's air group VF-3 was commanded by Lt. Commander John S. 'Jimmy' Thach
On February 20, 1942, the USS Lexington (CV-2) was part of Task Force 11, commanded by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown. The task force had been operating in the Coral Sea, preparing to raid Japanese positions on Rabaul, located in New Britain, part of the Japanese-controlled Bismarck Archipelago. However, Japanese reconnaissance planes spotted the task force, and the raid was called off due to the high risk of a counterattack. As Task Force 11 withdrew, it came under attack by Japanese aircraft and submarines. The Attack that followed was from Japanese land-based G4M 'Betty' bombers based in Rabaul. A total of 17 G4M 'Betty' bombers approached the task force, with the goal of sinking the carrier. However the Defensive Action put up by the The Lexington's air group, VF-3, commanded by Lt. Commander John S. 'Jimmy' Thach, became a legionary moment. F4F Wildcat fighters were scrambled to intercept the incoming bombers. In a successful defensive action, Thach and his pilots shot down 16 out of the 17 Betty bombers, with only one escaping. The Wildcats used aggressive tactics, including Thach's 'Beam Defense Position,' which later evolved into the famous 'Thach Weave'. The ship’s anti-aircraft batteries also contributed to the defense, preventing any bombs from striking Lexington. The crew’s defense and air cover successfully repelled the attack, keeping the ship unharmed.
Despite fending of the Japanese air attacks the Lexington still had to deal with the Submarine Threat. The Japanese submarine I-19 had been shadowing Lexington and attempted to attack. However, Lexington detected the submarine using her CXAM radar, one of the first operational radar systems in the U.S. Navy. The carrier successfully evaded the torpedoes, and I-19 was driven away by U.S. destroyers in the task force. The Lexington had escaped both the aerial and submarine attacks without damage. The incident demonstrated the effectiveness of early radar technology and fighter cover, both of which became crucial in defending carriers during WWII. The shooting down of 16 bombers by the Wildcats of VF-3 was a significant morale boost for the U.S. Navy during a difficult period early in the war. This engagement highlighted the increasing importance of air power in naval warfare and helped lay the groundwork for carrier-based operations that would dominate the Pacific War.
Rear Admiral Eiji Gotō, commander of the 24th Air Flotilla, launched all 17 of his long-range Mitsubishi G4M1 'Betty' torpedo bombers of the recently activated 4th Kōkūtai, although no torpedoes were available at Rabaul and they made do with a pair of 250-kilogram (550 lb) bombs apiece. To better search for the Americans, the Japanese split their aircraft into two groups and Lexington's radar acquired one of these at 16:25. At this time, the ship was rotating its patrolling aircraft and the newly launched aircraft barely had time to reach the altitude of the Japanese before they arrived. Lexington had 15 fully fueled Wildcats and Dauntlesses on her forward flight deck that had been moved forward to allow the patrolling fighters to land. They represented a serious fire hazard, but they could not be launched until all aircraft on the flight deck were moved aft. Cognizant of the danger, the deck crews succeeded in respotting the aircraft and the fueled aircraft were able to take off before the Japanese attacked.[50] Commander Herbert Duckworth said, 'It was as if some great hand moved all the planes aft simultaneously.'[51] Only four of the nine G4Ms in the first wave survived to reach Lexington, but all of their bombs missed and they were all shot down afterward, including one by a Dauntless. The losses were not all one-sided as they shot down two of the defending Wildcats. The second wave of eight bombers was spotted at 16:56, while all but two of the Wildcats were dealing with the first wave. Lieutenant Edward O'Hare and his wingman, Lieutenant (junior grade) Marion Dufilho, were able to intercept the bombers a few miles short of Lexington, but Dufilho's guns jammed before he could fire a shot. O'Hare shot down three G4Ms and damaged two others before the bombers dropped their bombs, none of which struck the wildly maneuvering carrier. Only three of the G4Ms reached base, as Wildcats and Dauntlesses pursued and shot down several others.[52]
USS Lexington (CV-2) - and the Lae-Salamaua raid
The task force changed course after dark for its rendezvous with the tanker Platte, scheduled for 22 February. One Japanese Aichi E13A 'Jake' floatplane succeeded in tracking the task force for a short time after dark, but six H6Ks launched after midnight were unable to locate the American ships. Brown rendezvoused with Platte and the escorting ANZAC Squadron on schedule and he requested reinforcement by another carrier if another raid on Rabaul was desired.[53] Nimitz promptly responded by ordering Yorktown's Task Force 17, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, to rendezvous with Brown north of New Caledonia on 6 March to allow the latter to attack Rabaul. The initial plan was to attack from the south in the hope of avoiding Japanese search aircraft, but this was changed on 8 March when word was received that Rabaul harbor was empty as the Japanese had invaded Papua New Guinea and all the shipping was anchored off the villages of Lae and Salamaua. The plan was changed to mount the attack from a position in the Gulf of Papua, even though this involved flying over the Owen Stanley Mountains. The two carriers reached their positions on the morning of 10 March and Lexington launched eight Wildcats, 31 Dauntlesses and 13 Devastators. They were the first to attack the 16 Japanese ships in the area and sank three transports and damaged several other ships before Yorktown's aircraft arrived 15 minutes later. One Dauntless was shot down by anti-aircraft fire while a Wildcat shot down a Nakajima E8N floatplane. A H6K spotted one carrier later that afternoon, but the weather had turned bad and the 24th Air Flotilla decided not to attack. Task Force 11 was ordered to return to Pearl and Lexington exchanged six Wildcats, five Dauntlesses and one Devastator for two Wildcats from Yorktown that needed overhaul before she left. The task force arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 March 1942.[54]
The ship was given a short refit, during which her eight-inch gun turrets were removed and replaced by quadruple 1.1-inch (28 mm) anti-aircraft guns. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch assumed command of Task Force 11 on 1 April and it was reorganized to consist of Lexington and the heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans as well as seven destroyers. The task force sortied from Pearl Harbor on 15 April, carrying 14 Buffalos of VMF-211 to be flown off at Palmyra Atoll. After flying off the Marine fighters, the task force was ordered to train with the battleships of Task Force 1 in the vicinity of Palmyra and Christmas Island. Late on 18 April, the training was canceled as Allied codebreakers had figured out that the Japanese intended to invade and occupy Port Moresby and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands (Operation Mo). Therefore, Fitch's ships, acting on a command from Nimitz, rendezvoused with TF 17 north of New Caledonia on 1 May, after refueling from the tanker Kaskaskia on 25 April to thwart the Japanese offensive. At this time, Lexington's air group consisted of 21 Wildcats, 37 Dauntlesses and 12 Devastators.[55]
Air raid on Rabaul by the Lexington Task Force[J98]
The US carrier group that had attacked the Marshall Islands on 1 February consisted of a task force under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher built around the aircraft carrier Yorktown, and a second group based on the carrier Enterprise under the command of Vice Admiral William Halsey. The total strength of the force was two aircraft carriers, three cruisers, and four destroyers.
In response to the incursion by the US task force, the 24th Air Flotilla at Rabaul instigated daily patrols of the waters to the north of the Solomon Islands and the Coral Sea from 5 February using two to four flying boats.[J99] According to postwar investigations, the force that attacked the Marshall Islands had returned to Hawaii at the time of the heightened patrols by the 24th Air Flotilla, with a different force drawing near to Rabaul after having set out from Hawaii on 31 January. This was the above-mentioned task force led by Vice Admiral Brown (hereafter called the Lexington Task Force), with a strength of four heavy cruisers and ten destroyers in addition to Lexington. The sole objective for the offensive planned by Brown was none other than the Japanese-occupied Rabaul. This recommendation was readily approved by Brown’s superior, Vice Admiral Leary.[J100]
The Lexington Task Force proceeded south-west and swept the waters to the north of Fiji and Samoa after passing through the seas to the east of the Phoenix Islands on 8 February. The Japanese forces received intelligence that “an enemy carrier force was proceeding to the Samoa area” on 7 February, but it thereafter disappeared.[J101]
The task force veered to the north, while east of the New Hebrides, on 15 February and proceeded north-west through the waters to the east and north of the Solomon Islands. It was Vice Admiral Brown’s plan to despatch bombers from a position 230 kilometres from Rabaul at 2 am on 21 February. However, the Japanese forces received intelligence that two enemy destroyers had suddenly appeared in the waters near Truk on 19 February. This report proved to be false, but flying boats were despatched from Rabaul during the evening of 20 February to carry out reconnaissance for the enemy destroyers in the rear waters near Truk. The lead plane radioed the following message at 8.30 am before losing communications: “Large enemy force 110 kilometres north-east of Rabaul, heading north-east.”[J102] The 4th Air Corps lifted from Vunakanau airfield at 12.20 am after receiving orders from 24th Air Flotilla command to engage the enemy force.
As the 4th Air Corps was not at full strength at that time, it was unable to put fighters in the air to support the assault group (bomber group), and the bomber’s torpedoes had not even arrived. However, the aircrews had participated in the superb campaigns in the South-West Area at the beginning of the war and were flushed with these successes. They had great confidence in the outcome of the assault using only fixed bombs.
The Lexington Task Force, however, proceeded north observing extremely strict radio silence. At 8.50 am on 20 February, several unidentified aircraft were identified by radar on board Lexington (these were the first fitted in the US navy and could not show altitude). These aircraft were the above-mentioned patrol flying boats. The assault group that had sortied from Rabaul reported the discovery of the enemy carrier force at 2.35 pm and again at 3 pm. The Rabaul base waited expectantly for a report indicating a successful attack. However, two bombers in the first wave of nine were brought down by US fighters before they reached their targets. The other seven were able to drop their bombs, but the carriers took evasive action and were able to avoid any direct hits. Fighters launched from the carriers engaged with the bombers in the skies over the task force. Without an escort of fighters, all in the first wave of Japanese land-based bombers were destroyed. Similarly, three bombers in the second wave of eight were brought down prior to reaching the target, and two more wre brought down immediately after bombing the carrier force.
During the attack, two Japanese bombers damaged by US hits attempted unsuccessfully to ram the carriers. Of the remaining three bombers, only one returned to the Rabaul base, with one ditching into the ocean and the other crash-landing in Simpson Harbour. The Americans lost one pilot and two fighters. Commander Brown, however, fearing the opportunity to bomb Rabaul was lost, abandoned the planned air raid and withdrew without further action. The Japanese had lost 14 land-based bombers, two flying boats, and one reconnaissance seaplane, with the two ditched bombers suffering serious damage. Although the damages were great, the planned air raid on Rabaul had been averted.
Air raid on Salamaua[J103]
Vice Admiral Brown, in the light of the failed air raid on Rabaul, submitted the following proposals to Pacific Fleet Commander Nimitz:
1. At least two carriers should be used in future operations against airbases with the strength of Rabaul;
2. It is essential to increase by two the number of fuel tankers required in operations in warm regions in the tropics owing to increased fuel consumption from the requirement for aircraft to take off at full speed.Nimitz accepted both requests and assigned him Yorktown under Rear Admiral Fletcher, thus forming a mobile force based on two aircraft carriers.
The Lexington Task Force, which had withdrawn to the north-east on 20 February, veered to the west in the waters to the east of Santa Cruz Islands and entered the Coral Sea. It joined the Yorktown group to the south-west of Espiritu Santo soon after it had entered the patrol region of Japanese reconnaissance planes. At that time, there were no suitable targets for air raids other than Rabaul. It was precisely at this time that Japanese forces had landed in the Lae and Salamaua area, presenting a perfect target for air attack by the task force. The problem was whether to take the dangerous course through the Bismarck Sea to launch an assault, or to launch an attack over the 5,000 metre-high Owen Stanley Range from the waters to the south of eastern New Guinea. Suitable nautical charts of the Bismarck Sea for the first option had not been prepared and, furthermore, this would take the carrier force too close to Rabaul. The task force launched an assault group from 80 kilometres off the south coast of eastern New Guinea on 10 March, some 900 kilometres from Rabaul on a line through Lae and Salamaua. By 6.40 am, 104 planes were airborne.
The air raid was a success, with Japanese losses as previously described. The Americans lost only one aircraft and one pilot. [Editor’s note: This differs from the Japanese record of losses.]
The following is taken from the detailed battle report on Tsugaru, which had participated as an escort in this battle: For an offensive operation, there is a necessity for prior discussion concerning the expectation of counter-attack by an enemy force of considerable strength.
The support units, even for this current Lae and Salamaua operation, need to be of sufficient strength concomitant with the powerful Allied task force. Up until that time when Lae and Salamaua have been secured, establishments have been completed, air raid units have been deployed, and the bases can sufficiently demonstrate their functioning strength, there is a necessity for preparations against movements of the enemy into the waters south-east of New Guinea.
[Editor’s note: The main strength of the Japanese mobile carrier fleet, after it had conducted air raids on 5 March against Cilacap (south coast of Java), was at that time in the waters around the Cocos Islands (south of Sumatra) preparing for counter-offensives from the British navy’s Eastern Fleet.]
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Coral Sea begins on the 8th May 1942
USS Lexington in the early morning of 8th May 1942, prior to launching her aircraft during the Battle of the Coral Sea
Preliminary actions
Both Task Forces needed to refuel, but TF 17 finished first and Fletcher took Yorktown and her consorts northward toward the Solomon Islands on 2 May. TF 11 was ordered to rendezvous with TF 17 and Task Force 44, the former ANZAC Squadron, further west into the Coral Sea on 4 May.[56] The Japanese opened Operation Mo by occupying Tulagi on 3 May. Alerted by Allied reconnaissance aircraft, Fletcher decided to attack Japanese shipping there the following day. The air strike on Tulagi confirmed that at least one American carrier was in the vicinity, but the Japanese had no idea of its location.[57] They launched a number of reconnaissance aircraft the following day to search for the Americans, but without result. One H6K flying boat spotted Yorktown, but was shot down by one of Yorktown's Wildcat fighters before she could radio a report. US Army Air Forces (USAAF) aircraft spotted Shōhō[Note 1] southwest of Bougainville Island on 5 May, but she was too far north to be attacked by the American carriers, which were refueling.[59] That day, Fletcher received Ultra intelligence that placed the three Japanese carriers known to be involved in Operation Mo near Bougainville Island, and predicted 10 May as the date of the invasion. It also predicted airstrikes by the Japanese carriers in support of the invasion several days before 10 May. Based on this information, Fletcher planned to complete refueling on 6 May and to move closer to the eastern tip of New Guinea to be in a position to locate and attack Japanese forces on 7 May.[60]
Another H6K spotted the Americans during the morning of 6 May and successfully shadowed them until 1400. The Japanese, however, were unwilling or unable to launch air strikes in poor weather or without updated spot reports.[61] Both sides believed they knew where the other force was, and expected to fight the next day.[62] The Japanese were the first to spot their opponents when one aircraft found the oiler Neosho escorted by the destroyer Sims at 0722, south of the strike force. They were misidentified as a carrier and a cruiser so the fleet carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku launched an airstrike 40 minutes later that sank Sims and damaged Neosho badly enough that she had to be scuttled a few days later. The American carriers were west of the Japanese carriers, not south, and they were spotted by other Japanese aircraft shortly after the carriers had launched their attack on Neosho and Sims.[63]
American reconnaissance aircraft reported two Japanese heavy cruisers northeast of Misima Island in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of New Guinea at 07:35 and two carriers at 08:15. An hour later Fletcher ordered an airstrike launched, believing that the two carriers reported were Shōkaku and Zuikaku. Lexington and Yorktown launched a total of 53 Dauntlesses and 22 Devastators escorted by 18 Wildcats. The 08:15 report turned out to be miscoded, as the pilot had intended to report two heavy cruisers, but USAAF aircraft had spotted Shōhō, her escorts and the invasion convoy in the meantime. As the latest spot report plotted only 30 nautical miles (56 km; 35 mi) away from the 08:15 report, the aircraft en route were diverted to this new target.[64]
Shōhō and the rest of the main force were spotted by aircraft from Lexington at 10:40. At this time, Shōhō's patrolling fighters consisted of two Mitsubishi A5M 'Claudes' and one Mitsubishi A6M Zero. The dive bombers of VS-2 began their attack at 1110 as the three Japanese fighters attacked the Dauntlesses in their dive. None of the dive bombers hit Shōhō, which was maneuvering to avoid their bombs; one Zero shot down a Dauntless after it had pulled out of its dive; several other Dauntlesses were also damaged. The carrier launched three more Zeros immediately after this attack to reinforce its defenses. The Dauntlesses of VB-2 began their attack at 11:18 and they hit Shōhō twice with 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs. These penetrated the ship's flight deck and burst inside her hangars, setting the fueled and armed aircraft there on fire. A minute later the Devastators of VT-2 began dropping their torpedoes from both sides of the ship. They hit Shōhō five times and the damage from the hits knocked out her steering and power. In addition, the hits flooded both the engine and boiler rooms. Yorktown's aircraft finished the carrier off and she sank at 11:31. After his attack, Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Dixon, commander of VS-2, radioed his famous message to the American carriers: 'Scratch one flat top!'[65]
After Shōkaku and Zuikaku had recovered the aircraft that had sunk Neosho and Sims, Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara, commander of the 5th Carrier Division, ordered that a further air strike be readied as the American carriers were believed to have been located. The two carriers launched a total of 12 Aichi D3A 'Val' dive bombers and 15 Nakajima B5N 'Kate' torpedo bombers late that afternoon. The Japanese had mistaken Task Force 44 for Lexington and Yorktown, which were much closer than anticipated, although they were along the same bearing. Lexington's radar spotted one group of nine B5Ns at 17:47 and half the airborne fighters were directed to intercept them while additional Wildcats were launched to reinforce the defenses. The intercepting fighters surprised the Japanese bombers and shot down five while losing one of their own. One section of the newly launched fighters spotted the remaining group of six B5Ns, shooting down two and badly damaging another bomber, although one Wildcat was lost to unknown causes. Another section spotted and shot down a single D3A. The surviving Japanese leaders canceled the attack after such heavy losses and all aircraft jettisoned their bombs and torpedoes. They had still not spotted the American carriers and turned for their own ships, using radio direction finders to track the carrier's homing beacon. The beacon broadcast on a frequency very close to that of the American ships and many of the Japanese aircraft confused the ships in the darkness. A number of them flew right beside the American ships, flashing signal lights in an effort to confirm their identity, but they were not initially recognized as Japanese because the remaining Wildcats were attempting to land aboard the carriers. Finally they were recognized and fired upon, by both the Wildcats and the anti-aircraft guns of the task force, but they sustained no losses in the confused action. One Wildcat lost radio contact and could not find either of the American carriers; the pilot was never found. The remaining 18 Japanese aircraft successfully returned to their carriers, beginning at 20:00.[66]
8th May 1942
View of the flight deck of Lexington, at about 15:00 on 8 May. The ship's air group is spotted aft, with Wildcat fighters nearest the camera. Dauntless dive bombers and Devastator torpedo bombers are parked further aft. Smoke is rising around the aft aircraft elevator from fires burning in the hangar.
On the morning of 8 May, both sides spotted each other about the same time and began launching their aircraft about 09:00. The Japanese carriers launched a total of 18 Zeros, 33 D3As and 18 B5Ns. Yorktown was the first American carrier to launch her aircraft and Lexington began launching hers seven minutes later. These totaled 9 Wildcats, 15 Dauntlesses and 12 Devastators. Yorktown's dive bombers disabled Shōkaku's flight deck with two hits and Lexington's aircraft were only able to further damage her with another bomb hit. None of the torpedo bombers from either carrier hit anything. The Japanese CAP was effective and shot down 3 Wildcats and 2 Dauntlesses for the loss of 2 Zeros.[67]
The Japanese aircraft spotted the American carriers around 11:05 and the B5Ns attacked first because the D3As had to circle around to approach the carriers from upwind. American aircraft shot down four of the torpedo bombers before they could drop their torpedoes, but 10 survived long enough to hit Lexington twice on the port side at 11:20, although 4 of the B5Ns were shot down by anti-aircraft fire after dropping their torpedoes. War correspondent Stanley Johnston, who was on the signal bridge during the battle, noted five torpedo hits on the port side from 11:18 to 11:22.[68] The shock from the first torpedo hit at the bow jammed both elevators in the up position and started small leaks in the port avgas storage tanks. The second torpedo hit her opposite the bridge, ruptured the primary port water main, and started flooding in three port fire rooms. The boilers there had to be shut down, which reduced her speed to a maximum of 24.5 knots (45.4 km/h; 28.2 mph), and the flooding gave her a 6–7° list to port. Shortly afterward, Lexington was attacked by 19 D3As. One was shot down by fighters before it could drop its bomb and another was shot down by the carrier. She was hit by two bombs, the first of which detonated in the port forward five-inch ready ammunition locker, killing the entire crew of one five-inch gun and starting several fires. The second hit struck the funnel, doing little significant damage although fragments killed many of the crews of the .50-caliber machine guns positioned near there. The hit also jammed the ship's siren in the 'on' position. The remaining bombs detonated close alongside and some of their fragments pierced the hull, flooding two compartments.[69]
Fuel was pumped from the port storage tanks to the starboard side to correct the list and Lexington began recovering damaged aircraft and those that were low on fuel at 11:39. The Japanese had shot down three of Lexington's Wildcats and five Dauntlesses, plus another Dauntless crashed on landing. At 12:43, the ship launched five Wildcats to replace the CAP and prepared to launch another nine Dauntlesses. A massive explosion at 12:47 was triggered by sparks that ignited gasoline vapors from the cracked port avgas tanks. The explosion killed 25 crewmen and knocked out the main damage control station. The damage did not interfere with flight deck operations, although the refueling system was shut down. The fueled Dauntlesses were launched and six Wildcats that were low on fuel landed aboard. Aircraft from the morning's air strike began landing at 13:22 and all surviving aircraft had landed by 14:14. The final tally included three Wildcats that were shot down, plus one Wildcat, three Dauntlesses and one Devastator that were forced to ditch.[70]
Battle of the Coral Sea Lexington begins to sink 8th May 1942
USS Lexington (CV-2) blows an aircraft over her side Battle of the Coral Sea 8th May 1942
Another serious explosion occurred at 14:42 that started severe fires in the hangar and blew the forward elevator 12 inches (305 mm) above the flight deck. Power to the forward half of the ship failed shortly afterward. Fletcher sent three destroyers to assist, but another major explosion at 15:25 knocked out water pressure in the hangar and forced the evacuation of the forward machinery spaces. The fire eventually forced the evacuation of all compartments below the waterline at 16:00 and Lexington eventually drifted to a halt. Evacuation of the wounded began shortly afterward and Sherman ordered 'abandon ship' at 17:07. A series of large explosions began around 18:00 that blew the aft elevator apart and threw aircraft into the air. Sherman waited until 18:30 to ensure that all of his crewmen were off the ship before leaving himself. Some 2,770 officers and men were rescued by the rest of the task force. The destroyer Phelps was ordered to sink the ship and fired a total of five torpedoes between 19:15 and 19:52. Immediately after the last torpedo hit, Lexington finally slipped beneath the waves[71] at 15°20′S 155°30′E.[2] Some 216 crewmen were killed and 2,735 were evacuated.[72] 17 SBD Dauntless dive bombers, 13 F4F Wildcat fighters, and 12 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers, 42 planes total, went down with Lexington.[73]
USS Lexington (CV-2) - Ships that Assisted during Sinking
During the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942, the USS Lexington (CV-2) was critically damaged and sank after a series of gasoline explosions. Several ships from Task Force 11 assisted in rescuing her crew and scuttling the carrier to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.
USS Yorktown (CV-5):
The USS Yorktown was the other U.S. carrier in the battle. While it did not directly participate in the rescue operations, it provided air cover and continued to engage Japanese forces, helping to defend the damaged Lexington.
Evacuation and Scuttling:
After suffering severe damage, the Lexington's crew was evacuated by the destroyers, with over 2,700 men saved.
The destroyers, including the Hammann, Morris, and Anderson, played critical roles in ensuring that most of the crew was safely rescued.
The USS Phelps scuttled the carrier, ensuring it did not fall into Japanese hands.
This swift action by the destroyers saved hundreds of lives and prevented the Lexington from being captured by the enemy.A summary of the Battle of the Coral Sea 8th May 1942
Type Japanese United States Ships 1 carrier (Shoho) 1 carrier (Lexington) 1 destroyer 1 oil tanker 4 specialty vessels 1 destroyer Total 6 sunk Total 3 sunk Aircraft 80 66 Personnel Approximately 900 543 On 7–8 May 1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval battle in history in which opposing ships never sighted each other. It was also the first carrier versus carrier battle. The result was a tactical draw, but a strategic victory for the United States in that the Japanese were forced to call off their planned capture of Port Moresby, New Guinea. Both the United States and Japan suffered significant losses, though the battle had a strategic impact that favored the Allies despite the immediate tactical results.
Japanese shipping Losses:
Aircraft Carrier Shōkaku (Damaged): The fleet carrier Shōkaku, one of Japan's largest carriers, was heavily damaged by American dive bombers on May 8, 1942. She took several bomb hits, damaging her flight deck and rendering her unable to launch or recover aircraft. Shōkaku managed to escape and return to Japan for repairs, missing the Battle of Midway as a result.
Japanese destroyer Kikuzuki was sunk on 4th May 1942
The Japanese destroyer Kikuzuki was sunk on May 4, 1942, during the preliminary American air raids against Japanese invasion forces around Tulagi.
Aircraft: Japan lost approximately 69 aircraft (from both Shōhō and Shōkaku) during the battle, with many skilled pilots lost. This depletion of experienced aviators would hurt Japan in later battles.
Troop and Transport Ships (Damaged): Several smaller ships and transport vessels were either sunk or damaged during the early phases of the battle, particularly in air raids on Japanese invasion forces near Tulagi.
American Losses:
Aircraft Carrier USS Lexington (CV-2): The USS Lexington, one of the two American carriers in the battle, was critically damaged on May 8, 1942, by Japanese torpedoes and bombs. Internal gasoline explosions worsened the damage, and the ship had to be abandoned and scuttled. The loss of the Lexington was a significant blow, as she was one of the largest and most important carriers in the U.S. Navy at the time.
Aircraft Carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5) (Damaged): The USS Yorktown, though damaged, was able to continue fighting. She was hit by a bomb during the battle but managed to make emergency repairs and return to Pearl Harbor. The repairs were completed so quickly that she was able to participate in the Battle of Midway only a month later.
Aircraft: The U.S. lost approximately 66 aircraft in the battle, including bombers, fighters, and torpedo planes. Some were lost in combat, while others went down with the Lexington or were lost due to operational accidents.
Strategic Outcome: While Japan achieved a tactical victory in terms of ships sunk, the Battle of the Coral Sea was a strategic victory for the Allies. Japan’s attempt to capture Port Moresby in New Guinea, which would have threatened Australia, was thwarted, and their naval strength was reduced. The damage to the Shōkaku and the loss of experienced aircrews meant that Japan entered the upcoming Battle of Midway with significantly diminished forces, contributing to the decisive American victory there.
Thus, the Coral Sea battle was a turning point in the Pacific, halting Japanese expansion for the first time and shifting momentum to the Allies.
- Flight Simulators
IL-2 Sturmovik 'Cliff's of Dover' Blitz - has no 3D model
IL-2 Sturmovik Battle of Stalingrad - has no 3D model
DCS World - has no 3D model
USN Top Fighter Pilot by Squadron and Leading Commanding Officer including Unit Total Kills Squadron # Nickname Start End A/C Carrier/Base Top Ace (kills w/ sqn) CO (kills w/ sqn) Kills # Aces VF-1 High Hatters Nov-43 Aug-44 F6F Yorktown CV-10 Richard Eastmond (9) B.M. Strean 100 3 VF-2 Rippers Mar-44 Sep-44 F6F Hornet CV-12 Cdr. William A. Dean (10) 240 28 VF-3 Felix the Cat Dec-41 May-42 F4F Lexington CV-2 Butch O'Hare (5) Jimmy Thach 18 1 May-42 Jun-42 F4F Yorktown CV-5 Elbert McCuskey (5) Jimmy Thach 34.5 1 VF-5 Aug-42 Oct-42 F4F Saratoga CV-3 H. M. Jensen (7) Leroy Simpler 78 4 Oct-43 Apr-44 F6F Yorktown CV-10 Robert Duncan (7) Ed Owens (5) 93.5 7 VF-6 Shooting Stars Dec-41 Oct-42 F4F Enterprise CV-6 Donald E. Runyon (8) James S. Gray 63 1 VF-6 Aug-43 Feb-44 F6F various CV's Alexander Vraciu (9) H.W. Harrison 37.5 0 VF-7 Sep-44 Jan-45 F6F Hancock CV-19 Lt. Cdr. L. J. Check (10) 72 2 VF-8 Dec-41 Jun-42 F4F Hornet CV-8 Merrill Cook (2) Sam Mitchell 5 0 Mar-44 Oct-44 F6F Bunker Hill CV-17 Cdr. William Collins (9) 156 13 VF-9 Cat o' Nines Oct-43 Mar-44 F6F Essex CV-9 Hamilton McWhorter (10) Phil Torrey 116 10 est. Mar-45 Jun-45 F6F Yorktown CV-10 Eugene Valencia (23) John S. Kitten 129 10 est. VF-10 Grim Reapers Oct-42 May-43 F4F Enterprise CV-6 Swede Vejtasa (7.25) J.H. Flatley 43 1 Jan-44 Jun-44 F6F Enterprise CV-6 Richard Devine (8) William Kane 88 5 Feb-45 Apr-45 F4U Intrepid CV-11 P. L. Kirkwood (8) Walter E. Clarke 87 7 VF-11 Sundowners May-43 Jul-43 F4F Guadalcanal Charles Stimpson (6) Charles White 52 2 Oct-44 Jan-45 F6F Hornet CV-12 Charles Stimpson (10) E. G. Fairfax 106 5 VF-12 Sep-43 Jun-44 F6F Saratoga CV-3 John Magda (4) R.G. Dose 20 0 Jan-45 Jun-45 F6F Randolph CV-15 Lt. Cdr. Frederick H. Michaelis (5) 51 2 VF-13 Black Cats Jul-44 Nov-44 F6F Franklin CV-13 Albert Pope (7) Wilson Coleman (6) 86 3 VF-14 Iron Angels May-44 Nov-44 F6F Wasp CV-18 William Knight (7.5) R. Gray 146 8 VF-15 Fighting Aces May-44 Nov-44 F6F Essex CV-9 McCampbell, Duncan, Rushing, Strane, Twelves James Rigg (11) 310 26 VF-16 Fighting Airedales Oct-43 Jun-44 F6F Lexington CV-16 Alexander Vraciu (10) Paul D. Buie (9) 136.5 7 VF-17 Jolly Rogers Oct-43 Mar-44 F4U Solomons Ike Kepford (16) Tom Blackburn (11) 152 11 VF-18 Oct-43 Mar-44 F6F Bunker Hill CV-17 Lt. Cdr. Sam Silber (6) 74 1 Aug-44 Nov-44 F6F Intrepid CV-11 Cecil Harris (22) Ed Murphy 176.5 13 VF-19 Satan's Kittens Jul-44 Nov-44 F6F Lexington CV-16 William Masoner Jr. (10) T. Hugh Winters (8) 155 11 VF-20 Aug-44 Jan-45 F6F Enterprise CV-6/etc. Douglas Baker (16.33) Fred Bakutis (7.5) 158 9 VF-21 Feb-43 Jul-43 F4F Guadalcanal Ross Torkelson (6) John Hulme 69 3 Jul-44 Oct-44 F6F Belleau Wood CVL-24 Bob Thomas (5) V. F. Casey 40 1 VF-22 Sep-44 Jan-45 F6F Cowpens CVL-25 Clement Craig (12) Thomas Jenkins 49.5 3 VF-23 Aug-43 May-44 F6F Princeton CVL-23 L.H. Kerr (4.83) H.L. Miller 35 0 VF-26 Apr-44 Oct-44 FM2 Santee CVE-29 Kenneth Hippe (6) Harold Funk 31 1 VC-27 Oct-44 Jan-45 FM2 Savo Island Ralph Elliott (9) P. W. Jackson 61 1 VF-27 May-44 Oct-44 F6F Princeton CVL-23 James Shirley (12) Fred Bardshar (7.5) 134 10 VF-28 May-44 Dec-44 F6F Monterey CVL-26 Oscar Bailey (5) Roger Mehle 55 2 VF-29 Oct-44 Apr-45 F6F Cabot CVL-28 Robert Murray (10.3) William Eder (6.5) 113 12 VF-30 Jan-45 Jun-45 F6F Belleau Wood CVL-24 James Reber (11) Douglas A. Clark 110 7 VF-31 Meat Axers Jan-44 Sep-44 F6F Cabot CVL-28 Cornelius Nooy (19) Bob Winston 165.5 14 VF-32 Outlaw's Bandits Mar-44 Oct-44 F6F Langley CVL-27 Lt. Cdr. Eddie Outlaw (6) 44 2 VF-33 Aug-43 Jan-44 F6F Solomons Frank Schneider (7) Hawley Russell 74.5 3 VF(N)-41 Aug-44 Jan-45 F6F Independence CVL-23 William Henry (9.5) T. F. Caldwell 46 2 VF-42 Dec-41 May-42 F4F Yorktown CV-5 Art Brassfield (4.83) Oscar Pedersen 25 0 VF-44 Crusaders Oct-44 Feb-45 F6F Langley CVL-27 Cdr. Malcolm T. Wordell (7) 47 3 VF-45 Nov-44 May-45 F6F San Jacinto CVL-30 James B. Cain (8) Gordon Schechter 81.5 6 VF-47 Fighting Cocks Mar-45 Aug-45 F6F Bataan CVL-29 Samuel Hibbard (7.33) Albert Clancy 67.5 1 VF-50 Devil Cats Apr-44 Jul-44 F6F Bataan CVL-29 Daniel Rehm (6) J.C. Strange 61 4 VF-51 Apr-44 Nov-44 F6F San Jacinto CVL-30 William Maxwell (7) C. L. Moore 50.5 1 VF-60 Nov-43 Oct-44 F6F Suwanee CVE-27 R. Singleton (3.25) H.O. Feilbach 25 0 VF-72 Jul-42 Oct-42 F4F Hornet CV-8 George Wrenn (5.25) Henry Sanchez 38 1 VF-80 Vorse's Vipers Nov-44 Jan-45 F6F Ticonderoga CV-14 Patrick Fleming (19) Leroy Keith 159.5 10 VF-82 Jan-45 Jun-45 F6F Bennington CV-20 Robert Jennings (7) Edward Hassell 85 5 VF-83 Kangaroos Mar-45 Sep-45 F6F Essex CV-9 Thaddeus Coleman (8) H.A. Sampson 137 11 VBF-83 Mar-45 Sep-45 F4U Essex CV-9 Thomas Reidy (10) Frank Patriarca 91 3 VF-84 Wolf Gang Jan-45 Jun-45 F4U Bunker Hill CV-17 Doris Freeman (7) Roger R. Hedrick 137 4
Naval Base Kitsap Bremerton, Washington Map
USS Yorktown citations notes:
- This allowed the British aircraft carrier Victorious to remain longer in the North Sea and carry out an attack on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway.[106]
USS Yorktown citations:
- Macintyre, Donald, CAPT RN (September 1967). 'Shipborne Radar'. United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
- Parshall, pp. 63–67, Millot, p. 118; Dull, p. 135; Lundstrom (2006), p. 203, Ito, pp. 48–49.
- 'Hiryu Tabular Record of Movement | Imperial Flattops | Nihon Kaigun'. www.combinedfleet.com.
- Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 374–375, 383
- 'Yorktown'. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Navy Department, Naval History and Heritage Command. 7 April 2014.
- Frank, Pat & Harrington, Joseph. Rendezvous at Midway (New York: The John Day Company), 1967. ASIN: B000K6FXAG.
- Zimmerman, Dwight (26 May 2012). 'Battle of Midway: Repairing the Yorktown After the Battle of the Coral Sea'. Defense Media Network. Faircount Media Group.
- 'Soryu (Aircraft Carrier, 1937–1942)'. Online Library of Selected Images: Japanese Navy Ships. Department of the Navy – Naval Historical Center. 21 March 1999.
- Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books. p. 262. ISBN 1-57488-923-0.
- 'William Barnes - Recipient -'. valor.militarytimes.com.
- Lord 1967, pp. 216–217
- 'Hammann I (DD-412)'. public2.nhhcaws.local.
- Lord 1967, pp. 280
- '1942: The Battle of Midway'. CBS News. 3 June 2017.
- 'Titanic explorer finds Yorktown'. CNN. 4 June 1998.
- Rousselle, Christine (5 October 2023). 'Undersea video of lost WWII aircraft carriers provides new clues about their dramatic last moments'. Fox News.
Bibliography:
- Cressman, Robert (2000) [1985]. That Gallant Ship: U.S.S. Yorktown (CV-5) (4th printing ed.). Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company. ISBN 0-933126-57-3. OCLC 14251897.
- Friedman, Norman (1983). U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-739-9.
- Ludlum, Stuart D. (1997). They Turned the War Around at Coral Sea and Midway: Going to War with Yorktown's Air Group Five. Bennington, Vermont: Merriam Press. ISBN 1-57638-085-8.
- Wright, Christopher C. (September 2019). "Question 7/56: Concerning What Radar Systems Were Installed on U.S. Asiatic Fleet Ships in December 1941". Warship International. LVI (3): 192–198. ISSN 0043-0374.
- Lord, Walter (1967). Incredible Victory. New York: Harper and Row. ISBN 1-58080-059-9.
- Ballard, Robert; Archbold, Rick (1999). Return to Midway. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic. ISBN 978-0792276562.
Magazine References: +
- Airfix Magazines (English) - http://www.airfix.com/
- Avions (French) - http://www.aerostories.org/~aerobiblio/rubrique10.html
- FlyPast (English) - http://www.flypast.com/
- Flugzeug Publikations GmbH (German) - http://vdmedien.com/flugzeug-publikations-gmbh-hersteller_verlag-vdm-heinz-nickel-33.html
- Flugzeug Classic (German) - http://www.flugzeugclassic.de/
- Klassiker (German) - http://shop.flugrevue.de/abo/klassiker-der-luftfahrt
- Le Fana de L'Aviation (French) - http://boutique.editions-lariviere.fr/site/abonnement-le-fana-de-l-aviation-626-4-6.html
- Le Fana de L'Aviation (French) - http://www.pdfmagazines.org/tags/Le+Fana+De+L+Aviation/
- Osprey (English) - http://www.ospreypublishing.com/
- Revi Magazines (Czech) - http://www.revi.cz/
Web References: +
- Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexington-class_aircraft_carrier
- Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto
Editor for Asisbiz: Matthew Laird Acred
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